— Supporting Information for "Can Community Policing Improve Police-Community Relations in Low-Income Countries?" —

CONTENTS

A Monitoring **SI-3**

B Ethics **SI-3**

C Threats to inference **SI-5**
C.1 Statistical power SI-5
C.2 Attrition SI-5
C.3 Spillovers SI-5

D Heterogeneous treatment effects **SI-6**

E Treatment effects on additional prespecified primary outcomes **SI-7**

A MONITORING

We used several mechanisms to monitor treatment compliance throughout implementation of the COP program. To monitor town hall meetings, we provided UPF officers at each post with a schedule to record the date and location of each meeting, as well as contact information for the LC1 chairperson and any other individual(s) responsible for mobilizing residents to attend the meetings. We also sent a staff member from IPA Uganda to attend all meetings and take detailed notes, including the date, time, and location of the meeting, the number of attendees, the topics discussed, and any questions asked and answers given. After each meeting, we asked officers to complete a separate form with the same information for purposes of validation, though compliance with this latter monitoring mechanism was low.

To monitor the activity of the CWTs, we provided them with a form that they were expected to complete and return to YIDO at the end of each month. The form included details on any incidents to which the CWT responded in the previous month, including whether or not the incident was reported to the police, whether or not the police responded, how long it took the police to respond, whether an arrest was made, and how satisfied the victim was with the police's response. Compliance with this latter monitoring mechanism was low. We also collected data on the names, age, and gender of all CWT members, as well as contact information for the leaders of each CWT.

B ETHICS

We were interested in studying the COP program in Uganda because we believed it had the potential to improve police-community relations in a country where those relations have long been strained. Ugandan citizens of all partisan affiliations are susceptible to crime and insecurity—problems that the UPF is constitutionally mandated to address. Given widespread enthusiasm for community policing around the world, even in countries and communities with adversarial police-community relations, we (as well as many other local stakeholders) believed there were significant potential benefits for citizen wellbeing to a program of the sort we evaluate here.

However, given the nature of the regime in Uganda and the role the UPF plays in entrenching it, the study raises ethical concerns that we address in this section. As guiding principles, we went beyond the IRB requirements of the various organizations that reviewed and approved our study, and we consulted the APSA Council's Principles and Guidance for Human Subjects Research.[1] We note that IRB approvals were obtained not only from our respective universities, but also from a local NGO (Mildmay Uganda Research Ethics Committee), Uganda's National Council for Science and Technology, Uganda's Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the Office of the President.

We took a number of precautions to mitigate any potential risks associated with the program and our evaluation of it. As discussed in the paper, despite the UPF's national reputation as an instrument of the ruling NRM party, rank-and-file officers at the local level tend to be less politicized, especially in the years between elections. For this reason, **we encouraged UPF not to conduct the study in an election year**. (Implementation indeed occurred in 2018-2019, between the 2016 and 2021 general elections). Moreover, given that politicization is also much less of a problem in rural areas than in urban centers, where clashes between security forces and the political opposition tend

[1] APSA's guidelines can be found online at https://bit.ly/31VEVgK.

to be most common, **we recommended that UPF limit the scope of the study to rural regions**. (The sampling frame indeed excluded urban areas.)

The intervention involved increased police presence in and around Ugandan communities. This had important ethical implications in a setting where the police have a reputation for petty corruption and bribe-seeking. Indeed, one goal of the intervention was to foster greater empathy and understanding between civilians and police officers, which we hoped would mitigate the incidence of corruption and abuse. To guard against the risk that increased contact would exacerbate misconduct, **we developed a robust monitoring and reporting system**, described in detail above, which allowed us to observe many (though admittedly not all) of the interactions between civilians and police officers that occurred in the context of the intervention. (It is possible, however, that more routine "fee for service" requests and other forms of petty corruption may have occurred without our monitors noticing.) The Ugandan police is also known to deploy specialized (quasi-militarized) units, for example to quell opposition rallies and protest marches. The mandate of these national forces is to "prevent disorder," not to solve crime. **We excluded these specialized units from our study.**

The intervention also involved strengthening the role that CWTs play in providing security for their communities. This component of the program had important ethical implications as well, especially if CWTs became embroiled in political intimidation or vigilantism. In their efforts to organize CWTs, **YIDO and UPF repeatedly emphasized that CWTs have no legal authority to arrest, adjudicate crimes, or otherwise act as substitutes for the police**. YIDO and the UPF also explicitly distinguished CWTs from "Crime Preventers"—an earlier community-based security program with ties to the NRM—and framed the CWT initiative as an attempt to strengthen police-community partnerships while avoiding the adverse unintended consequences of the Crime Preventers program.

APSA's Principles and Guidance for Human Subjects Research also discuss deception (principle 6) and consent (principle 5). Attendance at town hall meetings and other community policing activities was voluntary, and involved no deception. It would have been infeasible to inform people who participated in these activities that they were part of a study, as this would have made the entire intervention unrealistic, would have generated severe experimenter demand effects, and would have alienated both the UPF officers and the LC1 chairpeople who were the *de facto* organizers of these activities. It is also worth noting that the citizens who participated in our research activities (e.g. surveys) were not necessarily the same as those who participated in the community policing activities. We were interested in measuring possible treatment effects on villages as a whole, not specifically on those who participated in community policing activities. Hence, our sampling frame included *all* residents of each treatment and control community, whether or not they participated in the COP program. Written voluntary informed consent was sought and documented for all research activities.

Finally, APSA's principle 10 asks that political science researchers consider the broader impact of their studies on local political processes. One might be concerned that if community policing improves police-community relations, this might translate into greater support for the incumbent NRM regime. We stress again that the COP program we study was designed and executed by the police as part of their routine activities, and that the research team had no control over the UPF's decision to implement the program. UPF leadership has long expressed a commitment to COP principles, and the intervention we evaluate was part of a progression of increasingly ambitious COP initiatives in Uganda. Relatedly, the research team made no direct contribution in-cash

or in-kind to the UPF, which self-funded all implementation activities.

C THREATS TO INFERENCE

C.1 STATISTICAL POWER

A rule of thumb for calculating minimum detectable effect (MDE) sizes is $MDE = 2.8 \times SE$, where SE is the standard error (**?**). In our main outcomes table, the largest standard error is in the last column, $SE = 0.094$, which gives an MDE of $2.8 \times 0.094 \sim 0.26$. Outcomes are expressed in baseline standard deviations for those that were measured at baseline, and in control group standard deviations for outcomes that were not measured at baseline. Hence, 0.26 refers to control group standard deviations, suggesting that even our largest MDEs are relatively small.

C.2 ATTRITION

In Tables SI-1 and SI-2 we test whether treatment assignment predicts attrition between our baseline and endline surveys. We find no evidence of differential attrition by treatment assignment.

C.3 SPILLOVERS

Even though we consider the presence of spillovers unlikely, we conduct two kinds of analyses to probe this assumption. First, Table SI-3 displays changes in control group outcomes from baseline to endline. For this exercise, we subset outcome indices to items that were measured in both survey waves. We find evidence of statistically significant changes in many (though not all) of our outcomes over time. In principle, this pattern is consistent with activities in the treatment group "spilling over" to villages under the jurisdiction of control group stations. But the pattern is also consistent with a secular trend in these outcomes that is common to all police stations in Uganda due to events at the regional or national level that are orthogonal to treatment.

