

Supplemental Materials to:  
Encouraging community action against teacher absenteeism:  
a mass media experiment in rural Uganda

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## **Appendix A. Ethical considerations**


We took a number of steps to ensure the appropriateness of our media campaign for the setting in which we work in order to make sure that it was respectful of participants rights and well-being. We worked with a production company that employs Ugandan script-writers and actors and has extensive experience producing and screening public service announcements in Ugandan video halls. The videos were pre-tested by focus groups prior to the launch of experiments in order to confirm that the videos' call for community involvement was culturally appropriate and perceived to be helpful.

## Appendix B. Supplemental figures



**Figure B1.** Excerpts from the teacher absenteeism media campaign.


From top: a boy admits to his father that his teacher has been absent for weeks, and his father pledges to do something about it; two parents discover an absent teacher selling soap in a market and question him about his behaviour; a government official confronts the school's headmaster with the complaint from the PTA members about absenteeism.



**Figure B2.** Timeline of media campaign, midline and endline surveys in field experiment.

Points represent unique visits to villages, either to screen films or to collect data. Colours and the Y axis represent the different treatment conditions, the X axis is ordered by date. The film screenings numbered 1-6 featured the following Hollywood films, in order: Pirates of the Carribean; Slumdog Millionaire; Spy; The Fast and the Furious 7; Creed; and Oz The Great and Powerful.





**Figure B4.** Adult attendance of screenings in field experiment by treatment status.

The horizontal axis presents the films in chronological order. The vertical axis reports the number of adults attending a screening. Points represent a single screening, lines represent LOESS-smoothed average over time and confidence interval. Left panel reports only screenings in control villages, right panel reports attendance in villages assigned to the teacher absenteeism campaign.

## Appendix C. Lab-in-the-field experiment

### *C.1. Assignment and compliance*

Respondents in the lab-in-the-field experiment were assigned to 11 different treatment conditions. Respondents assigned to 10 of these treatment conditions were shown different versions of our video vignettes on violence against women. These respondents serve as the “control” or “placebo” group here. Respondents assigned to the remaining condition were shown the teacher absenteeism video vignettes. The random assignment procedure worked as follows. Each enumerator was allocated a number between 1 and 1000. The enumerator’s number was used as a random number seed to produce a vector with elements equal to the integers from 1 to 11 in random order. The randomly ordered vector was printed on a sheet of paper, alongside the random number seeds used to generate the vector. The paper was handed to the enumerator. Upon beginning an interview, the enumerator entered the first element of the vector that had not been crossed out, as well as the random number seed. The integer determined which video the respondent watched on the tablet. After completion of each interview, the enumerator crossed out the element of the randomly-ordered vector that was used. Once the enumerator completed 11 interviews, he was given a new sheet with another random order that was generated by increasing the random number seed by 1. For example, if an enumerator started with a random order generated by a seed of 166, then he subsequently moved on to a random order generated by a seed of 167. Knowledge of the seeds that an enumerator used thus makes it possible to verify treatment compliance by ordering the interviews for a given enumerator in the sequence in which they were conducted and comparing the videos that respondents were shown to the randomly assigned order that results from the relevant number seeds.

Table C1 shows that compliance was not perfect. 12 respondents who were assigned to one of the violence against women videos were instead shown the teacher absenteeism video. Conversely, 12 respondents who were assigned to the teacher absenteeism video were instead shown one of the violence against women videos. Closer inspection of the order in which enumerators showed videos to respondents reveals that most cases of non-compliance seem to arise because enumerators showed the

wrong video to a respondent in one interview and then “corrected” this mistake by showing the video that would have been the correct one for this interview to the subsequent respondent. As a result of this behavior, all subsequent interviews done by this enumerator assigned the wrong videos.

	<b>Treatment assigned</b>	
<b>Treatment received</b>	$Z = 0$	$Z = 1$
Absenteeism = 0	616	12
Absenteeism = 1	12	49
<b>Total</b>	628	61

**Table C1.** Respondents by treatment assigned and treatment received in lab-in-the-field experiment

Given that non-compliance seems to be primarily a result of such administrative errors, it is very unlikely that non-compliance is related to potential outcomes. Out of an abundance of caution, we nonetheless report results from two-stage least squares instrumental variables regressions in the main text. These regressions use a binary indicator for whether a respondent was assigned to the absenteeism video as an instrument for whether the respondent was indeed shown the absenteeism video. Note that treatment assignment is a very strong instrument for treatment received with a first stage  $F$ -statistic of 231. Moreover, it seems difficult to imagine any way in which treatment assignment would affect outcomes other than through its effect on whether a respondent was shown the teacher absenteeism video. Table C2 shows estimates that result from a less conservative approach that regress the respective outcome on an indicator for whether the respondent was actually shown the absenteeism video. This approach assumes that non-compliance is unrelated to potential outcomes.

	Involve LC1 Chair	Tell village	Use PTA	Assemble group	Index
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
absenteeism	0.123*** (0.051)	0.172*** (0.064)	0.102* (0.064)	0.133** (0.066)	0.132*** (0.036)
Control Mean	0.71	0.5	0.55	0.28	0.51
<i>p</i> -values	0.008	0.004	0.058	0.022	0.000
Hypothesis	upr	upr	upr	upr	upr
Block FE	No	No	No	No	No
Observations	689	689	689	689	689
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.005	0.008	0.002	0.005	0.020

\*\*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \* $p < 0.1$

**Table C2.** Estimated effects of absenteeism videos on conative attitudes among participants of lab-in-the-field experiment – assuming that treatment received is independent of potential outcomes

Estimates stem from a regression of the outcome on an indicator for whether a respondent *received* the absenteeism treatment. Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. *p*-values are based on a normal approximation to the sampling distribution. See the caption of Table 1 for the wording of the outcomes used in columns 1 to 4. The *Index* outcome in column 5 is a simple average of these four outcomes. As per the main specification in our pre-analysis plan for the lab-in-the-field experiment, the analyses shown in this table do not include block fixed effects. The row labeled “Hypothesis” shows the direction of hypothesis tests.

### C.2. Robustness of main results

	Involve LC1 Chair (1)	Tell village (2)	Use PTA (3)	Assemble group (4)	Index (5)
absenteeism	0.130** (0.068)	0.131* (0.083)	0.125* (0.081)	0.096 (0.083)	0.121*** (0.045)
Control Mean	0.71	0.51	0.55	0.28	0.51
<i>p</i> -values	0.028	0.058	0.061	0.124	0.003
Hypothesis	upr	upr	upr	upr	upr
Block FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	689	689	689	689	689
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.006	0.014	0.005	-0.001	0.025

\*\*\*,  $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*,  $p < 0.05$ ; \*,  $p < 0.1$

**Table C3.** Estimated effects of absenteeism videos on conative attitudes among participants of lab-in-the-field experiment: robustness check, controlling for block fixed effects

Estimates stem from instrumental variables regressions that use a binary indicator for whether a respondent was assigned to the absenteeism video as an instrument for whether the respondent was indeed shown the absenteeism video. Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. *p*-values are based on a normal approximation to the sampling distribution. See the caption of table 1 for the wording of the outcomes used in columns 1 to 4. The *Index* outcome in column 5 is a simple average of these four outcomes. The analyses shown in this table includes block fixed effects. The row labeled ‘Hypothesis’ shows the direction of hypothesis tests.

	Involve LC1	Chair	Tell village	Use PTA	Assemble group	Index
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	
absenteeism	0.130** (0.068)	0.115* (0.079)	0.114* (0.082)	0.102 (0.082)	0.119*** (0.043)	
Control Mean	0.71	0.51	0.55	0.28	0.51	
<i>p</i> -values	0.028	0.072	0.083	0.107	0.003	
Hypothesis	upr	upr	upr	upr	upr	
Block FE	No	No	No	No	No	
LASSO covariates	1	6	7	1	5	
Observations	689	689	689	689	689	
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.007	0.042	0.044	0.009	0.064	

\*\*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \* $p < 0.1$

**Table C4.** Estimated effects of absenteeism videos on conative attitudes among participants of lab-in-the-field experiment: robustness check, controlling for LASSO-selected covariates

Estimates stem from instrumental variables regressions that use a binary indicator for whether a respondent was assigned to the absenteeism video as an instrument for whether the respondent was indeed shown the absenteeism video. Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. *p*-values are based on a normal approximation to the sampling distribution. See the caption of table 1 for the wording of the outcomes used in columns 1 to 4. The *Index* outcome in column 5 is a simple average of these four outcomes. The analyses shown in this table includes block fixed effects. The row labeled “Hypothesis” shows the direction of hypothesis tests. Analyses control for covariates selected via least absolute shrinkage and selection operator (LASSO) procedure as specified in our pre-analysis plan. The row ‘LASSO covariates’ shows the number of covariates selected by the LASSO procedure that are included in each regression.

