

Online Appendix to  
'Countering violence against women by encouraging disclosure:  
A mass media experiment in rural Uganda'

# Contents

<b>A Identification Strategy</b>	<b>3</b>
A.1 Estimation of Complier Average Causal Effects . . . . .	3
A.2 Orthogonality of Compliance and Treatment . . . . .	5
A.3 Balance on Covariates . . . . .	9
<b>B Robustness Checks</b>	<b>21</b>
B.1 Crossover Effects . . . . .	21
B.2 Agnostic Estimation . . . . .	25
B.3 Robustness of Main Results to Alternative Estimation Strategies . . . . .	27
B.4 Extreme Value Bounds . . . . .	33
<b>C Sampling Strategy</b>	<b>38</b>
C.1 Sampling Strategy for Clusters . . . . .	38
C.2 Sampling Strategy for Individuals . . . . .	39
<b>D Codebooks</b>	<b>43</b>
D.1 Results in Paper . . . . .	43
D.2 Results in Appendix . . . . .	48
<b>E Supplementary Information</b>	<b>54</b>
E.1 Ethical Considerations . . . . .	54
E.2 Explanatory Note on Main Tables . . . . .	56
E.3 Narrative for Anti-VAW Videos . . . . .	57
E.4 Anti-VAW Media Campaigns Around the World . . . . .	60
<b>F Supplementary Analyses</b>	<b>60</b>
F.1 Other Witnesses Increase Willingness to Report . . . . .	62
F.2 Tables for Coefficient Plot (Figure 5) . . . . .	63
F.3 Effects on Community-Level Measures of Violence . . . . .	64
F.4 Extrapolation of Main Results on Violence . . . . .	68
F.5 Heterogeneity of Main Effect on Violence . . . . .	70
F.6 Correlations Among Key Outcomes . . . . .	71

## A Identification Strategy

This section of the appendix presents the main identifying assumptions behind our study and tests them empirically.

- Subsection A.1 presents the key estimands of the study and shows how we estimate them. It provides a formal definition of the cross-over assumptions underlying the design and describes the characteristics of the subpopulations of interest (compliers and non-compliers).
- In subsection A.2 we provide a formal test of the hypothesis that compliance is unaffected by the treatment, both at the individual and cluster level. We are unable to reject the hypothesis that the treatment does not affect the probability that an individual went to view one of the screenings. We also show that the number of attendees of the screenings – as measured by enumerators – does not bear a statistically significant relationship to the treatment. These results support the notion that the treatment did not cause people to attend or avoid going to the films at all.
- Results presented in subsection A.3 support the claim that the treatment did not cause people with different observable characteristics to attend the films. We assess balance on a range of covariates among various subsamples in our data, and find roughly 5% of covariates are significantly imbalanced at the  $\alpha = 5\%$  level, which is consistent with the null hypothesis of no imbalance.

### A.1 Estimation of Complier Average Causal Effects

We denote a vector of random assignments,  $\mathbf{z}^m$ , where the superscript indicates the message to which a respondent’s village was assigned,

$$m \in \{\text{placebo, VAW, abortion, absenteeism}\},$$

$z_i^m = 1$  when individual  $i$  resides in a village  $j$  that was assigned to message  $m$ , 0 otherwise. We can then define a respondent-level compliance function,  $d_i^m(z^m)$ , where  $d_i^m$  indicates the actual treatment the respondent received. Let  $d_i^m = 1$  when the respondent attended at least one film showing message  $m$ , and  $d_i^m = 0$  otherwise. Our identification strategy assumes that individuals

who reside in villages that have not been assigned to a particular message  $m$  cannot have viewed message  $m$ , i.e.  $d_i^m(z^m = 0) = 0$ . This assumption seems plausible given that we selected the villages in our study in such a way that respondents are unlikely to have attended a film festival in a village in which they do not reside (see section C.1). Given this assumption, we can think of a “complier” as any respondent for whom  $d_i^m(z^m = 1) = 1$  and of a never-taker as any respondent for whom  $d_i^m(z^m = 1) = 0$ .

Since every village (cluster) screened the video message to which it was assigned (including screenings in the control condition, where films were shown with no treatment vignettes), we assume that these are the only compliance types in the population. We make two additional assumptions tested formally below. First, we assume  $d_i^{m=k}(z^{m=k}) = d_i^{m=l}(z^{m=l})$ , for all  $k$  and  $l$ . In other words, we assume that the specific treatment condition does not affect compliance. Given this assumption, the placebo “reveals” the same compliers as the other treatments. Second, we assume that  $Y_i^{m=k}(z^{m \neq k} = 1) = Y_i^{m=k}(z^{m=k} = 0)$ , for all  $k$ . In other words, we assume no crossover effects:  $m$ -specific outcomes are unaffected by assignment to non- $m$  treatments. Most importantly for the results presented in this paper, we assume that VAW-specific outcomes are unaffected by the absenteeism and abortion messages. We relax this assumption below, when we consider crossover effects and agnostic estimators.

In our main specifications, we are interested in the following causal estimand

$$\tau_{\text{com}} = E[(Y_i^{VAW}(d_i^{VAW}(z^{VAW} = 1))) - Y_i^{VAW}(d_i^{VAW}(z^{VAW} = 0))] | d_i^{VAW}(1) = 1], \quad (1)$$

which reveals the average causal effect of the VAW treatment messages on VAW-related outcomes among compliers.

We estimate  $\tau_{\text{com}}$  by fitting the following linear model among subsets of our data containing only compliers:

$$Y_{ij}^{VAW} = \alpha + \tau z_j^{VAW} + \mathbf{X}_j^\top \boldsymbol{\gamma} + \delta r_{ij} + \epsilon_{ij}, \quad (2)$$

where  $Y_{ij}^{VAW}$  is the outcome of interest for individual  $i$  in cluster (village)  $j$ ,  $\alpha$  is an intercept and  $z_j^{VAW}$  is a treatment assignment indicator which takes the value 1 if a respondent resides in a

village which was assigned to the VAW treatment.  $\mathbf{X}_j^\top$  is a vector containing block indicators and the average audience size across all screenings that took place in a given village.  $r_{ij}$  is an indicator for whether respondent  $i$  was part of the second round of endline sampling.  $\epsilon_{ij}$  is an individual-level error term which is adjusted for clustering at the village level. Consistent with the pre-analysis plan, we report one-sided  $p$ -values for most of our outcomes and two-tailed  $p$ -values for some.  $P$ -values are calculated through randomization inference by computing the sampling distribution of the estimator under the sharp null of no (positive / negative) effect for all units.<sup>1</sup>

The regression model above estimates the average treatment effect among individual compliers. One could conduct an analogous estimation at the cluster level after collapsing the outcome to cluster means. The latter approach has the advantage of simplicity but changes the weighting of individual respondents (giving more weight to respondents from clusters with fewer compliers).