To further distinguish between these explanations, we analyze changes among the five control group stations that are least likely to experience spillovers of certain kinds. One possible source of spillover effects is the UPF command structure. Spillovers may occur if police commanders who were tasked with implementing COP activities in treatment stations opted to implement those same activities in *all* stations under their jurisdiction. Table SI-4 shows, however, that trends in outcomes among the five control group stations that are in districts where no other station was assigned to treatment are very similar to trends among the control group as a whole. Table SI-5 shows that trends in the treatment group are similar to those in the control group—which is intuitive since we find little evidence of treatment effects. Taken together, these results suggest that the changes we observe from baseline to endline in the control group are unlikely to be a result of spillover.

We also consider the possibility of geographic spillovers unrelated to the UPF command structure. Spillover may occur where treatment and control stations are located close to each other. Tables SI-6 and SI-7 report estimates of direct and indirect effects, respectively, from models that allow for spillovers within varying radii. We define control stations that are located no more than 5, 10, 15, or 20 kilometers from the nearest treated station as "indirectly treated." We then estimate

the effects of "direct exposure" to COP by comparing stations in the treatment group to stations in the control group that have not been defined as "indirectly treated." In addition, we estimate the effect of "indirect exposure" to community policing by comparing stations that have been defined as "indirectly treated" to control group stations that have not.

Because the spatial layout of police stations in our sample is not exogenous, these analyses require some additional steps. First, to preserve unbiasedness, we weight units by the inverse of their probability of being assigned to the condition to which they were actually assignment. To do this, we replicated our random assignment procedure one million times to simulate each station's probability of being assigned to direct treatment, indirect treatment, and control. We then subset the data to stations whose probability of being assigned to the two conditions that are being compared lies strictly between 0 and 1. Because the number of clusters involved in some of these comparisons is small, and in order to correctly account for spatial clustering, we base our significance tests on p-values calculated using randomization inference.

Tables SI-6 and SI-7 report results from our pre-registered specification that controls for a baseline measure of the outcome (where available), an indicator for missingness in this baseline measure, and block fixed effects. However, because the number of clusters for some of these analyses is very small, controlling for block fixed effects risks dropping entire blocks within which there is no variation in treatment assignment. Since block fixed effects are not required for unbiasedness, in Tables SI-8 and SI-9 we also report estimates from a specification without them.

In Tables SI-7 and SI-9, we find no evidence indirect exposure to community policing affects any of our outcomes of interest. However, it is important to keep in mind that we do not have much statistical power to detect such effects. This lack of power is due in part to the spatial layout of our sample, which—as described above—limits the opportunity for spillovers to occur in the first place. The result is that our estimates of indirect effects in Tables SI-7 and SI-9 rely on a very small number of police stations.

Tables SI-6 and SI-8 report estimates of direct effects based on samples that exclude control stations that are defined as indirectly treated. Here, we have more statistical power as long as we do not define the spillover radius to be too large. Intuitively, if large geographic spillovers exist, we would expect analyses that exclude "contaminated" units to yield larger estimates of the direct effect of COP than our original analyses, which assume the absence of spillovers. In Tables SI-6 and SI-8 we find little to no evidence to suggest that treatment effects are any larger when we exclude "contaminated" units from the control group. Taken together, the spatial distribution of stations and villages in our sample and the results of these more formal analyses suggest that spillover is unlikely to explain our results.

D HETEROGENEOUS TREATMENT EFFECTS

Tables SI-10 through SI-18 report results from heterogeneous treatment effects analyses along potential "supply-side" and "demand-side" moderators, as discussed in the paper.

E TREATMENT EFFECTS ON ADDITIONAL PRESPECIFIED PRIMARY OUTCOMES

Tables SI-19 and SI-20 report estimates of treatment effects on additional prespecified outcomes, as discussed in the paper.

	Replaced	
	Citizens	Officers
	(1)	(2)
Community Policing	−0.015	−0.007
	(0.014)	(0.057)
Control Mean	0.155	0.802
p-value	0.303	0.893
Stations	72	71
Block FE	yes	yes
Observations	3,456	217

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table SI-1: Estimated effect of community policing on whether respondents were replaced

The dependent variable is an indicator for whether a respondent was replaced. Estimates stem from a specification that regresses the indicator for replacement on a treatment assignment indicator and block fixed effects. Standard errors allow for clustering on the police station level. The first column pertains to citizens and the second to police officers.

	p-value	N
Citizens	0.342	3456
Officers	0.878	217

Table SI-2: F-test of treatment-by-covariate interactions in models of attrition

p-values are derived from an F-test comparing two models. The full model regresses an indicator for whether a respondent was replaced on an indicator for treatment assignment and all treatment-by-covariate interactions using a selection of baseline covariates. The nested model restricts all interaction terms to be zero. Both the general and the nested model also include indicators for missing values in the baseline measures, where those exist. These missing values have been imputed with zeros. Row 1 pertains to citizens; the selection of covariates used for this test was prespecified. Row 2 pertains to officers; the selection of covariates used for this test was not prespecified.

	Baseline	Endline	Difference	p-value
Compliance Index (C)	0.054	0.272	0.218	0.000
Crime Victimization (C)	-0.000	-0.001	-0.001	0.969
Perceived Insecurity (C)	-0.037	-0.121	-0.084	0.016
Approval Police (C)	0.031	0.124	0.093	0.001
Police Abuse (C)	0.008	-0.033	-0.041	0.204
Report Crime (C)	-0.002	0.018	0.020	0.518
Report Tips (C)	-0.003	0.026	0.029	0.320
Report Abuse (C/A)	-0.026	0.080	0.106	0.003
Crime Admin (A)	-0.050	1.036	1.086	0.001
Police Intentions (C)	0.019	0.001	-0.019	0.540
Citizen Knowledge (C)	-0.013	-0.155	-0.141	0.000
Cooperation Norms (C)	-0.000	-0.172	-0.172	0.000
Police Capacity (C)	0.024	0.229	0.205	0.000
Police Responsiveness (C)	0.036	0.219	0.183	0.000
Trust Community (C)	-0.012	0.072	0.084	0.013

Table SI-3: Baseline to endline change in average outcomes in control group

Indices have been changed to contain only items that were measured at baseline and endline. The sample is subset to the control group and to respondents who were interviewed in both waves. Variance estimates for citizen outcomes allow for clustering on the village level. Variance estimates for the admin outcome allow for heteroscedasticity.

	Baseline	Endline	Difference	p-value
Compliance Index (C)	-0.216	-0.029	0.187	0.055
Crime Victimization (C)	0.270	-0.010	-0.280	0.028
Perceived Insecurity (C)	-0.442	-0.203	0.239	0.006
Approval Police (C)	0.155	0.226	0.071	0.364
Police Abuse (C)	-0.028	-0.039	-0.011	0.846
Report Crime (C)	-0.126	-0.033	0.093	0.244
Report Tips (C)	-0.096	-0.046	0.050	0.580
Report Abuse (C/A)	0.048	-0.067	-0.116	0.124
Crime Admin (A)	-0.050	1.036	1.086	0.001
Police Intentions (C)	0.163	-0.003	-0.166	0.092
Citizen Knowledge (C)	-0.163	-0.128	0.035	0.590
Cooperation Norms (C)	0.119	-0.111	-0.230	0.033
Police Capacity (C)	0.151	0.333	0.182	0.061
Police Responsiveness (C)	0.018	0.138	0.121	0.225
Trust Community (C)	0.173	0.070	-0.102	0.479

Table SI-4: Baseline to endline change in average outcomes in 5 control group stations where there is no treated station in the same district

Indices have been changed to contain only items that were measured at baseline and endline. The sample is subset to the four control group stations in districts with no treated station and to respondents who were interviewed in both waves. Variance estimates for citizen outcomes allow for clustering on the village level. Variance estimates for the admin outcome allow for heteroscedasticity.