### C.3. Additional analyses

	Parents should act	Community would intervene	Intervention is effective
	(1)	(2)	(3)
absenteeism	-0.038 (0.083)	0.074 (0.084)	0.040 (0.056)
Control Mean	0.67	0.35	0.85
<i>p</i> -values	0.675	0.191	0.234
Hypothesis	upr	upr	upr
Block FE	No	No	No
Observations	689	689	689
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	-0.002	0.002	-0.001

\*\*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \* $p < 0.1$

**Table C5.** Estimated effects of absenteeism videos on on perceived norms and efficacy among participants of lab-in-the-field experiment

Estimates stem from instrumental variables regressions that use a binary indicator for whether a respondent was assigned to the absenteeism video as an instrument for whether the respondent was indeed shown the absenteeism video. Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. *p*-values are based on a normal approximation to the sampling distribution. The outcomes are coded as follows: *Parents should act*: ‘Suppose a teacher is repeatedly absent from school during teaching hours. Which of the following statements comes closest to your view?’ 0 = ‘Parents intervention only leads to conflict and discord. Its better to leave the management of the school to the administrators.’ 1 = ‘Parents should call a meeting of the PTA and hold the school accountable for the teacher’s absence.’ *Community would intervene*: ‘Teachers are often absent during school hours. In some villages, parents wait to get all the facts before taking any action, in order to avoid creating unnecessary conflict. In other villages, the parents immediately come together and confront the headmaster. What is your village like?’ 0 = ‘More like the first villages, where parents wait to get all the facts,’ 1 = ‘More like the second villages, where parents immediately confront the headmaster.’ *Intervention is effective* ‘Some people think that it is hard to organise parents to do something about teacher absenteeism and that anything they achieve will quickly disappear. Other people think that parents can come together over a long stretch of time and reduce absenteeism. Which comes closest to your view?’ 0 = ‘It is hard to organise if parents get together to do something about teacher absenteeism and anything they achieve will quickly disappear,’ 1 = ‘Parents can come together over a long stretch of time and reduce absenteeism.’ As per the main specification in our pre-analysis plan for the lab-in-the-field experiment, the analyses shown in this table do not include block fixed effects. The row labeled “Hypothesis” shows the direction of hypothesis tests.

## Appendix D. Field experiment

### *D.1. Balance on covariates*

We examine balance on observable pre-treatment covariates in the main field experiment, focusing on the subsamples from the midline and endline survey data that are used to estimate the main results. For each covariate in each subsample, we test for a significant relationship to the treatment using randomization inference to conduct a likelihood ratio test. In the tables below, the first column names the covariate and the following seven columns show means of that covariate under the respective treatment conditions. The last column in the table shows the  $p$ -value from the likelihood ratio test. The full model regresses the covariate on the six non-placebo treatment indicators, controlling for block and resample fixed effects. The restricted model regresses the covariate on block and resample fixed effects only. The observed likelihood ratio is compared to 3,000 likelihood ratios simulated under the null of no effect of treatment on the covariate for all units by re-permuting the treatment assignment and re-estimating the likelihood. The  $p$ -value is equal to the proportion of such simulations at least as great as the observed likelihood ratio. Note that  $p$ -values are not adjusted to account for family-wise error rates: under independence, in expectation  $x\%$  of the covariates should exhibit imbalance that is significant at the  $x\%$  level. Balance tables always include all available covariates. The number of covariates included in the balance tables nevertheless varies as a function of whether the tests are conducted among the midline or endline data (different questions were asked in each round). The balance tables can be summarized as follows:

- Table D1 reports balance of 58 covariates across the seven treatment conditions among all respondents in the endline: 3/58 (5%) tests exhibit a  $p$ -value equal to or less than .05.
- Table D2 reports balance of 58 covariates across the seven treatment conditions among all compliers in the endline: 5/58 (9%) tests exhibit a  $p$ -value equal to or less than .05.
- Table D3 reports balance of 95 covariates across the seven treatment conditions among all respondents in the midline: 4/95 (4%) tests exhibit a  $p$ -value equal to

or less than .05.

- Table D4 reports balance of 95 covariates across the seven treatment conditions among all compliers in the midline: 5/95 (5%) tests exhibit a  $p$ -value equal to or less than .05.

The pattern of minor imbalances we see is entirely consistent with the hypothesis of covariates being orthogonal to treatment assignment among the subgroups among which our main effects are estimated.

	PLA	IPV	ABO	ABS	ABO_ABS	IPV_ABS	IPV_ABO	p-value
minority_tribe	0.05	0.12	0.08	0.04	0.10	0.04	0.05	0.01
no_work	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.02
english_christian	0.02	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.05	0.03	0.09	0.04
holy_spirit	0.12	0.08	0.14	0.19	0.13	0.17	0.09	0.08
radius	376.77	432.35	448.73	529.10	504.78	387.11	417.56	0.15
village_official	0.17	0.14	0.10	0.09	0.15	0.12	0.14	0.16
principal	0.31	0.26	0.22	0.21	0.22	0.21	0.26	0.21
illiterate	0.11	0.08	0.16	0.12	0.16	0.16	0.10	0.22
mukiga	0.05	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.09	0.03	0.04	0.22
luganda_lang	0.92	0.93	0.83	0.86	0.81	0.82	0.92	0.23
munyoro	0.08	0.06	0.07	0.07	0.03	0.02	0.08	0.24
household_head	0.51	0.59	0.56	0.56	0.63	0.60	0.56	0.25
minority_lang	0.03	0.03	0.08	0.02	0.06	0.03	0.01	0.25
doctor	0.34	0.37	0.35	0.31	0.30	0.31	0.41	0.25
day	1.30	1.24	1.26	1.32	1.25	1.34	1.24	0.26
survey_luganda	0.98	1.00	0.98	0.99	0.98	0.97	0.99	0.26
female	0.59	0.53	0.54	0.54	0.46	0.55	0.51	0.28
mutooro	0.02	0.02	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.00	0.04	0.28
muslim	0.20	0.21	0.14	0.15	0.15	0.07	0.17	0.28
cooperative	2.72	2.75	2.69	2.72	2.58	2.63	2.70	0.30
teacher	0.60	0.64	0.58	0.59	0.53	0.51	0.58	0.32
highest_grade	6.97	7.09	6.21	6.26	6.22	6.08	6.47	0.33
munyankole	0.08	0.10	0.11	0.07	0.10	0.17	0.10	0.36
write_and_read	0.83	0.87	0.76	0.82	0.80	0.78	0.85	0.38
domestic_work	0.07	0.06	0.05	0.03	0.04	0.03	0.05	0.38
age	35.16	34.61	33.91	34.79	35.16	35.44	34.14	0.40
atheist	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.41
catholic	0.40	0.41	0.42	0.44	0.43	0.52	0.38	0.44
christian_only	0.18	0.13	0.16	0.12	0.12	0.11	0.16	0.45
write_only	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.05	0.03	0.05	0.03	0.47
university	0.07	0.04	0.04	0.03	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.50
education_work	0.04	0.03	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.52
manual_work	0.09	0.08	0.04	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.53
other_work	0.04	0.05	0.07	0.04	0.04	0.06	0.04	0.53
mufumbira_tribe	0.03	0.01	0.03	0.09	0.05	0.07	0.01	0.55
village_official_fam	0.28	0.32	0.32	0.35	0.30	0.30	0.37	0.56
mobile_phone_use	3.41	3.33	3.19	3.34	3.29	3.42	3.46	0.58
read_only	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.61
police	0.26	0.28	0.28	0.22	0.24	0.22	0.23	0.62
fumbira_lang	0.03	0.01	0.03	0.08	0.06	0.06	0.02	0.63
runyankole_lang	0.02	0.03	0.07	0.03	0.06	0.10	0.04	0.65
not_married	0.13	0.17	0.15	0.14	0.13	0.16	0.12	0.70
religious_service	1.82	1.84	1.42	1.35	1.61	1.22	1.39	0.70