This estimation approach assumes no effect of treatment on compliance. Table 1 shows descriptive statistics of a set of covariates for adult respondents by compliance type. In some analyses we do not condition the analysis on attendance, and simply analyze effects among all randomly sampled respondents.

## A.2 Orthogonality of Compliance and Treatment

In a placebo-controlled design, the average treatment effect among compliers can be identified by subsetting to those who complied in each condition, provided that respondents who comply have the same potential outcomes distributions in expectation. In our study, this assumption implies the treatment did not affect *who* attended the treatment.

We test whether the compliance status of respondents is affected by the treatment by computing a likelihood ratio permutation test, modeling the compliance status of the respondent as the outcome of a logit data-generating process. The results are displayed in table 2. First, we compare a model that includes only block fixed effects and a resample indicator to one that also includes an indicator for whether a cluster was assigned to the VAW treatment condition. Second, we also report results from the most principled test of the null of no effect of the treatment on compliance status, insofar as it uses all 7 arms of the treatment and does not require the assumption that com-

---

<sup>1</sup>We also ran all our analyses including additional covariates. As pre-specified in our pre-analysis plan, we used lasso regression to select the minimal number of covariates that best predict each outcome from a large set of covariates, and included only these in our estimation. As can be seen in section B.3 of this appendix, the results do not change much.

	Mean among non-compliers	Mean among all compliers	Mean among panel compliers
Woman	0.55 (n = 4372)	0.31 (n = 1156)	0.31 (n = 1041)
Age (in yrs)	32.07 (n = 4372)	29.13 (n = 1156)	29.59 (n = 1041)
Less than 8 yrs of education	0.65 (n = 4370)	0.67 (n = 1156)	0.67 (n = 1041)
Married or living as married	0.75 (n = 4370)	0.71 (n = 1156)	0.72 (n = 1041)
Ever been to big city	0.74 (n = 4372)	0.81 (n = 1156)	0.8 (n = 1041)
Consumes news every day	0.67 (n = 4369)	0.73 (n = 1155)	0.74 (n = 1040)
Uses mobile phone every day	0.71 (n = 4365)	0.71 (n = 1153)	0.73 (n = 1039)
Main language is Luganda	0.86 (n = 4372)	0.87 (n = 1156)	0.88 (n = 1041)
Catholic	0.43 (n = 4372)	0.47 (n = 1156)	0.47 (n = 1041)
Protestant	0.15 (n = 4372)	0.16 (n = 1156)	0.16 (n = 1041)
Muslim	0.15 (n = 4372)	0.15 (n = 1156)	0.15 (n = 1041)
Prays at least once a day	0.84 (n = 4369)	0.79 (n = 1156)	0.79 (n = 1041)
Number of rooms in house	2.73 (n = 4372)	2.47 (n = 1156)	2.49 (n = 1041)
Mud wall	0.24 (n = 4372)	0.26 (n = 1156)	0.25 (n = 1041)
Brick wall	0.59 (n = 4372)	0.59 (n = 1156)	0.6 (n = 1041)
Owens radio	0.81 (n = 4372)	0.83 (n = 1156)	0.83 (n = 1041)
Owens TV	0.28 (n = 4372)	0.19 (n = 1156)	0.19 (n = 1041)
Owens cell phone	0.8 (n = 4372)	0.79 (n = 1156)	0.8 (n = 1041)

Table 1: Characteristics of Adult Respondents by Compliance Type

pliance is unaffected by combinations of the treatment. Both tests are done among all respondents and separately among men and women. Finally, we also test whether the number of compliers per cluster (focusing on compliers that were interviewed in both the midline and the endline) is affected by treatment. We do so by using an F-test to compare a linear model that predicts the number of compliers using block fixed effects and the resample indicator to one that also includes an VAW treatment indicator or the full set of treatment indicators for 6 of the 7 treatment conditions. We again do this test separately for the number of men and women compliers. All tests are done using randomization inference. Moreover, we show in Table 3 that the number of men and women who attended the film screenings, as reported by enumerators who were present during the screenings, is balanced across treatment conditions.

Taken together, these tests support the contention that our design is able to recover the complier average treatment effect (CATE) by subsetting analysis to compliers.

Restricted Model		Unrestricted Model		Sample	P-Value
Pr(Complier	Block + Resample Indicators)	Pr(Complier	Block + Resample + VAW Treatment Indicators)	All Respondents (ML, N = 5528)	0.517
Pr(Complier	Block + Resample Indicators)	Pr(Complier	Block + Resample + 7 Treatment Condition Indicators)	All Respondents (ML, N = 5528)	0.107
Pr(Complier	Block + Resample Indicators)	Pr(Complier	Block + Resample + VAW Treatment Indicators)	Women (ML, N = 2743)	0.254
Pr(Complier	Block + Resample Indicators)	Pr(Complier	Block + Resample + 7 Treatment Condition Indicators)	Women (ML, N = 2743)	0.164
Pr(Complier	Block + Resample Indicators)	Pr(Complier	Block + Resample + VAW Treatment Indicators)	Men (ML, N = 2785)	0.916
Pr(Complier	Block + Resample Indicators)	Pr(Complier	Block + Resample + 7 Treatment Condition Indicators)	Men (ML, N = 2785)	0.217
E(N Compliers	Block + Resample Indicators)	E(N Compliers	Block + Resample + VAW Treatment Indicators)	110 Clusters	0.525
E(N Compliers	Block + Resample Indicators)	E(N Compliers	Block + Resample + 7 Treatment Condition Indicators)	110 Clusters	0.122
E(N Women Compliers	Block + Resample Indicators)	E(N Compliers	Block + Resample + VAW Treatment Indicators)	110 Clusters	0.251
E(N Women Compliers	Block + Resample Indicators)	E(N Compliers	Block + Resample + 7 Treatment Condition Indicators)	110 Clusters	0.231
E(N Men Compliers	Block + Resample Indicators)	E(N Compliers	Block + Resample + VAW Treatment Indicators)	110 Clusters	0.965
E(N Men Compliers	Block + Resample Indicators)	E(N Compliers	Block + Resample + 7 Treatment Condition Indicators)	110 Clusters	0.127

Table 2: Tests of the assumption that treatment does not affect compliance.