	Baseline	Endline	Difference	p-value
Compliance Index (C)	-0.053	0.447	0.500	0.000
Crime Victimization (C)	0.000	-0.014	-0.014	0.698
Perceived Insecurity (C)	0.037	-0.082	-0.119	0.005
Approval Police (C)	-0.031	0.119	0.150	0.000
Police Abuse (C)	-0.008	0.037	0.045	0.272
Report Crime (C)	0.002	0.024	0.022	0.536
Report Tips (C)	0.003	0.008	0.005	0.887
Report Abuse (C/A)	0.026	0.104	0.078	0.016
Crime Admin (A)	-0.050	1.036	1.086	0.001
Police Intentions (C)	-0.019	0.001	0.020	0.566
Citizen Knowledge (C)	0.013	-0.120	-0.133	0.000
Cooperation Norms (C)	0.000	-0.202	-0.202	0.000
Police Capacity (C)	-0.024	0.187	0.210	0.000
Police Responsiveness (C)	-0.036	0.228	0.264	0.000
Trust Community (C)	0.012	0.100	0.088	0.011

Table SI-5: Baseline to endline change in average outcomes in treatment group

Indices have been changed to contain only items that were measured at baseline and endline. The sample is subset to the treatment group and to respondents who were interviewed in both waves. Variance estimates for citizen outcomes allow for clustering on the village level. Variance estimates for the admin outcome allow for heteroscedasticity.

	5 km	10 km	15 km	20 km
Compliance Index (C)	0.19^{***}	0.21^{**}	0.19	0.37
	$(p = 0.003)$	$(p = 0.036)$	$(p = 0.163)$	$(p = 0.124)$
Crime Victimization (C)	0.01	0.03	0.02	0.09
	$(p = 0.73)$	$(p = 0.413)$	$(p = 0.811)$	$(p = 0.475)$
Perceived Insecurity (C)	0.02	0.07	0.05	0.14
	$(p = 0.791)$	$(p = 0.246)$	$(p = 0.6)$	$(p = 0.194)$
Approval Police (C)	0	-0.03	-0.02	-0.12
	$(p = 0.936)$	$(p = 0.654)$	$(p = 0.854)$	$(p = 0.394)$
Police Empathy (O)	-0.08	0.14	0.13	0.31
	$(p = 0.427)$	$(p = 0.292)$	$(p = 0.548)$	$(p = 0.366)$
Police Abuse (C)	0.08^{*}	0.07^{*}	0.08	0.19^{*}
	$(p = 0.051)$	$(p = 0.095)$	$(p = 0.345)$	$(p = 0.063)$
Report Crime (C)	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.06
	$(p = 0.572)$	$(p = 0.596)$	$(p = 0.7)$	$(p = 0.227)$
Report Tips (C)	0.03	0.03	-0.02	0
	$(p = 0.24)$	$(p = 0.406)$	$(p = 0.694)$	$(p = 0.972)$
Report Abuse (C/A)	0.24^{**}	0.22	0.33	0.13
	$(p = 0.045)$	$(p = 0.175)$	$(p = 0.325)$	$(p = 0.718)$
Demand Spending (C)	0.06	0.1	0.09	0.07
	$(p = 0.199)$	$(p = 0.11)$	$(p = 0.111)$	$(p = 0.559)$
Report to LC1 (L)	-0.06	0.11	0.41^{**}	0.39
	$(p = 0.622)$	$(p = 0.481)$	$(p = 0.025)$	$(p = 0.278)$
Referral by LC1 (L)	0.16	0.11	-0.08	-0.25
	$(p = 0.197)$	$(p = 0.523)$	$(p = 0.739)$	$(p = 0.531)$
Crime Admin (A)	0.5	0.72	1.09	0.11
	$(p = 0.414)$	$(p = 0.33)$	$(p = 0.325)$	$(p = 0.912)$
Police Intentions (C)	0.01	-0.03	0.03	-0.07
	$(p = 0.768)$	$(p = 0.549)$	$(p = 0.647)$	$(p = 0.146)$
Citizen Knowledge (C)	0.03^{*}	0.02	0.03	0.02
	$(p = 0.087)$	$(p = 0.307)$	$(p = 0.384)$	$(p = 0.626)$
Cooperation Norms (C)	-0.04	-0.05	-0.06	-0.15
	$(p = 0.12)$	$(p = 0.199)$	$(p = 0.294)$	$(p = 0.104)$
Police Capacity (C)	-0.02	-0.02	0.03	-0.07
	$(p = 0.414)$	$(p = 0.57)$	$(p = 0.642)$	$(p = 0.523)$
Police Responsiveness (C)	0.03	-0.01	0.11	0.06
	$(p = 0.617)$	$(p = 0.926)$	$(p = 0.195)$	$(p = 0.594)$
Trust Courts (C)	-0.05	-0.06	0.02	-0.05
	$(p = 0.36)$	$(p = 0.34)$	$(p = 0.892)$	$(p = 0.809)$
Trust Community (C)	0.01	-0.03	0.01	0.13
	$(p = 0.902)$	$(p = 0.652)$	$(p = 0.959)$	$(p = 0.462)$
Treated Stations	36	35	24	13
Control Stations	28	16	7	6

Table SI-6: Estimated effects of direct exposure to community policing using different spillover radii

Outcomes and regression specifications are identical to those used to produce our main results. Stations in the control group that are located no further than 5km (10km, 15km, 20km) from the closest station in the treatment group are defined as indirectly exposed to community policing. The random assignment procedure has been replicated 1 million times to simulate each station's probability of being assigned to, respectively, direct treatment, indirect treatment and control. Analyses subset to data from stations whose probability of being assigned to, respectively, direct treatment and control lies strictly between 0 and 1. Units are weighted by the inverse of their probability of being assigned to their assigned condition. Two-tailed p-values are calculated using randomization inference. When simulating the sampling distribution under the sharp null hypothesis of no effect for any unit, outcomes of units that were assigned to indirect exposure have been adjusted by subtracting the estimated effect of indirect exposure.