judge	0.13	0.09	0.10	0.09	0.12	0.10	0.11	0.72
munyarwanda	0.09	0.09	0.16	0.11	0.09	0.13	0.11	0.74
official	0.20	0.21	0.20	0.16	0.17	0.18	0.18	0.78
married	0.54	0.53	0.55	0.53	0.58	0.48	0.54	0.79
muganda.tribe	0.60	0.57	0.48	0.56	0.50	0.53	0.57	0.81
separated	0.13	0.14	0.13	0.13	0.12	0.17	0.13	0.84
transport_work	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.03	0.02	0.03	0.04	0.85
other_person	0.09	0.08	0.08	0.06	0.06	0.08	0.07	0.85
retail_work	0.09	0.09	0.10	0.11	0.06	0.11	0.10	0.89
living_conditions_compared	2.04	2.05	1.97	2.05	2.08	1.99	2.02	0.90
living_as_married	0.20	0.16	0.17	0.20	0.17	0.19	0.21	0.92
frequency_discussion	1.45	1.43	1.52	1.45	1.51	1.46	1.46	0.98
clergy	0.50	0.53	0.49	0.52	0.52	0.52	0.52	0.98
agriculture_work	0.60	0.60	0.62	0.64	0.66	0.61	0.62	0.99
hospitality_work	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.05	0.99

Table D1.: Balance on covariates with all combinations of treatment conditions among all respondents in Endline.

	PLA	IPV	ABO	ABS	ABO_ABS	IPV_ABS	IPV_ABO	p-value
minority_tribe	0.05	0.15	0.08	0.04	0.13	0.03	0.03	0.00
no_work	0.00	0.00	0.03	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
english_christian	0.03	0.07	0.07	0.08	0.08	0.06	0.17	0.02
minority_lang	0.03	0.04	0.09	0.02	0.05	0.03	0.00	0.05
doctor	0.37	0.32	0.36	0.31	0.34	0.25	0.43	0.05
village_official	0.16	0.12	0.07	0.09	0.16	0.12	0.18	0.06
atheist	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.08
age	29.95	29.49	28.92	30.03	31.28	31.82	29.95	0.09
principal	0.36	0.23	0.21	0.22	0.21	0.21	0.23	0.09
radius	379.82	457.81	471.23	554.79	512.57	381.56	439.31	0.09
munyarwanda	0.07	0.09	0.19	0.11	0.08	0.15	0.10	0.16
catholic	0.46	0.43	0.47	0.49	0.44	0.58	0.39	0.16
university	0.06	0.05	0.03	0.04	0.07	0.01	0.02	0.17
police	0.31	0.32	0.36	0.24	0.28	0.23	0.21	0.17
luganda_lang	0.91	0.93	0.85	0.86	0.86	0.82	0.96	0.20
munyankole	0.09	0.10	0.12	0.06	0.08	0.19	0.11	0.22
cooperative	2.77	2.83	2.73	2.79	2.60	2.67	2.77	0.23
munyoro	0.07	0.05	0.09	0.07	0.02	0.02	0.08	0.24
teacher	0.63	0.65	0.57	0.62	0.54	0.50	0.62	0.27
highest_grade	7.15	7.59	6.45	7.00	7.07	6.16	6.94	0.28
write_only	0.05	0.02	0.06	0.04	0.02	0.05	0.02	0.28
education_work	0.05	0.05	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.29
domestic_work	0.05	0.03	0.05	0.01	0.04	0.02	0.04	0.32
mobile_phone_use	3.55	3.27	3.26	3.53	3.45	3.46	3.59	0.33
runyankole_lang	0.03	0.02	0.05	0.02	0.04	0.12	0.03	0.34
holy_spirit	0.08	0.06	0.11	0.13	0.13	0.10	0.08	0.36
other_person	0.04	0.08	0.08	0.03	0.05	0.08	0.08	0.36
survey_luganda	0.99	0.99	0.99	0.99	0.99	0.97	1.00	0.38
mukiga	0.04	0.03	0.02	0.05	0.09	0.03	0.03	0.40
manual_work	0.09	0.11	0.04	0.10	0.09	0.09	0.11	0.40
write_and_read	0.80	0.88	0.79	0.88	0.84	0.80	0.88	0.45
mutooro	0.01	0.03	0.03	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.03	0.45
separated	0.08	0.09	0.04	0.05	0.08	0.10	0.09	0.50
day	1.24	1.26	1.20	1.30	1.30	1.36	1.22	0.52
not_married	0.18	0.23	0.22	0.17	0.16	0.25	0.20	0.54
illiterate	0.11	0.08	0.12	0.07	0.13	0.14	0.08	0.54

muganda_tribe	0.64	0.53	0.46	0.55	0.54	0.53	0.61	0.54
living_conditions_compared	1.90	1.88	1.84	2.01	2.00	1.82	1.86	0.54
hospitality_work	0.04	0.06	0.03	0.03	0.06	0.04	0.06	0.56
other_work	0.04	0.07	0.07	0.04	0.05	0.08	0.07	0.56
religious_service	2.25	2.30	1.23	1.05	1.77	1.22	1.22	0.56
female	0.31	0.30	0.29	0.27	0.30	0.38	0.30	0.57
official	0.26	0.26	0.24	0.24	0.17	0.18	0.20	0.57
transport_work	0.07	0.05	0.07	0.06	0.04	0.05	0.08	0.58
married	0.48	0.50	0.54	0.53	0.57	0.44	0.50	0.59
christian_only	0.02	0.02	0.05	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.01	0.61
muslim	0.23	0.19	0.14	0.16	0.16	0.07	0.17	0.65
mufumbira_tribe	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.11	0.04	0.04	0.01	0.68
village_official_fam	0.36	0.38	0.35	0.41	0.34	0.26	0.36	0.69
fumbira_lang	0.04	0.01	0.01	0.10	0.05	0.03	0.01	0.71
judge	0.12	0.09	0.08	0.10	0.13	0.09	0.09	0.75
living_as_married	0.26	0.19	0.20	0.25	0.19	0.21	0.21	0.76
agriculture_work	0.57	0.55	0.60	0.65	0.62	0.62	0.53	0.77
clergy	0.57	0.53	0.47	0.49	0.52	0.53	0.49	0.81
read_only	0.04	0.02	0.03	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.83
household_head	0.65	0.68	0.67	0.66	0.72	0.67	0.70	0.84
frequency_discussion	1.61	1.48	1.65	1.49	1.60	1.63	1.55	0.91
retail_work	0.09	0.06	0.11	0.09	0.08	0.08	0.10	0.96

Table D2.: Balance on covariates with all combinations of treatment conditions among compliers in Endline.

	PLA	IPV	ABO	ABS	ABO_ABS	IPV_ABS	IPV_ABO	p-value
living_standard	1.15	1.05	1.07	1.17	1.08	0.96	1.07	0.01
living_conditions	0.13	0.09	0.08	0.17	0.03	0.07	0.03	0.02
english_christian	0.07	0.08	0.09	0.09	0.10	0.07	0.14	0.03
education_work	0.06	0.04	0.03	0.05	0.02	0.04	0.04	0.03
misc_floor	0.08	0.08	0.15	0.13	0.14	0.11	0.16	0.07
mutooro	0.02	0.01	0.04	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.07
minority_lang	0.03	0.02	0.09	0.02	0.06	0.03	0.03	0.08
not_married	0.15	0.16	0.15	0.17	0.14	0.18	0.12	0.10
minority_tribe	0.07	0.09	0.05	0.07	0.06	0.04	0.07	0.13
living_standard_children	1.60	1.54	1.57	1.55	1.52	1.46	1.54	0.14
highest_grade	7.49	7.43	6.90	7.00	6.34	6.72	6.77	0.14
no_work	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.16
muslim	0.20	0.20	0.14	0.15	0.14	0.09	0.16	0.17
job_kampala	0.94	0.93	0.96	0.93	0.94	0.95	0.95	0.17
luganda_lang	0.92	0.93	0.82	0.84	0.82	0.80	0.90	0.17
catholic	0.40	0.42	0.42	0.47	0.46	0.51	0.40	0.18
living_conditions_compared	2.25	2.22	2.17	2.27	2.09	2.18	2.16	0.18
cement_floor	0.69	0.62	0.55	0.57	0.45	0.54	0.54	0.19
minority_religion	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.20
religious_service	1.92	1.82	1.66	1.33	1.46	1.21	1.57	0.20
age	31.25	31.11	30.73	31.66	32.05	31.90	31.49	0.20
mukiga	0.04	0.03	0.06	0.02	0.08	0.05	0.03	0.21
rooms	2.64	2.66	2.60	2.92	2.73	2.59	2.59	0.22
stone_wall	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.06	0.03	0.23
chair	0.88	0.87	0.85	0.90	0.88	0.85	0.85	0.24
sofa	0.33	0.27	0.23	0.27	0.22	0.23	0.26	0.24
living_as_married	0.39	0.35	0.44	0.36	0.35	0.39	0.43	0.25
munyoro	0.09	0.05	0.08	0.07	0.05	0.03	0.06	0.25
female	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.49	0.49	0.49	0.27