	Placebo	VAW	ABO	ABS	ABO+ABS	VAW+ABO	VAW+ABS	p-value
Average attendees per screening	35.46	35.58	32.73	35.83	32.96	41.31	32.40	0.74
Total attendees per trading center	209.31	213.50	195.06	212.44	195.81	247.88	191.50	0.70
Average women attendees per screening	11.59	10.99	10.22	10.74	12.32	14.78	11.46	0.52
Total women attendees per trading center	68.25	65.94	61.25	63.62	73.00	88.69	67.44	0.48
Average men attendees per screening	23.87	24.59	22.51	25.08	20.64	26.53	20.94	0.74
Total men attendees per trading center	141.06	147.56	133.81	148.81	122.81	159.19	124.06	0.72

Table 3: Balance of reported attendance across all conditional treatment conditions.

### A.3 Balance on Covariates

We examine balance on observable pre-treatment covariates, focusing primarily on the subsamples from the midline and endline survey data that are used to estimate the main results. For each covariate in each subsample, we test for a significant relationship to the treatment using randomization inference to conduct a likelihood ratio test. In the tables below, the first column names the covariate and the following seven columns show means of covariate under the respective treatment conditions. The last column in the table shows the  $p$ -value from the likelihood ratio test. The ‘full’ model regresses the covariate on the six non-placebo treatment indicators, controlling for block and resample fixed effects. The restricted model regresses the covariate on block and resample fixed effects only. The observed likelihood ratio is compared to 3,000 likelihood ratios simulated under the null of no effect of treatment on the covariate for all units by re-permuting the treatment assignment and re-estimating the likelihood. The  $p$ -value is equal to the proportion of such simulations at least as great as the observed likelihood ratio. Note that  $p$ -values are not adjusted to account for family-wise error rates: under independence, in expectation  $x\%$  of the covariates should exhibit imbalance that is significant at the  $x\%$  level.

Note that balance tables are always estimated using all available covariates. The number of covariates included in the balance tables nevertheless varies as a function of: a) whether the tests are conducted among the midline or endline data (different questions were asked in each round); b) variation in the variable among subsamples (some variables, such as whether the respondent speaks a minority language, have very little variation overall and eventually no variation as samples become increasingly narrower). The balance tables can be summarized as follows:

- Table 4 reports balance of 94 covariates across the seven treatment conditions among all respondents in the midline: 5/94 (5%) tests exhibit a  $p$ -value equal to or less than .05.
- Table 5 reports balance of 94 covariates across the seven treatment conditions among all compliers in the midline: 4/94 (5%) tests exhibit a  $p$ -value equal to or less than .05.
- Table 6 reports balance of 90 covariates across the seven treatment conditions among all compliers in the midline: 6/91 (7%) tests exhibit a  $p$ -value equal to or less than .05.
- Table 7 reports balance of 93 covariates across the seven treatment conditions among all compliers in the midline: 3/94 (3%) tests exhibit a  $p$ -value equal to or less than .05.
- Table 8 reports balance of 57 covariates across the seven treatment conditions among all respondents in the endline: 2/57 (4%) tests exhibit a  $p$ -value equal to or less than .05.
- Table 9 reports balance of 56 covariates across the seven treatment conditions among all women in the endline: 0/56 (0%) tests exhibit a  $p$ -value equal to or less than .05.
- Table 10 reports balance of 57 covariates across the seven treatment conditions among all compliers in the endline: 4/57 (7%) tests exhibit a  $p$ -value equal to or less than .05.
- Table 11 reports balance of 55 covariates across the seven treatment conditions among women compliers in the endline, irrespective of whether they were in the midline: 6/55 (11%) tests exhibit a  $p$ -value equal to or less than .05.
- Table 12 reports balance of 55 covariates across the seven treatment conditions among women compliers in the endline who were also in the midline: 6/55 (11%) tests exhibit a  $p$ -value equal to or less than .05.
- Table 13 reports balance of 56 covariates across the seven treatment conditions among men compliers, irrespective of whether they were in the midline: 2/56 (4%) tests exhibit a  $p$ -value equal to or less than .05.
- Table 14 reports balance of 56 covariates across the seven treatment conditions among men compliers, irrespective of whether they were in the midline: 2/56 (4%) tests exhibit a  $p$ -value equal to or less than .05.

Averaging across all tables, we find an overall rate of 5%. The pattern of minor imbalances we see is entirely consistent with the hypothesis of covariates being orthogonal to treatment status among the various subgroups among which our main effects are estimated.