	5 km	10 km	15 km	20 km
Compliance Index (C)	0.11	−0.04	−0.13	0
	($p = 0.688$)	($p = 0.848$)	($p = 0.555$)	($p = 0.996$)
Crime Victimization (C)	−0.07	0.08	0.03	−0.06
	($p = 0.751$)	($p = 0.439$)	($p = 0.721$)	($p = 0.914$)
Perceived Insecurity (C)	−0.24	0.13	0.15	0.01
	($p = 0.321$)	($p = 0.419$)	($p = 0.557$)	($p = 0.994$)
Approval Police (C)	0.18	−0.18	−0.14	−0.02
	($p = 0.507$)	($p = 0.296$)	($p = 0.517$)	($p = 0.984$)
Police Empathy (O)	−0.04	0.44	0.32	0.6
	($p = 0.975$)	($p = 0.197$)	($p = 0.409$)	($p = 0.363$)
Police Abuse (C)	0	0.04	0.05	−0.1
	($p = 0.994$)	($p = 0.752$)	($p = 0.674$)	($p = 0.698$)
Report Crime (C)	0.08	−0.03	−0.09	0.07
	($p = 0.567$)	($p = 0.719$)	($p = 0.351$)	($p = 0.554$)
Report Tips (C)	0.15	−0.06	−0.18	−0.09
	($p = 0.388$)	($p = 0.53$)	($p = 0.134$)	($p = 0.732$)
Report Abuse (C/A)	−0.1	−0.17	−0.15	0.22
	($p = 0.646$)	($p = 0.467$)	($p = 0.681$)	($p = 0.397$)
Demand Spending (C)	−0.05	0.08	0.11	−0.19
	($p = 0.7$)	($p = 0.538$)	($p = 0.465$)	($p = 0.574$)
Report to LC1 (L)	−0.73	0.18	0.56	−0.44
	($p = 0.358$)	($p = 0.679$)	($p = 0.217$)	($p = 0.339$)
Referral by LC1 (L)	0.35	0.31	−0.38	−0.04
	($p = 0.647$)	($p = 0.596$)	($p = 0.499$)	($p = 0.869$)
Crime Admin (A)	−0.26	0.68	1.26	−0.53
	($p = 0.897$)	($p = 0.779$)	($p = 0.689$)	($p = 0.762$)
Police Intentions (C)	0.1	−0.2	−0.15	0.08
	($p = 0.533$)	($p = 0.144$)	($p = 0.331$)	($p = 0.704$)
Citizen Knowledge (C)	0.1	−0.02	−0.01	0.04
	($p = 0.307$)	($p = 0.766$)	($p = 0.86$)	($p = 0.78$)
Cooperation Norms (C)	0.07	−0.11	−0.09	0
	($p = 0.692$)	($p = 0.287$)	($p = 0.346$)	($p = 0.998$)
Police Capacity (C)	0.05	−0.09	−0.04	0.19
	($p = 0.704$)	($p = 0.375$)	($p = 0.739$)	($p = 0.405$)
Police Responsiveness (C)	0.08	−0.23	−0.16	−0.08
	($p = 0.648$)	($p = 0.22$)	($p = 0.506$)	($p = 0.872$)
Trust Courts (C)	−0.22	−0.15	−0.21	0.14
	($p = 0.408$)	($p = 0.37$)	($p = 0.335$)	($p = 0.654$)
Trust Community (C)	0.04	−0.23	−0.19	−0.06
	($p = 0.866$)	($p = 0.229$)	($p = 0.357$)	($p = 0.931$)
Treated Stations	7	17	13	5
Control Stations	5	5	3	2

Table SI-7: Estimated effects of indirect exposure to community policing using different spillover radii

Outcomes and regression specifications are identical to those used to produce our main results. Stations in the control group that are located no further than 5km (10km, 15km, 20km) from the closest station in the treatment group are defined as indirectly exposed to community policing. The random assignment procedure has been replicated 1 million times to simulate each station's probability of being assigned to, respectively, direct treatment, indirect treatment and control. Analyses subset to data from stations whose probabilit of being assigned to, respectively, indirect treatment and control lies strictly between 0 and 1. Units are weighted by the inverse of their probability of being assigned to their assigned condition. Two-tailed p-values are calculated using randomization inference. When simulating the sampling distribution under the sharp null hypothesis of no effect for any unit, outcomes of units that were assigned to direct exposure have been adjusted by subtracting the estimated effect of direct exposure.

	5 km	10 km	15 km	20 km
Compliance Index (C)	0.15	0.09	0.04	0.31**
	($p = 0.106$)	($p = 0.774$)	($p = 0.769$)	($p = 0.044$)
Crime Victimization (C)	0.02	0.07	0.04	0.02
	($p = 0.595$)	($p = 0.149$)	($p = 0.563$)	($p = 0.794$)
Perceived Insecurity (C)	0.02	0.08*	0.07	0.05
	($p = 0.618$)	($p = 0.094$)	($p = 0.351$)	($p = 0.709$)
Approval Police (C)	−0.02	−0.11*	0	−0.1
	($p = 0.737$)	($p = 0.069$)	($p = 0.964$)	($p = 0.28$)
Police Empathy (O)	−0.05	0.32**	0.02	0.1
	($p = 0.594$)	($p = 0.031$)	($p = 0.94$)	($p = 0.725$)
Police Abuse (C)	0.09**	0.14***	0.08	0.05
	($p = 0.012$)	($p = 0$)	($p = 0.161$)	($p = 0.374$)
Report Crime (C)	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.05
	($p = 0.623$)	($p = 0.518$)	($p = 0.89$)	($p = 0.352$)
Report Tips (C)	0.03	0.05	0.03	−0.03
	($p = 0.274$)	($p = 0.174$)	($p = 0.753$)	($p = 0.558$)
Report Abuse (C/A)	0.22**	0.18	0.26	0.36
	($p = 0.042$)	($p = 0.194$)	($p = 0.303$)	($p = 0.249$)
Demand Spending (C)	0.05	0.07	0.03	−0.06
	($p = 0.18$)	($p = 0.209$)	($p = 0.633$)	($p = 0.485$)
Report to LC1 (L)	−0.05	0.1	0.72***	−0.07
	($p = 0.587$)	($p = 0.49$)	($p = 0.008$)	($p = 0.773$)
Referral by LC1 (L)	0.11	−0.08	−0.23	0.17
	($p = 0.423$)	($p = 0.739$)	($p = 0.319$)	($p = 0.539$)
Crime Admin (A)	0.49	0.63	0.78	0.01
	($p = 0.367$)	($p = 0.301$)	($p = 0.395$)	($p = 0.98$)
Police Intentions (C)	0	−0.1**	0	0
	($p = 0.9$)	($p = 0.019$)	($p = 0.919$)	($p = 0.991$)
Citizen Knowledge (C)	0.02	0.01	0.04*	0.01
	($p = 0.119$)	($p = 0.615$)	($p = 0.09$)	($p = 0.656$)
Cooperation Norms (C)	−0.03	−0.01	0.03	−0.07
	($p = 0.228$)	($p = 0.777$)	($p = 0.671$)	($p = 0.357$)
Police Capacity (C)	−0.03	−0.15**	−0.02	0.03
	($p = 0.279$)	($p = 0.039$)	($p = 0.667$)	($p = 0.514$)
Police Responsiveness (C)	0.01	−0.17	0	0.07
	($p = 0.832$)	($p = 0.194$)	($p = 0.988$)	($p = 0.329$)
Trust Courts (C)	−0.05	−0.13**	−0.14	0.05
	($p = 0.276$)	($p = 0.029$)	($p = 0.147$)	($p = 0.61$)
Trust Community (C)	0	−0.09	−0.18	−0.02
	($p = 0.951$)	($p = 0.151$)	($p = 0.106$)	($p = 0.841$)
Treated Stations	36	35	24	13
Control Stations	28	16	7	6

Table SI-8: Estimated effects of direct exposure to community policing using different spillover radii (no fixed effects)

Outcomes and regression specifications are identical to those used to produce our main results, except for the exclusion of block fixed effects. Stations in the control group that are located no further than 5km (10km, 15km, 20km) from the closest station in the treatment group are defined as indirectly exposed to community policing. The random assignment procedure has been replicated 1 million times to simulate each station's probability of being assigned to, respectively, direct treatment, indirect treatment and control. Analyses subset to data from stations whose probability of being assigned to, respectively, direct treatment and control lies strictly between 0 and 1. Units are weighted by the inverse of their probability of being assigned to their assigned condition. Two-tailed p-values are calculated using randomization inference. When simulating the sampling distribution under the sharp null hypothesis of no effect for any unit, outcomes of units that were assigned to indirect exposure have been adjusted by subtracting the estimated effect of indirect exposure.