earth.floor	0.23	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.40	0.35	0.30	0.28
tv	0.33	0.29	0.23	0.31	0.21	0.24	0.22	0.28
electric.light	0.29	0.25	0.17	0.26	0.14	0.17	0.16	0.30
illiterate	0.10	0.09	0.13	0.11	0.14	0.13	0.11	0.32
cement.wall	0.11	0.07	0.09	0.10	0.06	0.10	0.10	0.34
other.work	0.05	0.06	0.04	0.04	0.03	0.04	0.03	0.38
survey.luganda	0.96	0.98	0.97	0.94	0.94	0.93	0.97	0.38
brick.wall	0.63	0.67	0.57	0.61	0.58	0.54	0.57	0.39
write.and.read	0.82	0.85	0.79	0.81	0.77	0.79	0.82	0.39
runyannkole.lang	0.02	0.03	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.12	0.06	0.40
pray.private	8.03	8.10	7.99	8.19	8.09	8.03	7.99	0.41
members	4.53	4.61	4.39	4.72	4.58	4.31	4.54	0.42
village.official	0.08	0.07	0.09	0.08	0.09	0.06	0.10	0.42
married	0.36	0.39	0.33	0.36	0.40	0.32	0.35	0.43
separated	0.09	0.10	0.08	0.12	0.11	0.12	0.10	0.47
household.younger	3.03	3.11	2.92	3.22	3.11	2.88	3.07	0.47
other.person	0.10	0.09	0.08	0.11	0.09	0.07	0.08	0.48
close.relatives	0.89	0.89	0.86	0.89	0.87	0.83	0.88	0.48
household.children	2.40	2.41	2.28	2.52	2.49	2.25	2.41	0.49
transport.work	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.04	0.03	0.51
manual.work	0.09	0.06	0.07	0.06	0.08	0.07	0.07	0.51
share.house	0.30	0.34	0.30	0.26	0.24	0.31	0.28	0.52
charcoal.fuel	0.51	0.47	0.43	0.38	0.37	0.38	0.41	0.53
kerosene.light	0.20	0.25	0.30	0.24	0.29	0.24	0.28	0.54
witchcraft	1.28	1.19	1.25	1.23	1.24	1.27	1.25	0.55
cellphone	0.83	0.82	0.78	0.81	0.77	0.80	0.78	0.55
household.other	0.08	0.09	0.07	0.08	0.06	0.07	0.05	0.55
single.hut	0.61	0.58	0.61	0.62	0.68	0.59	0.62	0.56
household.spouse	0.36	0.35	0.37	0.35	0.36	0.34	0.38	0.56
several.huts	0.09	0.08	0.09	0.12	0.08	0.10	0.09	0.58
protestant	0.16	0.16	0.17	0.12	0.14	0.15	0.15	0.59
university	0.08	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.05	0.06	0.05	0.59
munyankole	0.08	0.10	0.14	0.11	0.13	0.17	0.13	0.59
household.older	0.50	0.51	0.47	0.50	0.46	0.43	0.47	0.60
fumbira.lang	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.07	0.05	0.05	0.01	0.60
living.conditions.tribe	-0.08	-0.08	0.01	-0.07	-0.09	-0.10	-0.08	0.64
mufumbira.tribe	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.06	0.05	0.05	0.02	0.68
firewood.fuel	0.47	0.51	0.55	0.59	0.61	0.59	0.56	0.69
domestic.work	0.04	0.05	0.05	0.03	0.04	0.04	0.05	0.69
misc.wall	0.01	0.02	0.06	0.02	0.04	0.04	0.05	0.72
atheist	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.73
mobile.phone.use	3.33	3.34	3.18	3.28	3.16	3.29	3.18	0.73
christian.only	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.74
misc.light	0.08	0.08	0.07	0.06	0.07	0.09	0.09	0.75
day	1.24	1.21	1.24	1.25	1.27	1.26	1.21	0.75
travel.big.city	0.75	0.77	0.75	0.73	0.75	0.79	0.76	0.76
solar.light	0.29	0.28	0.34	0.32	0.37	0.36	0.32	0.77
misc.fuel	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.77
mud.wall	0.21	0.20	0.25	0.23	0.29	0.25	0.25	0.78
frequency.discussion	1.80	1.73	1.84	1.79	1.80	1.80	1.78	0.78
munyarwanda	0.11	0.10	0.10	0.12	0.13	0.13	0.09	0.79
agriculture.work	0.52	0.53	0.60	0.59	0.62	0.57	0.60	0.80
muganda.tribe	0.56	0.59	0.52	0.54	0.50	0.53	0.58	0.83
number.children	3.82	3.89	3.88	4.03	4.21	3.96	4.00	0.84
radio	0.81	0.83	0.81	0.83	0.81	0.80	0.82	0.86
same.village	0.40	0.37	0.35	0.40	0.38	0.36	0.39	0.86
holy.spirit	0.15	0.13	0.14	0.16	0.14	0.15	0.12	0.88

village_official_fam	0.25	0.27	0.25	0.26	0.26	0.25	0.23	0.89
write_only	0.04	0.04	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.04	0.89
dist.to.video.hall	597.48	928.32	587.05	1021.48	1073.73	1323.52	559.16	0.91
men.beaten	1.55	1.52	1.43	1.47	1.47	1.61	1.47	0.92
read_only	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.92
household.head	0.56	0.57	0.56	0.57	0.58	0.59	0.56	0.93
retail_work	0.14	0.16	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.14	0.13	0.97
motor_cycle	0.27	0.27	0.25	0.27	0.26	0.25	0.26	0.98
hospitality_work	0.05	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.05	0.99

Table D3.: Balance on covariates with all combinations of treatment conditions among all respondents in Midline.

	PLA	IPV	ABO	ABS	ABO_ABS	IPV_ABS	IPV_ABO	p-value
living_standard_children	1.57	1.32	1.55	1.58	1.63	1.35	1.55	0.01
english_christian	0.03	0.06	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.06	0.19	0.01
minority_tribe	0.09	0.17	0.08	0.07	0.08	0.03	0.04	0.01
cellphone	0.87	0.74	0.72	0.86	0.80	0.76	0.80	0.03
no_work	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.04
atheist	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.07
motor_cycle	0.22	0.20	0.21	0.32	0.21	0.21	0.16	0.07
misc_floor	0.09	0.09	0.21	0.14	0.19	0.12	0.20	0.08
munyankole	0.07	0.10	0.09	0.04	0.10	0.18	0.13	0.09
protestant	0.21	0.23	0.16	0.10	0.16	0.14	0.16	0.11
minority_lang	0.03	0.04	0.08	0.02	0.05	0.03	0.01	0.11
dist.to.video.hall	429.37	254.12	297.63	240.32	1213.80	211.40	232.31	0.11
living_standard	1.13	1.03	1.03	1.21	1.03	0.95	0.99	0.12
munyarwanda	0.08	0.04	0.17	0.12	0.10	0.16	0.09	0.12
highest_grade	7.37	7.66	6.45	7.09	7.06	6.18	6.92	0.13
university	0.07	0.05	0.03	0.04	0.06	0.01	0.02	0.13
kerosene_light	0.16	0.33	0.35	0.24	0.31	0.30	0.37	0.16
tv	0.29	0.14	0.14	0.24	0.18	0.15	0.20	0.16
rooms	2.49	2.34	2.25	2.54	2.72	2.54	2.33	0.18
cement_floor	0.69	0.51	0.43	0.56	0.44	0.49	0.50	0.19
age	28.70	28.51	27.96	28.59	30.10	30.44	28.83	0.19
luganda_lang	0.91	0.93	0.86	0.86	0.84	0.80	0.94	0.19
education_work	0.08	0.06	0.02	0.03	0.01	0.03	0.04	0.19
stone_wall	0.02	0.01	0.04	0.04	0.03	0.06	0.03	0.20
electric_light	0.26	0.12	0.11	0.14	0.07	0.07	0.11	0.20
misc_wall	0.01	0.04	0.09	0.01	0.02	0.07	0.07	0.23
mobile_phone_use	3.49	3.12	3.06	3.43	3.28	3.12	3.29	0.24
earth_floor	0.22	0.40	0.36	0.31	0.37	0.39	0.31	0.26
munyoro	0.09	0.03	0.06	0.07	0.02	0.03	0.07	0.31
living_conditions	0.13	-0.02	0.01	0.11	0.06	0.04	-0.10	0.31
catholic	0.44	0.44	0.48	0.49	0.45	0.55	0.39	0.32
holy_spirit	0.09	0.06	0.12	0.14	0.12	0.13	0.08	0.32
sofa	0.26	0.14	0.13	0.21	0.15	0.19	0.17	0.33
write_and_read	0.81	0.88	0.79	0.88	0.85	0.81	0.87	0.34
frequency_discussion	1.88	1.68	1.94	1.73	1.94	1.79	1.82	0.35
mukiga	0.03	0.02	0.06	0.03	0.10	0.04	0.03	0.35
write_only	0.05	0.02	0.06	0.04	0.02	0.05	0.02	0.36
read_only	0.05	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.37
married	0.33	0.36	0.34	0.37	0.41	0.30	0.25	0.38
living_as_married	0.37	0.31	0.40	0.35	0.33	0.37	0.47	0.38
other_work	0.05	0.07	0.05	0.03	0.01	0.03	0.02	0.38
charcoal_fuel	0.53	0.50	0.35	0.36	0.38	0.32	0.42	0.39