	PLA	VAW	ABO	ABS	ABO_ABS	VAW_ABS	VAW_ABO	p-value
living_standard	1.07	1.00	1.00	1.13	1.03	0.91	0.99	0.01
english_christian	0.07	0.08	0.09	0.09	0.10	0.07	0.14	0.03
education_work	0.06	0.04	0.03	0.05	0.02	0.04	0.04	0.03
living_conditions	0.12	0.08	0.07	0.15	0.03	0.06	0.02	0.04
mutooro	0.02	0.01	0.04	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.06
misc_floor	0.08	0.08	0.15	0.13	0.14	0.11	0.16	0.07
minority_lang	0.03	0.02	0.09	0.02	0.06	0.03	0.03	0.08
not_married	0.15	0.16	0.15	0.17	0.14	0.18	0.12	0.10
minority_tribe	0.07	0.09	0.05	0.07	0.06	0.04	0.07	0.13
highest_grade	7.49	7.43	6.90	7.00	6.34	6.72	6.77	0.14
muslim	0.20	0.20	0.14	0.15	0.14	0.09	0.16	0.17
job_kampala	0.94	0.93	0.96	0.93	0.94	0.95	0.95	0.17
luganda_lang	0.92	0.93	0.82	0.84	0.82	0.80	0.90	0.17
catholic	0.40	0.42	0.42	0.47	0.46	0.51	0.40	0.18
no_work	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.18
cement_floor	0.69	0.62	0.55	0.57	0.45	0.54	0.54	0.19
minority_religion	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.20
religious_service	1.92	1.82	1.66	1.33	1.46	1.21	1.57	0.20
age	31.25	31.11	30.73	31.66	32.05	31.90	31.49	0.20
rooms	2.64	2.66	2.60	2.92	2.73	2.59	2.59	0.22
stone_wall	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.06	0.03	0.23
sofa	0.33	0.27	0.23	0.27	0.22	0.23	0.26	0.23
living_standard_children	1.47	1.42	1.45	1.45	1.46	1.34	1.43	0.24
chair	0.88	0.87	0.85	0.90	0.88	0.85	0.85	0.24
mukiga	0.04	0.03	0.05	0.02	0.08	0.05	0.03	0.24
living_as_married	0.39	0.35	0.44	0.36	0.35	0.39	0.43	0.25
munyoro	0.09	0.05	0.08	0.07	0.05	0.03	0.06	0.25
female	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.49	0.49	0.49	0.27
earth_floor	0.23	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.40	0.35	0.30	0.28
tv	0.33	0.29	0.23	0.31	0.21	0.24	0.22	0.28
electric_light	0.29	0.25	0.17	0.26	0.13	0.17	0.16	0.29
illiterate	0.10	0.09	0.13	0.11	0.14	0.13	0.11	0.33
cement_wall	0.11	0.07	0.09	0.10	0.06	0.10	0.10	0.34
write_and_read	0.82	0.85	0.79	0.81	0.77	0.79	0.82	0.36
other_work	0.05	0.06	0.04	0.04	0.03	0.04	0.03	0.38
pray_private	8.02	8.10	7.99	8.19	8.09	8.03	7.99	0.39
brick_wall	0.63	0.67	0.57	0.61	0.58	0.54	0.57	0.39
runyankole_lang	0.02	0.03	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.12	0.06	0.40
members	4.53	4.61	4.39	4.72	4.58	4.31	4.54	0.42
married	0.36	0.39	0.33	0.36	0.40	0.32	0.35	0.43
living_conditions_compared	2.03	2.06	1.97	2.07	1.98	1.97	1.99	0.47
separated	0.09	0.10	0.08	0.12	0.11	0.12	0.10	0.47
household_younger	3.03	3.11	2.92	3.22	3.11	2.88	3.07	0.47
survey_luganda	0.98	0.98	0.97	0.96	0.97	0.95	0.99	0.48
household_children	2.40	2.41	2.28	2.52	2.49	2.25	2.41	0.49
close_relatives	0.89	0.89	0.86	0.89	0.87	0.83	0.88	0.49
transport_work	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.04	0.03	0.51
manual_work	0.09	0.06	0.07	0.06	0.08	0.07	0.07	0.51
share_house	0.30	0.34	0.30	0.26	0.24	0.31	0.28	0.52
charcoal_fuel	0.51	0.47	0.43	0.38	0.37	0.38	0.41	0.53
kerosene_light	0.20	0.25	0.30	0.24	0.29	0.24	0.28	0.54
other_person	0.10	0.09	0.08	0.11	0.08	0.07	0.08	0.54
cellphone	0.83	0.82	0.78	0.81	0.77	0.80	0.78	0.55
household_other	0.08	0.09	0.07	0.08	0.06	0.07	0.05	0.55
single_hut	0.61	0.58	0.61	0.62	0.68	0.59	0.62	0.56
several_huts	0.09	0.08	0.09	0.12	0.08	0.10	0.09	0.58
household_spouse	0.36	0.35	0.37	0.35	0.36	0.34	0.38	0.59
university	0.08	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.05	0.06	0.05	0.59
munyankole	0.08	0.10	0.14	0.11	0.13	0.17	0.13	0.59
household_older	0.50	0.51	0.47	0.50	0.46	0.43	0.47	0.60
fumbira_lang	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.07	0.05	0.05	0.01	0.60
protestant	0.16	0.16	0.17	0.12	0.14	0.15	0.15	0.62
witchcraft	1.26	1.17	1.23	1.21	1.20	1.24	1.23	0.62
domestic_work	0.04	0.05	0.05	0.03	0.04	0.04	0.05	0.68
firewood_fuel	0.47	0.51	0.55	0.59	0.61	0.59	0.56	0.69
living_conditions_tribe	-0.04	-0.05	0.03	-0.04	-0.06	-0.07	-0.05	0.69
misc_wall	0.01	0.02	0.06	0.02	0.04	0.04	0.05	0.72
village_official	0.07	0.06	0.08	0.06	0.07	0.06	0.08	0.72
atheist	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.73
mufumbira_tribe	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.06	0.05	0.05	0.02	0.73
mobile_phone_use	3.33	3.34	3.18	3.28	3.16	3.29	3.19	0.73
misc_light	0.08	0.08	0.07	0.06	0.08	0.09	0.09	0.76
day	1.24	1.22	1.24	1.25	1.27	1.25	1.21	0.76
misc_fuel	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.77
munyarwanda	0.11	0.10	0.10	0.12	0.12	0.13	0.09	0.77
mud_wall	0.21	0.20	0.25	0.23	0.29	0.25	0.25	0.78
travel_big_city	0.75	0.77	0.75	0.73	0.75	0.79	0.76	0.78
solar_light	0.29	0.28	0.34	0.32	0.37	0.36	0.32	0.79
frequency_discussion	1.80	1.73	1.84	1.79	1.80	1.80	1.78	0.79
agriculture_work	0.52	0.53	0.60	0.59	0.62	0.57	0.60	0.80

christian_only	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.82
muganda_tribe	0.56	0.59	0.52	0.54	0.50	0.53	0.58	0.83
number_children	3.83	3.89	3.87	4.03	4.21	3.96	4.01	0.84
write_only	0.04	0.04	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.04	0.85
radio	0.81	0.83	0.81	0.83	0.81	0.80	0.82	0.86
same_village	0.40	0.37	0.35	0.40	0.38	0.36	0.39	0.86
read_only	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.87
holy_spirit	0.15	0.13	0.14	0.16	0.14	0.15	0.12	0.88
dist_to_video_hall	597.45	928.32	587.05	1021.48	1075.62	1324.33	559.44	0.90
household_head	0.56	0.57	0.56	0.57	0.58	0.59	0.56	0.93
men_beaten	1.07	1.08	1.13	1.09	1.03	1.18	1.04	0.97
retail_work	0.14	0.16	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.14	0.13	0.97
motor_cycle	0.27	0.27	0.25	0.27	0.26	0.25	0.26	0.98
hospitality_work	0.05	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.05	0.99

Table 4: Balance on covariates among **all respondents in the midline sample**, irrespective of compliance or gender.