	5 km	10 km	15 km	20 km
Compliance Index (C)	0.03	−0.05	−0.21	0.2
	($p = 0.929$)	($p = 0.905$)	($p = 0.405$)	($p = 0.483$)
Crime Victimization (C)	0.07	0.1	0.01	−0.06
	($p = 0.576$)	($p = 0.157$)	($p = 0.906$)	($p = 0.568$)
Perceived Insecurity (C)	0.05	0.11	0.08	0.14
	($p = 0.717$)	($p = 0.252$)	($p = 0.386$)	($p = 0.685$)
Approval Police (C)	−0.09	−0.17*	−0.02	−0.16
	($p = 0.641$)	($p = 0.064$)	($p = 0.85$)	($p = 0.626$)
Police Empathy (O)	0.13	0.58**	0.14	0.57*
	($p = 0.567$)	($p = 0.014$)	($p = 0.593$)	($p = 0.05$)
Police Abuse (C)	0.09	0.11	0.04	0
	($p = 0.423$)	($p = 0.139$)	($p = 0.637$)	($p = 0.99$)
Report Crime (C)	0.11	0.05	0	0.03
	($p = 0.194$)	($p = 0.263$)	($p = 0.93$)	($p = 0.679$)
Report Tips (C)	0.1	0.06	−0.01	−0.1
	($p = 0.307$)	($p = 0.322$)	($p = 0.91$)	($p = 0.364$)
Report Abuse (C/A)	−0.02	−0.09	0.1	0.21
	($p = 0.934$)	($p = 0.819$)	($p = 0.743$)	($p = 0.549$)
Demand Spending (C)	0.07	0.07	−0.02	−0.13
	($p = 0.396$)	($p = 0.41$)	($p = 0.776$)	($p = 0.554$)
Report to LC1 (L)	−0.33	0.12	0.67	−0.61
	($p = 0.393$)	($p = 0.75$)	($p = 0.191$)	($p = 0.115$)
Referral by LC1 (L)	−0.15	−0.31	−0.63	−0.26
	($p = 0.762$)	($p = 0.326$)	($p = 0.151$)	($p = 0.57$)
Crime Admin (A)	0	0.5	0.39	−0.31
	($p = 1$)	($p = 0.688$)	($p = 0.778$)	($p = 0.749$)
Police Intentions (C)	−0.01	−0.16**	−0.01	0.03
	($p = 0.97$)	($p = 0.041$)	($p = 0.914$)	($p = 0.671$)
Citizen Knowledge (C)	0.05	0	0.01	−0.02
	($p = 0.258$)	($p = 0.903$)	($p = 0.747$)	($p = 0.887$)
Cooperation Norms (C)	0.03	0.03	0.07	−0.06
	($p = 0.692$)	($p = 0.735$)	($p = 0.501$)	($p = 0.74$)
Police Capacity (C)	−0.06	−0.18	0	0.08
	($p = 0.55$)	($p = 0.101$)	($p = 0.941$)	($p = 0.487$)
Police Responsiveness (C)	−0.07	−0.27*	−0.01	0.05
	($p = 0.708$)	($p = 0.069$)	($p = 0.951$)	($p = 0.757$)
Trust Courts (C)	−0.18	−0.18*	−0.09	0.25
	($p = 0.35$)	($p = 0.089$)	($p = 0.496$)	($p = 0.425$)
Trust Community (C)	−0.11	−0.17	−0.19	−0.16
	($p = 0.458$)	($p = 0.132$)	($p = 0.124$)	($p = 0.624$)
Treated Stations	7	17	13	5
Control Stations	5	5	3	2

Table SI-9: Estimated effects of indirect exposure to community policing using different spillover radii (no fixed effects)

Outcomes and regression specifications are identical to those used to produce our main results, except for the exclusion of block fixed effects. Stations in the control group that are located no further than 5km (10km, 15km, 20km) from the closest station in the treatment group are defined as indirectly exposed to community policing. The random assignment procedure has been replicated 1 million times to simulate each station's probability of being assigned to, respectively, direct treatment, indirect treatment and control. Analyses subset to data from stations whose probabilit of being assigned to, respectively, indirect treatment and control lies strictly between 0 and 1. Units are weighted by the inverse of their probability of being assigned to their assigned condition. Two-tailed p-values are calculated using randomization inference. When simulating the sampling distribution under the sharp null hypothesis of no effect for any unit, outcomes of units that were assigned to direct exposure have been adjusted by subtracting the estimated effect of direct exposure.

	Treatment			Treatment × Limited Resources			N
	estimate	S.E.	p-value	estimate	S.E.	p-value	
Compliance Index (C)	0.180	0.078	0.029	-0.056	0.107	0.601	3456
Crime Victimization (C)	0.070	0.041	0.098	-0.142	0.052	0.010	3456
Perceived Insecurity (C)	0.040	0.067	0.551	-0.046	0.086	0.597	3456
Approval Police (C)	-0.042	0.063	0.511	0.090	0.084	0.294	3456
Police Empathy (O)	-0.130	0.113	0.262	0.098	0.190	0.608	198
Police Abuse (C)	0.032	0.043	0.460	0.094	0.094	0.322	3456
Report Crime (C)	0.019	0.025	0.450	-0.060	0.040	0.143	3456
Report Tips (C)	0.039	0.035	0.267	-0.059	0.048	0.227	3456
Report Abuse (C/A)	0.389	0.152	0.016	-0.341	0.246	0.175	3456
Demand Spending (C)	0.028	0.057	0.623	-0.004	0.085	0.963	3456
Report to LC1 (L)	-0.049	0.134	0.714	0.107	0.195	0.589	288
Referral by LC1 (L)	0.039	0.191	0.841	0.238	0.276	0.394	288
Crime Admin (A)	0.253	0.278	0.367	0.518	0.524	0.328	72
Police Intentions (C)	-0.008	0.041	0.855	0.026	0.061	0.680	3456
Citizen Knowledge (C)	0.030	0.015	0.054	-0.045	0.024	0.070	3456
Cooperation Norms (C)	-0.018	0.032	0.585	-0.031	0.044	0.480	3456
Police Capacity (C)	-0.056	0.033	0.097	0.065	0.058	0.273	3456
Police Responsiveness (C)	-0.003	0.070	0.965	0.059	0.096	0.547	3456
Trust Courts (C)	-0.008	0.065	0.905	-0.028	0.088	0.749	3456
Trust Community (C)	0.021	0.058	0.718	-0.005	0.081	0.949	3455

Table SI-10: Heterogeneous effects of community policing by whether police station is well resourced

Estimates stem from a specification that regresses the outcome on an indicator for treatment assignment, an indicator for whether the police station scored below the median of an index of police station resources based on information collected at baseline, the interaction between the two as well as a baseline measure of the outcome (where available), an indicator for missingness in this baseline measure, and block fixed effects. The resource index is made up of the following variables: number of officers, number of motor cycles, size of monthly fuel allowance, crime registration book available, station diary in good condition. The columns labelled "Treatment" pertain to estimates of effects among respondents who live in jurisdictions of stations with above-median resources. The columns labelled "Treatment × Limited resources" pertain to the difference in effects across respondents who live in jurisdictions in stations with below-median and above-median resource levels.