firewood_fuel	0.42	0.46	0.62	0.59	0.59	0.65	0.55	0.40
living_conditions_tribe	-0.03	-0.15	-0.01	-0.08	-0.13	-0.10	-0.25	0.40
runyankole_lang	0.02	0.02	0.05	0.03	0.05	0.13	0.04	0.42
illiterate	0.10	0.07	0.13	0.06	0.12	0.13	0.08	0.43
domestic_work	0.02	0.01	0.03	0.01	0.03	0.01	0.04	0.43
solar_light	0.32	0.31	0.31	0.42	0.40	0.36	0.26	0.46
chair	0.84	0.86	0.82	0.89	0.87	0.82	0.87	0.48
pray_private	7.71	8.09	8.01	7.92	8.00	7.88	7.71	0.49
misc_light	0.10	0.08	0.09	0.05	0.10	0.10	0.09	0.49
brick_wall	0.71	0.64	0.54	0.65	0.57	0.54	0.56	0.50
witchcraft	1.38	1.25	1.31	1.32	1.22	1.34	1.23	0.51
single_hut	0.57	0.58	0.62	0.65	0.69	0.65	0.60	0.54
other_person	0.05	0.08	0.08	0.09	0.05	0.03	0.07	0.54
religious_service	2.08	2.22	1.24	1.04	1.70	1.22	1.21	0.56
muslim	0.22	0.18	0.13	0.17	0.16	0.08	0.17	0.60
number_children	2.98	3.17	3.23	3.08	3.63	3.63	3.20	0.60
christian_only	0.02	0.02	0.04	0.02	0.01	0.03	0.01	0.62
female	0.28	0.29	0.31	0.27	0.31	0.38	0.30	0.62
household_older	0.39	0.34	0.42	0.41	0.34	0.37	0.45	0.62
fumbira_lang	0.03	0.01	0.01	0.09	0.05	0.04	0.01	0.62
same_village	0.51	0.42	0.46	0.49	0.53	0.45	0.46	0.63
men_beaten	1.77	1.82	1.92	1.39	1.63	1.80	1.65	0.64
agriculture_work	0.53	0.56	0.61	0.66	0.68	0.62	0.64	0.66
mufumbira_tribe	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.09	0.04	0.04	0.01	0.67
job_kampala	0.94	0.95	0.94	0.92	0.96	0.96	0.95	0.69
share_house	0.32	0.33	0.31	0.26	0.25	0.25	0.32	0.69
household_other	0.12	0.11	0.09	0.08	0.07	0.08	0.10	0.69
transport_work	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.06	0.03	0.06	0.08	0.70
radio	0.82	0.85	0.77	0.84	0.85	0.83	0.83	0.74
manual_work	0.10	0.06	0.07	0.06	0.09	0.09	0.06	0.74
minority_religion	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.76
mud_wall	0.21	0.24	0.26	0.22	0.32	0.25	0.28	0.78
several_huts	0.12	0.09	0.08	0.09	0.06	0.10	0.09	0.79
village_official_fam	0.25	0.29	0.24	0.29	0.26	0.22	0.22	0.79
not_married	0.23	0.24	0.18	0.22	0.19	0.24	0.20	0.80
muganda_tribe	0.62	0.59	0.51	0.56	0.53	0.50	0.60	0.80
hospitality_work	0.05	0.08	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.06	0.05	0.80
day	1.24	1.16	1.17	1.22	1.25	1.25	1.25	0.84
mutooro	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.84
separated	0.06	0.09	0.08	0.06	0.07	0.09	0.08	0.85
travel_big_city	0.81	0.80	0.80	0.78	0.82	0.84	0.80	0.86
misc_fuel	0.05	0.04	0.04	0.05	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.87
household_spouse	0.22	0.21	0.25	0.27	0.23	0.26	0.23	0.87
village_official	0.12	0.12	0.10	0.09	0.11	0.08	0.13	0.91
household_head	0.65	0.68	0.65	0.65	0.70	0.66	0.67	0.92
retail_work	0.13	0.10	0.11	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.07	0.92
survey_luganda	0.95	0.96	0.97	0.98	0.96	0.95	0.98	0.92
close_relatives	0.86	0.91	0.89	0.88	0.87	0.87	0.90	0.93
household_children	2.00	1.99	1.94	2.12	2.15	2.19	2.00	0.94
cement_wall	0.06	0.06	0.07	0.08	0.05	0.08	0.06	0.96
living_conditions_compared	2.08	1.97	2.05	2.07	2.06	2.08	2.04	0.96
household_younger	2.64	2.66	2.64	2.76	2.84	2.84	2.61	0.97
members	4.03	4.00	4.06	4.16	4.18	4.21	4.07	0.99

Table D4.: Balance on covariates among compliers with all combinations of treatment conditions in Midline.

## D.2. Distribution of main conative attitude outcomes

	Involve LC1 Chair	Tell village	Use PTA	Assemble group
Find a tutor	0.82	0.55	0.54	0.40
Ask headmaster	0.79	0.58	0.71	0.34
Wait	0.46	0.44	0.40	0.23
Neighbouring village	0.83	0.63	0.61	0.31

**Table D5.** Conative attitudes among compliers in field experiment - Endline, control group (N = 567)

	Involve LC1 Chair	Tell village	Use PTA	Assemble group
Find a tutor	0.84	0.67	0.63	0.44
Ask headmaster	0.85	0.71	0.69	0.45
Wait	0.65	0.49	0.41	0.23
Neighbouring village	0.81	0.61	0.66	0.31

**Table D6.** Conative attitudes among compliers in field experiment - Endline, treatment group (N = 474)

Entries are means for compliers. Outcomes are based on questions that ask respondents which of two actions they prefer to take upon finding out that their child's teacher has been absent for two days this week. Each respondent was asked to make four decisions, each of which involved a choice between two options. In each pair of options, one option involved active intervention, while the other option implied inaction. Different respondents were randomly assigned to be faced with different pairs of options. The randomisation was restricted in the following ways: Each pair contained an active and a passive option. Respondents were never asked twice about the same action and the order of the active options remained constant. The active actions coded 1 are as follows: *Involve LC1 Chair*: 'Tell the LC1 chairperson to investigate why the headmaster has allowed this problem to occur.' *Tell village*: 'Bring it up in the village meeting'. *Use PTA*: 'Immediately begin organising a PTA meeting, even if you know this might start some trouble'. *Assemble group*: 'Assemble a group of parents and confront the teacher'. The four passive actions coded 0 are as follows: 'Find a tutor to instruct your child until the teacher comes back', 'Ask the headmaster to put your child into a different classroom until the teacher returns', 'Wait another few days to see if the problem corrects itself', 'Send your child to a school in the neighbouring village, where the teachers always come to class'. Each table shows the proportion of compliers choosing the 'active' option (columns), by 'passive' option offered (rows).