	PLA	VAW	ABO	ABS	ABO_ABS	VAW_ABS	VAW_ABO	p-value
english_christian	0.03	0.06	0.06	0.08	0.07	0.06	0.19	0.01
minority_tribe	0.09	0.17	0.08	0.07	0.08	0.03	0.04	0.01
living_standard_children	1.47	1.27	1.45	1.52	1.56	1.29	1.47	0.02
cellphone	0.87	0.74	0.72	0.86	0.80	0.76	0.80	0.03
living_standard	1.04	0.97	0.95	1.16	0.98	0.87	0.88	0.05
atheist	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.07
motor_cycle	0.22	0.20	0.21	0.32	0.21	0.21	0.16	0.07
misc_floor	0.09	0.09	0.21	0.14	0.19	0.12	0.20	0.08
munyankole	0.07	0.10	0.09	0.04	0.10	0.18	0.13	0.09
protestant	0.21	0.23	0.15	0.10	0.16	0.14	0.16	0.11
minority_lang	0.03	0.04	0.08	0.02	0.05	0.03	0.01	0.11
no_work	0.01	0.00	0.02	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.11
dist_to_video_hall	429.16	254.12	297.63	240.32	1213.82	214.65	232.31	0.11
highest_grade	7.37	7.66	6.45	7.09	7.06	6.18	6.92	0.13
university	0.07	0.05	0.03	0.04	0.06	0.01	0.02	0.13
kerosene_light	0.16	0.33	0.35	0.24	0.31	0.30	0.37	0.16
tv	0.29	0.14	0.14	0.24	0.18	0.15	0.20	0.16
munyarwanda	0.08	0.04	0.16	0.12	0.10	0.16	0.09	0.16
electric_light	0.26	0.12	0.11	0.14	0.07	0.07	0.11	0.17
rooms	2.49	2.34	2.25	2.54	2.72	2.54	2.33	0.18
cement_floor	0.69	0.51	0.43	0.56	0.44	0.49	0.50	0.19
age	28.70	28.51	27.96	28.59	30.10	30.44	28.83	0.19
luganda_lang	0.91	0.93	0.86	0.86	0.84	0.80	0.94	0.19
education_work	0.08	0.06	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.03	0.04	0.19
stone_wall	0.02	0.01	0.04	0.04	0.03	0.06	0.03	0.20
mobile_phone_use	3.49	3.12	3.06	3.43	3.28	3.12	3.34	0.21
misc_wall	0.01	0.04	0.09	0.01	0.02	0.07	0.07	0.23
earth_floor	0.22	0.40	0.36	0.31	0.37	0.39	0.31	0.26
living_conditions_tribe	-0.03	-0.13	0.06	-0.07	-0.12	-0.10	-0.24	0.26
munyoro	0.09	0.03	0.06	0.08	0.02	0.03	0.07	0.31
catholic	0.44	0.44	0.48	0.49	0.45	0.55	0.39	0.32
holy_spirit	0.09	0.06	0.12	0.14	0.12	0.13	0.08	0.32
sofa	0.26	0.14	0.13	0.21	0.15	0.19	0.17	0.33
mukiga	0.03	0.02	0.04	0.02	0.10	0.04	0.03	0.33
write_and_read	0.81	0.88	0.79	0.88	0.85	0.81	0.87	0.34
frequency_discussion	1.88	1.68	1.94	1.73	1.94	1.79	1.82	0.35
write_only	0.05	0.02	0.06	0.04	0.02	0.05	0.02	0.36
married	0.33	0.36	0.34	0.37	0.41	0.30	0.25	0.38
living_as_married	0.37	0.31	0.40	0.35	0.33	0.37	0.47	0.38
other_work	0.05	0.07	0.05	0.03	0.01	0.03	0.02	0.38
charcoal_fuel	0.53	0.50	0.35	0.36	0.38	0.32	0.42	0.39
illiterate	0.10	0.07	0.13	0.06	0.12	0.13	0.08	0.39
misc_light	0.10	0.08	0.09	0.05	0.10	0.10	0.09	0.40
firewood_fuel	0.42	0.46	0.62	0.59	0.59	0.65	0.55	0.40
read_only	0.05	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.40
runyankole_lang	0.02	0.02	0.05	0.03	0.05	0.13	0.04	0.42
domestic_work	0.02	0.01	0.03	0.01	0.03	0.01	0.04	0.43
living_conditions_compared	1.90	1.87	1.75	1.98	1.93	1.92	1.76	0.46
living_conditions	0.12	-0.02	0.01	0.09	0.06	0.03	-0.09	0.47
witchcraft	1.36	1.24	1.30	1.32	1.20	1.33	1.21	0.48
chair	0.84	0.86	0.82	0.89	0.87	0.82	0.87	0.48
pray_private	7.71	8.09	8.01	7.92	8.00	7.88	7.71	0.49
solar_light	0.32	0.31	0.31	0.42	0.40	0.36	0.26	0.49
brick_wall	0.71	0.64	0.54	0.65	0.57	0.54	0.56	0.50
single_hut	0.57	0.58	0.62	0.65	0.69	0.65	0.60	0.54
other_person	0.05	0.08	0.08	0.09	0.05	0.03	0.07	0.54
religious_service	2.08	2.22	1.24	1.04	1.70	1.22	1.21	0.56
muslim	0.22	0.18	0.13	0.17	0.16	0.08	0.17	0.60
number_children	2.98	3.17	3.23	3.08	3.63	3.63	3.20	0.60
female	0.28	0.29	0.31	0.27	0.31	0.38	0.30	0.62
household_older	0.39	0.34	0.42	0.41	0.34	0.37	0.45	0.62
fumbira_lang	0.03	0.01	0.01	0.09	0.05	0.04	0.01	0.62
same_village	0.51	0.42	0.46	0.49	0.53	0.45	0.46	0.63
survey_luganda	0.98	0.96	0.97	0.99	0.99	0.96	0.98	0.63
men_beaten	1.40	1.24	1.53	1.01	1.09	1.20	1.20	0.66
agriculture_work	0.53	0.56	0.61	0.66	0.68	0.62	0.64	0.66
christian_only	0.02	0.02	0.04	0.02	0.01	0.03	0.01	0.67
job_kampala	0.94	0.95	0.94	0.92	0.96	0.96	0.95	0.69
share_house	0.32	0.33	0.31	0.26	0.25	0.25	0.32	0.69