	Treatment			Treatment × High Turnover			N
	estimate	S.E.	p-value	estimate	S.E.	p-value	
Compliance Index (C)	0.094	0.065	0.161	0.163	0.105	0.131	3408
Crime Victimization (C)	-0.004	0.043	0.926	-0.001	0.064	0.992	3408
Perceived Insecurity (C)	0.068	0.045	0.139	-0.147	0.096	0.136	3408
Approval Police (C)	-0.028	0.046	0.549	0.105	0.089	0.250	3408
Police Empathy (O)	0.049	0.109	0.658	-0.357	0.188	0.068	196
Police Abuse (C)	0.106	0.055	0.062	-0.053	0.073	0.472	3408
Report Crime (C)	-0.048	0.026	0.072	0.094	0.037	0.016	3408
Report Tips (C)	-0.006	0.027	0.820	0.064	0.050	0.216	3408
Report Abuse (C/A)	-0.012	0.128	0.927	0.560	0.231	0.021	3408
Demand Spending (C)	0.058	0.043	0.188	-0.079	0.065	0.239	3408
Report to LC1 (L)	0.100	0.126	0.433	-0.207	0.205	0.319	284
Referral by LC1 (L)	0.041	0.141	0.771	0.265	0.239	0.276	284
Crime Admin (A)	0.504	0.461	0.280	0.101	0.649	0.877	71
Police Intentions (C)	-0.019	0.039	0.637	0.081	0.061	0.195	3408
Citizen Knowledge (C)	0.004	0.018	0.833	0.010	0.029	0.742	3408
Cooperation Norms (C)	-0.047	0.027	0.091	0.056	0.050	0.266	3408
Police Capacity (C)	-0.045	0.037	0.242	0.063	0.051	0.222	3408
Police Responsiveness (C)	-0.011	0.057	0.843	0.119	0.103	0.256	3408
Trust Courts (C)	-0.018	0.058	0.767	-0.026	0.088	0.767	3408
Trust Community (C)	-0.024	0.057	0.680	0.126	0.085	0.146	3407

Table SI-11: Heterogeneous effects of community policing by whether there was high officer turnover at respective police station

Estimates stem from a specification that regresses the outcome on an indicator for treatment assignment, an indicator for whether more than 2 officers interviewed at baseline were not part of the endline sample, the interaction between the two as well as a baseline measure of the outcome (where available), an indicator for missingness in this baseline measure, and block fixed effects. The columns labelled "Treatment" pertain to estimates of effects among respondents in police stations with low turnover. The columns labelled "Treatment × High Turnover" pertain to the difference in effects across respondents who live in high and low turnover stations. The estimates in this table should be interpreted with care, because the amount of officer turnover could, in principle, be affected by treatment which would induce post-treatment bias. However, we find no evidence of such an effect. The number of observations is lower, because the officer baseline survey was not conducted in one station which is hence excluded from this analysis.

	Treatment			Treatment × Far from District HQ			N
	estimate	S.E.	p-value	estimate	S.E.	p-value	
Compliance Index (C)	0.216	0.085	0.019	-0.078	0.108	0.475	3456
Crime Victimization (C)	0.008	0.037	0.833	-0.025	0.056	0.664	3456
Perceived Insecurity (C)	0.012	0.062	0.846	0.012	0.093	0.896	3456
Approval Police (C)	0.009	0.060	0.880	0.018	0.094	0.852	3456
Police Empathy (O)	-0.177	0.136	0.207	0.131	0.177	0.466	198
Police Abuse (C)	0.003	0.039	0.947	0.150	0.083	0.080	3456
Report Crime (C)	0.010	0.024	0.671	-0.019	0.039	0.635	3456
Report Tips (C)	0.029	0.038	0.464	-0.024	0.054	0.656	3456
Report Abuse (C/A)	0.352	0.174	0.056	-0.111	0.272	0.684	3456
Demand Spending (C)	0.019	0.061	0.761	0.025	0.088	0.775	3456
Report to LC1 (L)	-0.104	0.137	0.454	0.107	0.197	0.590	288
Referral by LC1 (L)	0.157	0.187	0.411	0.036	0.272	0.894	288
Crime Admin (A)	0.405	0.357	0.262	0.417	0.595	0.487	72
Police Intentions (C)	0.041	0.042	0.338	-0.055	0.064	0.395	3456
Citizen Knowledge (C)	0.035	0.019	0.078	-0.054	0.027	0.052	3456
Cooperation Norms (C)	-0.029	0.033	0.379	-0.000	0.043	0.991	3456
Police Capacity (C)	0.024	0.037	0.519	-0.071	0.052	0.183	3456
Police Responsiveness (C)	0.033	0.063	0.602	-0.008	0.107	0.942	3456
Trust Courts (C)	0.009	0.065	0.893	-0.031	0.104	0.765	3456
Trust Community (C)	0.045	0.057	0.443	-0.070	0.090	0.440	3455

Table SI-12: Heterogeneous effects of community policing by whether station is far from district headquarter

Estimates stem from a specification that regresses the outcome on an indicator for treatment assignment, an indicator for whether the respective police station is further from the district headquarter than the median station in the sample, the interaction between the two as well as a baseline measure of the outcome (where available), an indicator for missingness in this baseline measure, and block fixed effects. The columns labelled "Treatment" pertain to estimates of effects among respondents from stations that are close to the district headquarter. The columns labelled "Treatment × Far from District HQ" pertain to the difference in the treatment effects across stations that are far from and close to the district headquarters.