	Involve LC1 Chair	Tell village	Use PTA	Assemble group
Find a tutor	0.82	0.62	0.72	0.35
Ask headmaster	0.89	0.66	0.79	0.40
Wait	0.64	0.48	0.55	0.18
Neighbouring village	0.76	0.51	0.72	0.36

**Table D7.** Conative attitudes among compliers in field experiment - Midline, control group (N = 567)

	Involve LC1 Chair	Tell village	Use PTA	Assemble group
Find a tutor	0.90	0.66	0.74	0.41
Ask headmaster	0.83	0.66	0.83	0.48
Wait	0.68	0.51	0.59	0.33
Neighbouring village	0.79	0.58	0.71	0.37

**Table D8.** Conative attitudes among compliers in field experiment - Midline, treatment group (N = 474)

Entries are means for compliers. Outcomes are based on questions that ask respondents which of two actions they prefer to take upon finding out that their child’s teacher has been absent for two days this week. Each respondent was asked to make four decisions, each of which involved a choice between two options. In each pair of options, one option involved active intervention, while the other option implied inaction. Different respondents were randomly assigned to be faced with different pairs of options. The randomisation was restricted in the following ways: Each pair contained an active and a passive option. Respondents were never asked twice about the same action and the order of the active options remained constant. The active actions coded 1 are as follows: *Involve LC1 Chair*: ‘Tell the LC1 chairperson to investigate why the headmaster has allowed this problem to occur.’ *Tell village*: ‘Bring it up in the village meeting’. *Use PTA*: ‘Immediately begin organising a PTA meeting, even if you know this might start some trouble’. *Assemble group*: ‘Assemble a group of parents and confront the teacher’. The four passive actions coded 0 are as follows: ‘Find a tutor to instruct your child until the teacher comes back’, ‘Ask the headmaster to put your child into a different classroom until the teacher returns’, ‘Wait another few days to see if the problem corrects itself’, ‘Send your child to a school in the neighbouring village, where the teachers always come to class’. Each table shows the proportion of compliers choosing the ‘active’ option (columns), by ‘passive’ option offered (rows).

### D.3. Robustness of main results

	Involve LC1 Chair		Tell village		Use PTA		Assemble group		Index	
	Midline	Endline	Midline	Endline	Midline	Endline	Midline	Endline	Midline	Endline
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
absenteeism	0.021 (0.023)	0.044* (0.026)	0.029 (0.030)	0.065** (0.028)	0.036 (0.027)	0.046* (0.028)	0.067** (0.029)	0.049* (0.027)	0.038** (0.016)	0.051*** (0.017)
Control Mean	0.77	0.74	0.57	0.55	0.68	0.55	0.33	0.31	0.59	0.54
RI <i>p</i> -values	0.204	0.062	0.174	0.019	0.109	0.074	0.021	0.059	0.014	0.005
Hypothesis	upr	upr	upr	upr	upr	upr	upr	upr	upr	upr
Block FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,156	1,104	1,156	1,104	1,156	1,104	1,156	1,104	1,156	1,104
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.007	0.006	−0.002	0.014	0.001	−0.0002	0.014	0.001	0.011	0.009

\* $p < 0.1$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.01$

**Table D9.** Estimated effects of absenteeism videos on conative attitudes among *all* “compliers” interviewed in a given wave in field experiment

Standard errors clustered at the village-level are shown in parentheses. *p*-values calculated using randomization inference. See the captions of Tables 1 and 4 for the wording and coding of outcomes. As per our pre-analysis plan for the field experiment, the estimates in this table stem from specifications that include block fixed effects. The row labeled “Hypothesis” shows the direction of hypothesis tests. Our main results are estimated among compliers who have been interviewed in both mid- and endline surveys. Estimates in this table instead stem from analyses of *all* compliers who have been interviewed at midline and endline, respectively.

	Involve LC1 Chair		Tell village		Use PTA		Assemble group	
	Midline	Endline	Midline	Endline	Midline	Endline	Midline	Endline
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
absenteeism	0.026 (0.023)	0.056** (0.025)	0.041 (0.031)	0.066** (0.029)	0.038 (0.028)	0.036 (0.027)	0.064** (0.030)	0.039 (0.029)
Control Mean	0.77	0.74	0.56	0.55	0.7	0.56	0.33	0.32
RI $p$ -values	0.169	0.021	0.1	0.023	0.103	0.119	0.028	0.123
Hypothesis	upr	upr	upr	upr	upr	upr	upr	upr
Block FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,041	1,041	1,041	1,041	1,041	1,041	1,041	1,041
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.046	0.071	0.017	0.033	0.035	0.047	0.028	0.021

\*p<0.1; \*\* p<0.05; \*\*\* p<0.01

**Table D10.** Estimated effects of absenteeism videos on conative attitudes among “compliers” in field experiment: robustness check, controlling for ‘inactive’ options

Standard errors clustered at the village-level are shown in parentheses.  $p$ -values calculated using randomization inference. See the caption of Tables 1 for the wording of outcomes. As per our pre-analysis plan for the field experiment, the estimates in this table stem from specifications that include block fixed effects. The row labeled “Hypothesis” shows the direction of hypothesis tests. Analyses control for indicators for the randomised ‘passive’ option presented to respondents.

	Involve LC1 Chair		Tell village		Use PTA		Assemble group		Index	
	Midline	Endline	Midline	Endline	Midline	Endline	Midline	Endline	Midline	Endline
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)
absenteeism	0.025 (0.024)	0.049** (0.026)	0.040 (0.030)	0.064** (0.030)	0.026 (0.028)	0.043* (0.028)	0.060** (0.029)	0.036 (0.028)	0.038** (0.016)	0.048*** (0.017)
Control Mean	0.77	0.74	0.56	0.55	0.7	0.56	0.33	0.32	0.59	0.54
RI $p$ -values	0.179	0.042	0.112	0.026	0.189	0.085	0.033	0.128	0.018	0.008
Hypothesis	upr	upr	upr	upr	upr	upr	upr	upr	upr	upr
Block FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,041	1,041	1,041	1,041	1,041	1,041	1,041	1,041	1,041	1,041
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.008	0.004	-0.002	0.013	0.002	-0.002	0.014	-0.0002	0.012	0.007

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

**Table D11.** Estimated effects of absenteeism videos on conative attitudes among “compliers” in field experiment: robustness check, without controlling for audience size

Standard errors clustered at the village-level are shown in parentheses.  $p$ -values calculated using randomization inference. See the captions of Tables 1 and 4 for the wording and coding of outcomes. As per our pre-analysis plan for the field experiment, the estimates in this table stem from specifications that include block fixed effects. The row labeled “Hypothesis” shows the direction of hypothesis tests. Contrary to our main specification used throughout, the analyses shown in this table do not include a covariate for the average size of the audience across all screenings in each village.



Conative attitudes index			
	Compliers	Never-Takers	All
	(1)	(2)	(3)
absenteeism	0.038** (0.016)	-0.003 (0.008)	0.007 (0.008)
Control Mean	0.59	0.55	0.56
RI <i>p</i> -values	0.014	0.628	0.203
Hypothesis	upr	upr	upr
Block FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,156	4,378	5,534
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.011	0.003	0.003

\* $p < 0.1$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.01$

**Table D13.** Estimated effects of absenteeism videos on conative attitudes at midline in field experiment: testing for presence of spillovers

Standard errors clustered at the village-level are shown in parentheses. *p*-values calculated using randomization inference. The outcome is a simple average of the four conative attitude measures described in the caption of Table 1. As per our pre-analysis plan for the field experiment, the estimates in this table stem from specifications that include block fixed effects. The row labeled “Hypothesis” shows the direction of hypothesis tests. Effects are estimated, respectively, among compliers, never-takers, and all respondents in the midline survey of our main experiment (two months after the film festival screenings).

#### D.4. Additional analyses

The table below shows estimates of treatment effects on outcomes that have only been measured at endline. Note that our PAP pre-specified an analysis of an additional outcome that asks teachers whether they have been confronted by parents about absenteeism. We do not report estimates of treatment effects on this outcome, because it has only been collected for the 34 respondents in our endline sample who are teachers.