household_other	0.12	0.11	0.09	0.08	0.07	0.08	0.10	0.69
transport_work	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.06	0.03	0.06	0.08	0.70
mufumbira_tribe	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.09	0.04	0.04	0.01	0.72
radio	0.82	0.85	0.77	0.84	0.85	0.83	0.83	0.74
manual_work	0.10	0.06	0.07	0.06	0.09	0.09	0.06	0.74
minority_religion	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.76
mutooro	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.77
mud_wall	0.21	0.24	0.26	0.22	0.32	0.25	0.28	0.78
several_huts	0.12	0.09	0.08	0.09	0.06	0.10	0.09	0.79
hospitality_work	0.05	0.08	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.06	0.05	0.79
not_married	0.23	0.24	0.18	0.22	0.19	0.24	0.20	0.80
muganda_tribe	0.62	0.59	0.51	0.56	0.53	0.50	0.60	0.80
day	1.24	1.16	1.17	1.22	1.25	1.25	1.25	0.84
separated	0.06	0.09	0.08	0.06	0.07	0.09	0.08	0.85
travel_big_city	0.81	0.80	0.80	0.78	0.82	0.84	0.80	0.85
household_spouse	0.22	0.21	0.25	0.27	0.23	0.26	0.22	0.86
misc_fuel	0.05	0.04	0.04	0.05	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.87
household_head	0.65	0.68	0.65	0.65	0.70	0.66	0.68	0.90
close_relatives	0.86	0.91	0.89	0.89	0.87	0.87	0.90	0.91
retail_work	0.13	0.10	0.11	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.92
household_children	2.00	1.99	1.94	2.12	2.15	2.19	2.00	0.94
cement_wall	0.06	0.06	0.07	0.08	0.05	0.08	0.06	0.96
household_younger	2.64	2.66	2.64	2.76	2.84	2.84	2.61	0.97
village_official	0.11	0.09	0.10	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.10	0.97
members	4.03	4.00	4.06	4.16	4.18	4.21	4.07	0.99

Table 5: Balance on covariates among **all compliers in the midline sample**, irrespective of gender or presence in endline sample.

	PLA	VAW	ABO	ABS	ABO_ABS	VAW_ABS	VAW_ABO	p-value
frequency_discussion	2.42	1.54	2.08	1.70	1.97	2.01	1.98	0.01
english_christian	0.08	0.07	0.12	0.09	0.11	0.04	0.24	0.02
illiterate	0.14	0.10	0.28	0.05	0.19	0.18	0.08	0.02
catholic	0.50	0.46	0.56	0.47	0.39	0.63	0.43	0.04
brick_wall	0.75	0.80	0.34	0.67	0.58	0.56	0.41	0.04
cellphone	0.69	0.49	0.52	0.77	0.73	0.73	0.65	0.05
pray_private	7.94	8.29	8.16	8.19	8.65	8.22	8.08	0.06
luganda_lang	0.92	0.98	0.90	0.81	0.79	0.82	0.96	0.06
write_and_read	0.81	0.83	0.62	0.88	0.77	0.78	0.84	0.07
religious_service	1.22	1.12	1.28	1.02	1.50	1.31	0.96	0.09
age	29.75	26.22	27.06	28.81	29.73	30.67	29.02	0.09
electric_light	0.19	0.05	0.10	0.05	0.06	0.05	0.16	0.11
survey_luganda	0.97	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.11
misc_wall	0.00	0.02	0.10	0.02	0.00	0.01	0.10	0.12
other_person	0.11	0.24	0.16	0.26	0.15	0.05	0.12	0.12
same_village	0.28	0.22	0.34	0.21	0.32	0.27	0.14	0.12
munyoro	0.14	0.02	0.06	0.02	0.00	0.04	0.08	0.14
stone_wall	0.00	0.00	0.12	0.09	0.03	0.10	0.08	0.15
men_beaten	2.11	1.22	1.62	0.63	1.27	1.12	1.04	0.16
cement_wall	0.06	0.00	0.12	0.00	0.08	0.06	0.10	0.18
misc_fuel	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.18
minority_lang	0.00	0.02	0.04	0.02	0.08	0.00	0.00	0.18
holy_spirit	0.06	0.07	0.12	0.12	0.23	0.12	0.08	0.22
solar_light	0.31	0.27	0.32	0.40	0.42	0.27	0.14	0.23
household_children	2.61	2.46	2.10	2.86	2.71	2.58	2.04	0.23
close_relatives	0.81	0.98	0.86	0.88	0.87	0.86	0.84	0.23
munyankole	0.03	0.12	0.14	0.05	0.15	0.17	0.18	0.24
minority_tribe	0.00	0.10	0.10	0.05	0.11	0.04	0.04	0.24
christian_only	0.06	0.07	0.00	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.00	0.25
highest_grade	6.89	6.78	5.08	6.63	5.95	5.55	6.02	0.25
household_head	0.11	0.24	0.18	0.09	0.21	0.27	0.20	0.27
education_work	0.08	0.05	0.00	0.02	0.02	0.04	0.02	0.27
day	1.25	1.37	1.24	1.28	1.55	1.27	1.33	0.29
earth_floor	0.31	0.49	0.52	0.44	0.44	0.54	0.37	0.30
household_older	0.97	0.73	0.86	0.91	0.77	0.71	0.84	0.31
several_huts	0.06	0.02	0.12	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.32
charcoal_fuel	0.58	0.56	0.36	0.28	0.39	0.31	0.51	0.32
misc_floor	0.06	0.05	0.10	0.09	0.15	0.06	0.18	0.33
radio	0.67	0.76	0.70	0.72	0.84	0.65	0.69	0.33
motor_cycle	0.28	0.24	0.22	0.35	0.27	0.17	0.10	0.35
protestant	0.11	0.20	0.08	0.07	0.13	0.08	0.10	0.36
cement_floor	0.64	0.46	0.38	0.47	0.42	0.40	0.45	0.36
firewood_fuel	0.42	0.44	0.64	0.70	0.61	0.69	0.49	0.36
job_kampala	0.92	0.98	0.98	0.93	0.98	0.96	0.98	0.37
single_hut	0.56	0.66	0.46	0.67	0.63	0.65	0.61	0.37
members	4.89	4.41	4.32	5.00	4.69	4.53	4.10	0.39
other_work	0.00	0.02	0.00	0.05	0.02	0.00	0.02	0.39
domestic_work	0.06	0.05	0.10	0.05	0.10	0.03	0.10	0.42
mukiga	0.00	0.05	0.02	0.05	0.08	0.01	0.00	0.44
household_younger	2.92	2.68	2.46	3.09	2.92	2.82	2.27	0.45
fumbira_lang	0.06	0.00	0.00	0.14	0.05	0.06	0.00	0.45
separated	0.08	0.22	0.14	0.07	0.15	0.19	0.16	0.46
living_conditions_tribe	0.00	-0.05	0.28	0.12	0.05	-0.10	-0.08	0.46
tv	0.17	0.12	0.14	0.16	0.10	0.09	0.18	0.47
manual_work	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.00	0.03	0.05	0.04	0.50
number_children	3.67	3.20	3.84	3.65	4.26	4.00	3.43	0.51
married	0.42	0.27	0.30	0.40	0.40	0.27	0.20	0.54
runyankole_lang	0.03	0.00	0.06	0.02	0.08	0.12	0.04	0.54