	Treatment			Treatment × Low Rank			N
	estimate	S.E.	p-value	estimate	S.E.	p-value	
Compliance Index (C)	0.086	0.065	0.193	0.189	0.120	0.126	3408
Crime Victimization (C)	-0.019	0.037	0.608	0.039	0.063	0.546	3408
Perceived Insecurity (C)	-0.023	0.060	0.699	0.098	0.082	0.246	3408
Approval Police (C)	0.008	0.057	0.887	0.007	0.088	0.942	3408
Police Empathy (O)	-0.180	0.098	0.080	0.216	0.163	0.197	196
Police Abuse (C)	0.080	0.059	0.189	-0.002	0.084	0.981	3408
Report Crime (C)	-0.002	0.027	0.935	-0.031	0.043	0.480	3408
Report Tips (C)	0.051	0.030	0.097	-0.095	0.043	0.037	3408
Report Abuse (C/A)	0.275	0.153	0.083	-0.127	0.256	0.623	3408
Demand Spending (C)	0.016	0.048	0.739	0.052	0.082	0.530	3408
Report to LC1 (L)	-0.184	0.101	0.079	0.557	0.196	0.008	284
Referral by LC1 (L)	0.024	0.165	0.885	0.288	0.292	0.333	284
Crime Admin (A)	0.458	0.247	0.069	0.179	0.655	0.786	71
Police Intentions (C)	0.048	0.037	0.204	-0.101	0.064	0.125	3408
Citizen Knowledge (C)	0.000	0.017	0.990	0.024	0.033	0.471	3408
Cooperation Norms (C)	0.021	0.026	0.424	-0.139	0.049	0.008	3408
Police Capacity (C)	-0.022	0.031	0.488	0.005	0.058	0.938	3408
Police Responsiveness (C)	0.033	0.064	0.613	0.004	0.102	0.972	3408
Trust Courts (C)	-0.036	0.061	0.565	0.024	0.114	0.833	3408
Trust Community (C)	0.027	0.045	0.558	-0.004	0.096	0.971	3407

Table SI-13: Heterogeneous effects of community policing by whether officers at baseline were below average rank

Estimates stem from a specification that regresses the outcome on an indicator for treatment assignment, an indicator for whether the average rank of officers at the respective police station at baseline was smaller than the sample median, the interaction between the two as well as a baseline measure of the outcome (where available), an indicator for missingness in this baseline measure, and block fixed effects. The columns labelled "Treatment" pertain to estimates of effects among respondents who live in jurisdictions of stations with above-median average rank. The columns labelled "Treatment × Low Rank" pertain to the difference in effects across respondents who live in jurisdictions of stations with below-median and above-median rank levels. The number of observations is lower, because the officer baseline survey was not conducted in one station which is hence excluded from this analysis.

	Treatment			Treatment × Intimidated			N
	estimate	S.E.	p-value	estimate	S.E.	p-value	
Compliance Index (C)	0.153	0.050	0.004	0.109	0.056	0.055	2946
Crime Victimization (C)	0.016	0.034	0.646	-0.068	0.042	0.112	2946
Perceived Insecurity (C)	0.004	0.044	0.935	-0.009	0.043	0.833	2946
Approval Police (C)	-0.004	0.034	0.899	0.041	0.048	0.403	2946
Police Abuse (C)	0.071	0.034	0.043	-0.007	0.082	0.930	2946
Report Crime (C)	0.009	0.021	0.659	-0.051	0.018	0.007	2946
Report Tips (C)	-0.019	0.027	0.482	0.042	0.044	0.343	2946
Report Abuse (C/A)	0.264	0.109	0.019	-0.112	0.063	0.081	2946
Demand Spending (C)	0.003	0.050	0.958	0.052	0.075	0.490	2946
Police Intentions (C)	0.006	0.028	0.838	0.012	0.035	0.733	2946
Citizen Knowledge (C)	0.027	0.017	0.119	-0.038	0.024	0.116	2946
Cooperation Norms (C)	-0.012	0.031	0.706	-0.053	0.042	0.204	2946
Police Capacity (C)	-0.040	0.031	0.207	0.050	0.050	0.318	2946
Police Responsiveness (C)	0.021	0.047	0.648	0.018	0.064	0.776	2946
Trust Courts (C)	-0.074	0.055	0.182	0.083	0.071	0.245	2946
Trust Community (C)	0.018	0.049	0.710	0.024	0.061	0.695	2945

Table SI-14: Heterogeneous effects of community policing by whether respondent was intimidated by police at baseline

Estimates stem from a specification that regresses the outcome on an indicator for treatment assignment, an indicator for whether the respondent indicated at baseline that she was afraid of the police, the interaction between the two as well as a baseline measure of the outcome (where available), an indicator for missingness in this baseline measure, and block fixed effects. The sample does not include 510 replacement respondents who were only interviewed at endline but not at baseline. Missing values in the moderator are imputed using the sample average. The columns labelled "Treatment" pertain to estimates of effects among respondents who were not afraid of police at baseline. The columns labelled "Treatment × Intimidated" pertain to the difference in effects across respondents who were and were not afraid of police at baseline.

	Treatment			Treatment × High Satisfaction			N
	estimate	S.E.	p-value	estimate	S.E.	p-value	
Compliance Index (C)	0.240	0.046	0.000	-0.082	0.054	0.135	2946
Crime Victimization (C)	-0.034	0.034	0.326	0.034	0.044	0.442	2946
Perceived Insecurity (C)	0.039	0.044	0.375	-0.085	0.051	0.102	2946
Approval Police (C)	0.005	0.046	0.911	0.022	0.055	0.695	2946
Police Abuse (C)	0.048	0.050	0.345	0.037	0.092	0.689	2946
Report Crime (C)	-0.034	0.023	0.151	0.040	0.023	0.091	2946
Report Tips (C)	-0.005	0.031	0.886	0.005	0.048	0.921	2946
Report Abuse (C/A)	0.186	0.107	0.089	0.059	0.043	0.174	2946
Demand Spending (C)	0.023	0.054	0.672	0.023	0.070	0.746	2946
Police Intentions (C)	0.001	0.030	0.969	0.028	0.027	0.295	2946
Citizen Knowledge (C)	-0.005	0.018	0.760	0.029	0.025	0.253	2946
Cooperation Norms (C)	-0.058	0.032	0.077	0.049	0.044	0.265	2946
Police Capacity (C)	0.000	0.042	0.998	-0.032	0.054	0.557	2946
Police Responsiveness (C)	0.025	0.051	0.622	0.021	0.049	0.673	2946
Trust Courts (C)	0.030	0.052	0.568	-0.119	0.067	0.081	2946
Trust Community (C)	0.012	0.052	0.823	0.047	0.068	0.493	2945

Table SI-15: Heterogeneous effects of community policing by prior satisfaction with police

Estimates stem from a specification that regresses the outcome on an indicator for treatment assignment, an indicator for whether the respondent's baseline score of the "Overall perceptions of police" index fell above the median, the interaction between the two as well as a baseline measure of the outcome (where available), an indicator for missingness in this baseline measure, and block fixed effects. The number of observations is lower, because the sample excludes 510 replacement respondents that were only interviewed at endline but not at baseline. The columns labelled "Treatment" pertain to estimates of effects among respondents who had low prior satisfaction with police at baseline. The columns labelled "Treatment × High Prior" pertain to the difference in effects across respondents with low and high prior satisfaction with police at baseline.