	PTA frequency	Community fundraiser	Parent's responsibility
	(1)	(2)	(3)
absenteeism	0.001 (0.057)	-0.005 (0.027)	-0.033 (0.028)
Control Mean	1.91	0.23	0.66
RI $p$ -values	0.527	0.59	0.845
Hypothesis	upr	upr	upr
Block FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,041	1,041	1,041
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.004	0.012	0.001

\* $p < 0.1$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.01$

**Table D14.** Estimated effects of absenteeism videos on miscellaneous outcomes measured at endline among “compliers” in field experiment

Standard errors clustered at the village-level are shown in parentheses.  $p$ -values calculated using randomization inference. As per our pre-analysis plan for the field experiment, the estimates in this table stem from specifications that include block fixed effects. The row labeled “Hypothesis” shows the direction of hypothesis tests. The table reports results for miscellaneous outcomes that were measured at endline only. The dependent variables are coded as follows: *PTA frequency* ‘Does the PTA in the local school hold meetings more than once a term?’ Scored 0-3 for ‘Less than three times a year’, ‘Three times a year’, ‘Once a month’, ‘Even more than once a month’, respectively. *Community fundraiser* ‘Suppose the teacher in the public school in your village has not been coming to class because the money to pay his salary was misspent by the administration. Some people think the community should solve the problem by holding a fundraiser to pay the teachers salary. Other think that the community should come together to put pressure on those who are responsible for paying the teacher to pressure them to allocate more funds. Which comes closest to your view?’ 0 = ‘The community should come together to put pressure on those who are responsible for paying the teacher to pressure them to allocate more funds’, 1 = ‘The community should solve the problem by holding a fundraiser to pay the teachers salary’. *Parent's responsibility* ‘Which of the following statements comes closest to your view?’ 0 = ‘Its the governments responsibility to provide all children a quality education’, 1 = ‘Its the parents responsibility to ensure that their children receive a quality education even if it means that parents have to pay school fees’.

### D.5. Correcting for multiple comparisons

We use two different procedures to correct for multiple comparisons. First, we implement the so-called free step-down resampling method that controls the familywise error rate (see Anderson, 2008, for a description). This is in line with our pre-analysis plan, which specifies that we would use this procedure but does not describe the procedure correctly. In keeping with Anderson (2008), we rely on  $p$ -values to implement this procedure and not on  $t$ -statistics as mentioned in our incorrect description of the procedure. For computational efficiency, we rely on parametric rather than randomization inference  $p$ -values. Second, we use the Benjamini-Hochberg correction which controls the false discovery rate. We show critical values for a false discovery rate of 10%, 20% and 30%, respectively. For a given false discovery rate, the test with the largest  $p$ -value that is less than its Benjamini-Hochberg critical value and all tests with a smaller  $p$ -value will be considered significant.

Finally, we consider two different sets of tests. First, we consider all tests that were pre-registered as “primary hypotheses” in our phase II pre-analysis plan (see section D.5.1). These tests involve not only the teacher absenteeism outcomes and treatments, but also two other sets of outcome-treatment combinations – one on violence against women and one on abortion. This family of tests is best thought of as collectively pertaining to the hypothesis that our education-entertainment treatments “work.” Second, we consider all tests on teacher absenteeism that are reported in this paper (see section D.5.2). This family of tests is best thought of as collectively pertaining to the hypothesis that the teacher absenteeism media messages affect absenteeism-related outcomes.

#### D.5.1. All treatments and outcomes

	Unadjusted parametric $p$ -value	Adjusted $p$ -value
Conative attitudes VAW	0.001	0.025
Conative attitudes ABS	0.002	0.047
Conative attitudes ABO	0.050	0.363
Prescriptive norm VAW	0.051	0.363
Prescriptive norm ABS	0.126	0.571
Discussion ABO	0.201	0.625
Discussion VAW	0.330	0.625
Prescriptive norm ABO	0.586	0.625
Discussion ABS	0.640	0.625

**Table D15.** Free step-down resampling procedure to correct  $p$ -values for multiple comparisons across all main outcomes and treatments (field experiment)

All analyses are based on endline data from our main field experiment. *VAW* stands for violence against women, *ABS* for teacher absenteeism and *ABO* for abortion. Outcomes with a given label have been regressed on an indicator for assignment to the corresponding treatment, using the same main specification used throughout this paper. The column labeled “Unadjusted parametric  $p$ -value” shows unadjusted one-tailed  $p$ -values calculated via a normal approximation to the sampling distribution for the null hypothesis of no negative average treatment effect. The column labeled “Adjusted  $p$ -value” shows  $p$ -values that have been adjusted using the free step-down resampling procedure. The table includes all outcomes that have been pre-specified as “Primary Hypotheses” in the phase II pre-analysis plan. The only deviation from this rule is that the “conative attitude” index for a given topic and treatment includes all available measures of conative attitudes – irrespective of whether these were explicitly modeled in the video or not. At the time of pre-specification, we drew a distinction between modeled and unmodeled behaviors that was dropped in later analyses. Including all available measures of conative attitudes in the indices maximizes precision.

Outcome	RI $p$ -value	Rank	Critical Value 10%	Critical Value 20%	Critical Value 30%
Conative attitudes VAW	0.004	1	0.0111	0.0222	0.0333
Conative attitudes ABS	0.009	2	0.0222	0.0444	0.0667
Conative attitudes ABO	0.059	3	0.0333	0.0667	0.1000
Prescriptive norm VAW	0.069	4	0.0444	0.0889	0.1333
Prescriptive norm ABS	0.154	5	0.0556	0.1111	0.1667
Discussion ABO	0.213	6	0.0667	0.1333	0.2000
Discussion VAW	0.349	7	0.0778	0.1556	0.2333
Prescriptive norm ABO	0.572	8	0.0889	0.1778	0.2667
Discussion ABS	0.642	9	0.1000	0.2000	0.3000

**Table D16.** Benjamini-Hochberg procedure to correct  $p$ -values for multiple comparisons across all main outcomes and treatments (field experiment)

All analyses are based on endline data from our main field experiment. *VAW* stands for violence against women, *ABS* for teacher absenteeism and *ABO* for abortion. Outcomes with a given label have been regressed on an indicator for assignment to the corresponding treatment, using the same main specification used throughout this paper. The column labeled “RI  $p$ -value” shows unadjusted one-tailed  $p$ -values calculated via randomization inference for the sharp null hypothesis of no negative effect for any unit. Critical values are shown for a false discovery rate of 10%, 20% and 30%, respectively. For a given false discovery rate, the test with the largest  $p$ -value that is less than its Benjamini-Hochberg critical value and all tests with a smaller  $p$ -value will be considered significant. The table includes all outcomes that have been pre-specified as “Primary Hypotheses” in the phase II pre-analysis plan. The only deviation from this rule is that the “conative attitude” index for a given topic and treatment includes all available measures of conative attitudes – irrespective of whether these were explicitly modeled in the video or not. At the time of pre-specification, we drew a distinction between modeled and unmodeled behaviors that was dropped in later analyses. Including all available measures of conative attitudes in the indices maximizes precision.

### D.5.2. Absenteeism treatment and outcomes

	Unadjusted parametric $p$ -value	Adjusted $p$ -value
Conative attitudes ABS	0.002	0.068
Teachers/absenteeism important	0.030	0.426
Parents complain	0.047	0.529
Parents should act	0.126	0.814
Community would intervene	0.152	0.814
Schools important	0.158	0.814
PTA frequency	0.493	0.854
Community fundraiser	0.576	0.854
Discussed absenteeism	0.640	0.854
Reported absenteeism	0.654	0.854
Candidate platform	0.680	0.854
Intervention is effective	0.770	0.854
Parent's responsibility	0.881	0.854

**Table D17.** Free step-down resampling procedure to correct  $p$ -values for multiple comparisons across all teacher absenteeism outcomes (field experiment)

All analyses are based on endline data from our main field experiment. The column labeled “Unadjusted parametric  $p$ -value” shows unadjusted one- or two-tailed  $p$ -values (as pre-registered) calculated via a normal approximation to the sampling distribution for the null hypothesis of no (negative) average treatment effect. The column labeled “Adjusted  $p$ -value” shows  $p$ -values that have been adjusted using the free step-down resampling procedure. The table includes all teacher absenteeism outcomes in the main field experiment for which results are reported in the paper.