mobile_phone_use	2.67	2.44	2.20	2.91	2.85	2.90	2.82	0.54
household_spouse	0.78	0.68	0.74	0.86	0.74	0.67	0.69	0.56
read_only	0.03	0.02	0.04	0.00	0.03	0.00	0.02	0.56
living_conditions	0.22	-0.02	0.08	0.30	0.05	-0.10	0.12	0.56
sofa	0.25	0.17	0.14	0.26	0.15	0.17	0.31	0.58
muslim	0.19	0.12	0.12	0.23	0.13	0.12	0.14	0.61
not_married	0.08	0.12	0.06	0.02	0.10	0.12	0.10	0.61
university	0.03	0.02	0.00	0.05	0.05	0.01	0.00	0.62
mufumbira_tribe	0.03	0.00	0.02	0.12	0.05	0.08	0.00	0.62
mutooro	0.06	0.05	0.02	0.00	0.02	0.01	0.06	0.63
living_standard_children	1.53	1.39	1.58	1.42	1.55	1.31	1.59	0.65
living_conditions_compared	2.08	2.00	1.82	2.12	2.11	1.96	2.06	0.67
village_official	0.03	0.05	0.02	0.05	0.00	0.06	0.06	0.68
travel_big_city	0.75	0.73	0.74	0.58	0.77	0.81	0.76	0.68
dist_to_video_hall	206.58	287.22	189.62	191.86	358.53	141.04	183.67	0.69
rooms	2.47	2.41	2.18	2.33	2.68	2.47	2.24	0.73
living_as_married	0.42	0.39	0.50	0.51	0.35	0.42	0.53	0.73
kerosene_light	0.22	0.39	0.36	0.33	0.34	0.42	0.43	0.75
muganda_tribe	0.67	0.56	0.54	0.58	0.47	0.50	0.53	0.76
misc_light	0.11	0.10	0.14	0.07	0.05	0.10	0.06	0.78
write_only	0.03	0.05	0.06	0.07	0.00	0.04	0.06	0.78
agriculture_work	0.61	0.56	0.70	0.72	0.61	0.67	0.55	0.78
retail_work	0.14	0.20	0.10	0.07	0.15	0.14	0.12	0.85
share_house	0.39	0.32	0.42	0.30	0.34	0.32	0.37	0.87
household_other	0.11	0.07	0.08	0.05	0.05	0.06	0.10	0.89
living_standard	1.08	1.12	0.92	1.07	0.98	0.94	0.88	0.90
no_work	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.92
chair	0.72	0.78	0.76	0.86	0.81	0.78	0.76	0.93
mud_wall	0.19	0.17	0.32	0.21	0.31	0.26	0.31	0.94
hospitality_work	0.08	0.10	0.06	0.07	0.08	0.08	0.14	0.96
munyarwanda	0.08	0.10	0.10	0.14	0.13	0.15	0.10	0.97
witchcraft	1.28	1.24	1.18	1.28	1.18	1.27	1.10	0.98
atheist	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
minority_religion	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
transport_work	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

Table 6: Balance on covariates among **women compliers in the midline sample**, irrespective of presence in endline sample.

	PLA	VAW	ABO	ABS	ABO_ABS	VAW_ABS	VAW_ABO	p-value
minority_tribe	0.12	0.19	0.07	0.08	0.07	0.03	0.04	0.00
english_christian	0.01	0.06	0.04	0.07	0.06	0.08	0.17	0.04
munyarwanda	0.08	0.02	0.18	0.12	0.09	0.17	0.08	0.05
living_standard	1.02	0.91	0.96	1.19	0.98	0.83	0.89	0.07
atheist	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.07
mobile_phone_use	3.81	3.41	3.45	3.62	3.47	3.26	3.57	0.07
living_standard_children	1.45	1.21	1.39	1.56	1.56	1.29	1.42	0.08
cellphone	0.94	0.85	0.81	0.90	0.83	0.79	0.87	0.09
kerosene_light	0.13	0.31	0.35	0.21	0.29	0.23	0.34	0.10
minority_lang	0.04	0.05	0.10	0.02	0.04	0.05	0.01	0.13
rooms	2.49	2.31	2.28	2.62	2.74	2.58	2.36	0.14
misc_floor	0.10	0.11	0.26	0.15	0.21	0.16	0.20	0.14
dist_to_video_hall	515.32	240.28	347.17	258.13	1592.59	260.21	253.22	0.14
other_work	0.06	0.09	0.07	0.03	0.01	0.06	0.03	0.15
living_conditions	0.08	-0.02	-0.02	0.01	0.06	0.11	-0.18	0.15
electric_light	0.29	0.15	0.11	0.18	0.07	0.09	0.09	0.17
single_hut	0.57	0.55	0.69	0.64	0.71	0.65	0.59	0.19
tv	0.34	0.15	0.15	0.27	0.21	0.18	0.20	0.19
sofa	0.26	0.12	0.13	0.19	0.15	0.20	0.11	0.19
university	0.09	0.06	0.05	0.04	0.07	0.02	0.03	0.19
write_only	0.05	0.01	0.06	0.03	0.03	0.06	0.01	0.20
mukiga	0.04	0.01	0.06	0.02	0.11	0.06	0.04	0.20
agriculture_work	0.51	0.56	0.57	0.64	0.71	0.59	0.68	0.20
no_work	0.01	0.00	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.20
motor_cycle	0.19	0.18	0.21	0.31	0.19	0.24	0.18	0.22
misc_wall	0.01	0.05	0.08	0.01	0.04	0.10	0.05	0.24
radio	0.88	0.89	0.81	0.88	0.86	0.94	0.89	0.24
cement_floor	0.71	0.53	0.45	0.59	0.45	0.54	0.52	0.25
christian_only	0.00	0.00	0.06	0.02	0.01	0.04	0.01	0.26
holy_spirit	0.10	0.06	0.12	0.15	0.08	0.14	0.08	0.26
munyankole	0.09	0.09	0.07	0.04	0.08	0.19	0.11	0.26
protestant	0.25	0.24	0.18	0.11	0.18	0.17	0.18	0.27
misc_light	0.10	0.07	0.07	0.04	0.13	0.10	0.10	0.28
hospitality_work	0.03	0.07	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.06	0.01	0.29
highest_grade	7.56	8.03	7.07	7.26	7.56	6.56	7.31	0.30
domestic_work	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.32
education_work	0.08	0.07	0.03	0.03	0.01	0.02	0.04	0.35
survey_luganda	0.98	0.95	0.96	0.98	0.98	0.93	0.97	0.35
share_house	0.29	0.34	0.26	0.25	0.21	0.20	0.30	0.36
earth_floor	0.19	0.36	0.29	0.26	0.34	0.30	0.28	0.36
chair	0.89	0.90	0.85	0.90	0.90	0.85	0.92	0.38
living_as_married	0.35	0.28	0.35	0.29	0.31	0.33	0.45	0.39
luganda_lang	0.91	0.91	0.83	0.88	0.86	0.79	0.94	0.39
married	0.30	0.40	0.36	0.36	0.41	0.33	0.26	0.41
munyoro	0.06	0.03	0.06	0.09	0.04	0.02	0.07	0.43
muslim	0.23	0.20	0.13	0.15	0.17	0.06	0.18	0.45
witchcraft	1.40	1.24	1.35	1.33	1.21	1.37	1.25	0.45
retail_work	0.13	0.06	0.12	0.10	0.07	0.06	0.05	0.45