	Treatment			Treatment × High Prior			N
	estimate	S.E.	p-value	estimate	S.E.	p-value	
Compliance Index (C)	0.150	0.054	0.007	0.057	0.064	0.377	2946
Crime Victimization (C)	-0.043	0.025	0.086	0.051	0.044	0.245	2946
Perceived Insecurity (C)	0.023	0.039	0.549	-0.036	0.043	0.402	2946
Approval Police (C)	0.008	0.049	0.869	0.020	0.058	0.733	2946
Police Abuse (C)	0.061	0.042	0.147	0.041	0.108	0.706	2946
Report Crime (C)	-0.027	0.020	0.197	0.026	0.026	0.316	2946
Report Tips (C)	-0.007	0.021	0.723	0.038	0.063	0.552	2946
Report Abuse (C/A)	0.184	0.098	0.065	0.063	0.053	0.239	2946
Police Intentions (C)	-0.001	0.035	0.974	0.012	0.036	0.735	2946
Citizen Knowledge (C)	0.009	0.016	0.602	0.003	0.026	0.910	2946
Cooperation Norms (C)	-0.034	0.033	0.318	-0.008	0.051	0.871	2946
Police Capacity (C)	-0.033	0.032	0.295	0.040	0.060	0.507	2946
Police Responsiveness (C)	-0.009	0.063	0.889	0.068	0.072	0.349	2946
Trust Community (C)	0.015	0.046	0.749	0.090	0.078	0.252	2945

Table SI-16: Heterogeneous effects of community policing by prior beliefs

Estimates stem from a specification that regresses the outcome on an indicator for treatment assignment, an indicator for whether the respondent's baseline score of the outcome fell above the median of baseline scores, the interaction between the two as well as block fixed effects. The columns labelled "Treatment" pertain to estimates of effects among respondents who had low prior beliefs along the respective dimension at baseline. The columns labelled "Treatment × High Prior" pertain to the difference in effects across respondents with low and high prior beliefs at baseline. The analysis excludes 510 replacement respondents who were interviewed at endline but not at baseline. Missing values in the moderators are imputed with the sample average. The table includes all outcomes for which baseline measures were collected.

	Treatment			Treatment × Woman			N
	estimate	S.E.	p-value	estimate	S.E.	p-value	
Compliance Index (C)	0.154	0.051	0.003	-0.007	0.051	0.894	3456
Crime Victimization (C)	0.012	0.034	0.720	-0.031	0.033	0.346	3456
Perceived Insecurity (C)	0.047	0.040	0.251	-0.060	0.042	0.162	3456
Approval Police (C)	0.042	0.045	0.357	-0.076	0.050	0.131	3456
Police Abuse (C)	0.129	0.062	0.044	-0.107	0.066	0.106	3456
Report Crime (C)	-0.006	0.023	0.796	-0.009	0.022	0.686	3456
Report Tips (C)	0.019	0.033	0.577	-0.018	0.041	0.664	3456
Report Abuse (C/A)	0.237	0.108	0.033	-0.028	0.033	0.397	3456
Demand Spending (C)	0.018	0.051	0.732	0.013	0.068	0.842	3456
Police Intentions (C)	0.011	0.031	0.727	-0.008	0.033	0.815	3456
Citizen Knowledge (C)	0.012	0.015	0.432	-0.007	0.018	0.688	3456
Cooperation Norms (C)	-0.036	0.033	0.282	0.007	0.036	0.857	3456
Police Capacity (C)	-0.053	0.032	0.101	0.066	0.044	0.137	3456
Police Responsiveness (C)	0.068	0.050	0.181	-0.081	0.052	0.126	3456
Trust Courts (C)	-0.034	0.050	0.500	0.025	0.063	0.694	3456
Trust Community (C)	0.006	0.044	0.899	0.026	0.053	0.624	3455

Table SI-17: Heterogeneous effects of community policing by gender

Estimates stem from a specification that regresses the outcome on an indicator for treatment assignment, an indicator for whether the respondent is a woman, the interaction between the two as well as a baseline measure of the outcome (where available), an indicator for missingness in this baseline measure and block fixed effects. The columns labelled "Treatment" pertain to estimates of effects among men. The columns labelled "Treatment × Woman" pertain to the difference in effects across men and women.

	Treatment			Treatment × NRM Stronghold			N
	estimate	S.E.	p-value	estimate	S.E.	p-value	
Compliance Index (C)	0.024	0.079	0.766	0.209	0.106	0.057	3408
Crime Victimization (C)	-0.015	0.061	0.807	0.025	0.077	0.749	3408
Perceived Insecurity (C)	-0.028	0.076	0.716	0.079	0.098	0.428	3408
Approval Police (C)	-0.002	0.067	0.982	0.007	0.093	0.937	3408
Police Empathy (O)	-0.050	0.121	0.686	-0.063	0.166	0.707	194
Police Abuse (C)	0.005	0.057	0.930	0.120	0.086	0.175	3408
Report Crime (C)	-0.042	0.031	0.185	0.059	0.045	0.198	3408
Report Tips (C)	0.035	0.039	0.383	-0.036	0.052	0.492	3408
Report Abuse (C/A)	0.194	0.153	0.219	0.064	0.247	0.798	3408
Demand Spending (C)	-0.049	0.053	0.366	0.133	0.078	0.099	3408
Report to LC1 (L)	0.149	0.158	0.357	-0.287	0.184	0.129	284
Referral by LC1 (L)	-0.118	0.212	0.584	0.458	0.277	0.108	284
Crime Admin (A)	0.355	0.567	0.534	0.287	0.728	0.695	71
Police Intentions (C)	0.005	0.051	0.926	0.004	0.070	0.953	3408
Citizen Knowledge (C)	0.025	0.024	0.304	-0.030	0.030	0.327	3408
Cooperation Norms (C)	-0.017	0.039	0.669	-0.009	0.049	0.851	3408
Police Capacity (C)	-0.024	0.036	0.509	0.003	0.055	0.963	3408
Police Responsiveness (C)	0.008	0.065	0.903	0.021	0.100	0.833	3408
Trust Courts (C)	-0.087	0.077	0.275	0.109	0.101	0.285	3408
Trust Community (C)	0.047	0.075	0.535	-0.059	0.096	0.542	3407

Table SI-18: Heterogeneous effects of community policing by whether respondent lives in an NRM stronghold

Estimates stem from a specification that regresses the outcome on an indicator for treatment assignment, an indicator for whether more than 60% of votes went to the NRM in the respondent's parish in the 2016 general elections, the interaction between the two as well as a baseline measure of the outcome (where available), an indicator for missingsness in this outcome measure and block fixed effects. The columns labelled "Treatment" pertain to estimates of effects among respondents who do not live in an NRM stronghold. The columns labelled "Treatment × NRM Stronghold" pertain to the difference in effects across respondents who live and do not live in an NRM stronghold. The number of observations is smaller, because the sample excludes one police station for which we could not match parishes to the electoral data.

	Estimate	S.E.	p-value	N
Local police care about community's views (C)	0.034	0.051	0.510	3447
Local police perform well (C)	0.013	0.045	0.770	3443
Local police have enough ressources (C)	0.001	0.052	0.985	3343

Table SI-19: Effects of community policing on citizen perceptions of local police

Outcomes are individual items from the citizen survey that have been standardized using the control group mean and standard deviation. Missing values are dealt with through listwise deletion, which explains why the number of observations varies across analyses. Standard errors allow for clustering on the police station level. p-values have not been adjusted for multiple comparisons. Specifications include block fixed effects.

	Estimate	S.E.	p-value	N
Citizen shared contact info with police (C)	-0.029	0.035	0.406	3456
Citizen donated to CWT (C)	0.040	0.049	0.422	3456
Amount citizen donated to CWT (C)	0.072	0.051	0.165	3448

Table SI-20: Effects of community policing on behavioral outcomes

Outcomes are individual items from the citizen survey that have been standardized using the control group mean and standard deviation. Missing values are dealt with through listwise deletion, which explains why the number of observations varies across analyses. Standard errors allow for clustering on the police station level. p-values have not been adjusted for multiple comparisons. Specifications include block fixed effects. The outcome "Amount citizen donated to CWT" codes citizens who did not contribute anything as zero.