Outcome	RI $p$ -value	Rank	Critical Value 10%	Critical Value 20%	Critical Value 30%
Conative attitudes ABS	0.009	1	0.0077	0.0154	0.0231
Teachers/absenteeism important	0.043	2	0.0154	0.0308	0.0462
Parents complain	0.057	3	0.0231	0.0462	0.0692
Parents should act	0.154	4	0.0308	0.0615	0.0923
Community would intervene	0.174	5	0.0385	0.0769	0.1154
Schools important	0.180	6	0.0462	0.0923	0.1385
PTA frequency	0.527	7	0.0538	0.1077	0.1615
Community fundraiser	0.590	8	0.0615	0.1231	0.1846
Discussed absenteeism	0.642	9	0.0692	0.1385	0.2077
Candidate platform	0.652	10	0.0769	0.1538	0.2308
Reported absenteeism	0.674	11	0.0846	0.1692	0.2538
Intervention is effective	0.746	12	0.0923	0.1846	0.2769
Parent's responsibility	0.845	13	0.1000	0.2000	0.3000

**Table D18.** Benjamini-Hochberg procedure to correct  $p$ -values for multiple comparisons across all teacher absenteeism outcomes (field experiment)

All analyses are based on endline data from our main field experiment. The column labeled “RI  $p$ -value” shows unadjusted one- or two-tailed  $p$ -values (as pre-registered) calculated via randomization inference for the sharp null hypothesis of no (negative) effect for any unit. Critical values are shown for a false discovery rate of 10%, 20% and 30%, respectively. For a given false discovery rate, the test with the largest  $p$ -value that is less than its Benjamini-Hochberg critical value and all tests with a smaller  $p$ -value will be considered significant. The table includes all teacher absenteeism outcomes in the main field experiment for which results are reported in the paper.

## Appendix E. Pilot field experiment and meta-analysis

	Ask headmaster	Tell village	Use PTA	Assemble group	Index
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
absenteeism	−0.001 (0.017)	−0.006 (0.028)	0.130*** (0.048)	0.111** (0.049)	0.059*** (0.022)
Control Mean	0.98	0.85	0.53	0.31	0.67
RI <i>p</i> -values	0.541	0.574	0.015	0.028	0.015
Hypothesis	upr	upr	upr	upr	upr
Block FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	376	376	376	376	376
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	−0.014	0.005	0.004	0.019	−0.0002

\**p*<0.1; \*\**p*<0.05; \*\*\**p*<0.01

**Table E1.** Estimated effects of absenteeism videos on conative attitudes among “compliers” in pilot field experiment

This table summarises the results from a pilot study carried out in November to December 2015 in a sample of 56 villages (half the size of our main experiment). Analysis restricted to compliers only. Standard errors clustered at the village-level are shown in parentheses. The dependent variables are coded as follows: Outcomes in columns 1 to 4 are based on questions that ask respondents which of two actions they prefer to take upon finding out that their child’s teacher has been absent. *Ask Headmaster* 0 = ‘Allow your child to leave school’, 1 = ‘Ask the headmaster to fire the teacher.’ *Tell Village* 0 = ‘Pray to God.’ 1 = ‘Bring it up in the village meeting.’ *Use PTA* 0 = ‘Wait another few days’, 1 = ‘Immediately begin organising a PTA meeting’. *Assemble Group* 0 = ‘Send your child to a school in the neighbouring village’, 1 = ‘Assemble a group of parents and confront the teacher.’ The *Index* variable is a simple average of the four previous variables.

	Ask LC1/Headmaster			Tell village			Use PTA			Assemble group		
	Pilot	Main	Meta	Pilot	Main	Meta	Pilot	Main	Meta	Pilot	Main	Meta
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
absenteeism	−0.001 (0.017)	0.021 (0.023)	0.007 (0.014)	−0.006 (0.028)	0.029 (0.030)	0.010 (0.020)	0.130** (0.048)	0.036 (0.027)	0.058*** (0.023)	0.111** (0.049)	0.067** (0.029)	0.078*** (0.025)
<i>p</i> -values	0.54	0.2	0.3	0.57	0.17	0.3	0.01	0.11	0.01	0.03	0.02	0
Hypothesis	upr	upr	upr	upr	upr	upr	upr	upr	upr	upr	upr	upr
Observations	376	1,041	1,417	376	1,041	1,417	376	1,041	1,417	376	1,041	1,417

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

**Table E2.** Estimated effects of absenteeism videos on conative attitudes among “compliers” – meta-analysis

Columns labelled *Pilot* show estimates among compliers in a pilot study that took place in December 2015 in 56 villages. Columns labelled *Main* show estimates among *all* compliers interviewed at midline in our main field experiment that took place in 2016 in a different sample of 112 villages. These main study results are also reported in table D9. Estimates stem from the same main specification used throughout this paper. The *Meta* columns show the results of a precision-weighted meta-analysis combining the results of the two studies under a Bayesian framework, assuming uninformative priors. Standard errors clustered at the village-level shown in parentheses. The coding of the dependent variables is described in Tables E1 and 1. Note that the wording of the outcome used in column 1 varies slightly across the two experiments. *p*-values for the pilot and main study results are computed using randomization inference, as for the other main analysis tables in this paper.

Conative attitudes index			
	Pilot	Main	Meta
	(1)	(2)	(3)
absenteeism	0.059** (0.022)	0.038** (0.016)	0.045*** (0.013)
<i>p</i> -values	0.015	0.014	0
Hypothesis	upr	upr	upr
Observations	376	1,041	1,417

\* $p < 0.1$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.01$

**Table E3.** Estimated effects of absenteeism videos on conative attitudes index among “compliers” – meta-analysis

Columns labelled *Pilot* show estimates among compliers in a pilot study that took place in December 2015 in 56 villages. Columns labelled *Main* show estimates among respondents in our main field experiment that took place in 2016 in a different sample of 112 villages. Estimates stem from the same main specification used throughout this paper. The *Meta* columns show the results of a precision-weighted meta-analysis combining the results of the two studies under a Bayesian framework, assuming uninformative priors. Standard errors clustered at the village-level shown in parentheses. The dependent variable for each study is a simple average of the four outcomes shown in Table E2. *p*-values for the pilot and main study results are computed using randomization inference, as for the other main analysis tables in this paper.

## **Appendix F. Suggested research design to study effects of media on actual prevalence of absenteeism**

To test the effects of media on the actual prevalence of absenteeism requires a rather different research design from the one deployed here, which unsurprisingly produced ambiguous results. Treatment clusters would be formed based on school catchment areas. This pool of clusters would be pared down to those that have the infrastructure for hosting the presentation of the treatment videos in some form. Within this list of relevant locations, some would be randomly assigned to exposure to media messages that dramatise the absenteeism issue, and levels of absenteeism would be measured periodically thereafter, ideally through unannounced audits. One design embellishment would be to measure potential causal pathways by assessing whether treatment villages experience a surge in parental involvement in school oversight.

In order to keep the number of locations manageable and increase statistical power, the media treatment could be rolled-out regionally as part of a stepped-wedge design in which one trading center is treated each week, and absenteeism rates are measured weekly across all trading centers. For example, suppose we selected a pool of 18 trading centers and audit absenteeism among a random sample of ten school teachers in each site, patterned after the World Bank’s Uganda Service Delivery Indicators Education Survey from 2013 (<https://microdata.worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/2749>).

Using the R package `DeclareDesign`, we simulated 10,000 stepped-wedge experiments in which the effect size is assumed to be one-third of the disturbance standard deviation. The disturbance variance is comprised of three independent components, each with the same variance: random time shocks, between-site heterogeneity, and idiosyncratic time-place shocks. The design places one site in the treatment group each week, and absenteeism is measured weekly for 18 weeks. Estimating the average treatment effect using two-way fixed effects (for time period and for sites), we calculate the power from this design to be 0.76.

A test on this scale seems feasible, and the policy implications of a demonstrable reduction in absenteeism would be considerable given the extent of the absenteeism problem and limited state capacity to address it without parental involvement.

Estimand	Estimator	Bias	RMSE	Power
ATE	TWFE	0	0.118	0.757

**Table F1.** Results of power calculation for stepped-wedge design using DeclareDesign.

## References

- Anderson, M. L. (2008). Multiple inference and gender differences in the effects of early intervention: A reevaluation of the abecedarian, perry preschool, and early training projects. *Journal of the American statistical Association*, 103(484):1481–1495.