several_huts	0.14	0.11	0.06	0.11	0.07	0.15	0.11	0.46
stone_wall	0.02	0.02	0.00	0.02	0.03	0.04	0.01	0.46
mutooro	0.00	0.02	0.03	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.00	0.46
living_conditions_tribe	-0.04	-0.16	-0.05	-0.14	-0.20	-0.10	-0.31	0.46
age	28.29	29.47	28.38	28.51	30.26	30.30	28.75	0.47
runyankole_lang	0.02	0.03	0.05	0.03	0.04	0.13	0.04	0.47
living_conditions_compared	1.83	1.82	1.72	1.92	1.85	1.89	1.63	0.49
frequency_discussion	1.67	1.73	1.88	1.74	1.93	1.66	1.75	0.49
read_only	0.05	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.01	0.02	0.03	0.49
day	1.24	1.07	1.14	1.20	1.11	1.23	1.22	0.50
cement_wall	0.06	0.09	0.05	0.11	0.04	0.09	0.04	0.52
firewood_fuel	0.42	0.47	0.61	0.55	0.58	0.62	0.58	0.52
transport_work	0.05	0.06	0.06	0.09	0.04	0.10	0.11	0.53
household_spouse	0.01	0.01	0.03	0.05	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.54
religious_service	2.41	2.67	1.22	1.05	1.79	1.16	1.32	0.57
charcoal_fuel	0.52	0.47	0.34	0.39	0.38	0.33	0.39	0.59
write_and_read	0.81	0.91	0.86	0.88	0.88	0.83	0.89	0.63
catholic	0.42	0.43	0.44	0.50	0.48	0.51	0.38	0.66
solar_light	0.32	0.33	0.30	0.44	0.39	0.41	0.32	0.66
household_older	0.16	0.17	0.22	0.22	0.14	0.16	0.29	0.67
brick_wall	0.69	0.57	0.63	0.64	0.56	0.52	0.63	0.68
household_head	0.86	0.87	0.87	0.85	0.91	0.90	0.89	0.68
mufumbira_tribe	0.01	0.03	0.04	0.09	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.69
minority_religion	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.71
pray_private	7.62	8.00	7.94	7.82	7.72	7.67	7.55	0.71
not_married	0.29	0.29	0.24	0.30	0.23	0.31	0.25	0.72
fumbira_lang	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.07	0.05	0.02	0.01	0.74
manual_work	0.13	0.08	0.09	0.09	0.12	0.12	0.07	0.76
mud_wall	0.22	0.27	0.24	0.22	0.33	0.25	0.26	0.77
other_person	0.02	0.01	0.04	0.03	0.01	0.02	0.04	0.77
men_beaten	1.13	1.24	1.50	1.15	1.01	1.25	1.27	0.79
muganda_tribe	0.60	0.60	0.50	0.56	0.56	0.51	0.63	0.79
same_village	0.60	0.51	0.51	0.59	0.62	0.56	0.60	0.81
household_other	0.13	0.12	0.10	0.09	0.08	0.09	0.10	0.82
number_children	2.71	3.15	2.95	2.86	3.36	3.40	3.10	0.84
job_kampala	0.95	0.94	0.93	0.92	0.95	0.96	0.94	0.89
close_relatives	0.88	0.88	0.90	0.89	0.86	0.88	0.93	0.93
village_official	0.14	0.10	0.14	0.09	0.11	0.10	0.11	0.94
members	3.70	3.83	3.94	3.85	3.95	4.01	4.05	0.97
household_younger	2.54	2.65	2.72	2.63	2.81	2.85	2.76	0.98
travel_big_city	0.84	0.83	0.83	0.85	0.84	0.87	0.82	0.98
misc_fuel	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.04	0.05	0.04	0.99
separated	0.05	0.04	0.06	0.05	0.04	0.03	0.04	0.99
household_children	1.76	1.79	1.87	1.85	1.91	1.94	1.98	0.99
illiterate	0.09	0.06	0.06	0.07	0.09	0.10	0.08	0.99

Table 7: Balance on covariates among **men compliers in the midline sample**, irrespective of presence in endline sample.

	PLA	VAW	ABO	ABS	ABO_ABS	VAW_ABS	VAW_ABO	p-value
minority_tribe	0.05	0.12	0.08	0.04	0.10	0.04	0.05	0.01
english_christian	0.02	0.04	0.03	0.04	0.05	0.03	0.09	0.04
holy_spirit	0.12	0.08	0.14	0.19	0.13	0.17	0.09	0.08
radius	376.77	432.35	448.73	529.10	504.78	387.11	417.56	0.15
village_official	0.14	0.11	0.08	0.07	0.12	0.07	0.09	0.20
principal	0.31	0.26	0.22	0.21	0.22	0.21	0.26	0.21
illiterate	0.11	0.08	0.16	0.12	0.16	0.16	0.10	0.22
mukiga	0.05	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.09	0.03	0.04	0.22
household_head	0.51	0.59	0.56	0.56	0.63	0.60	0.56	0.23
luganda_lang	0.92	0.93	0.83	0.86	0.81	0.82	0.92	0.23
day	1.30	1.24	1.26	1.32	1.25	1.34	1.24	0.24
munyoro	0.08	0.06	0.07	0.07	0.03	0.02	0.08	0.24
minority_lang	0.03	0.03	0.08	0.02	0.06	0.03	0.01	0.25
doctor	0.34	0.37	0.35	0.31	0.30	0.31	0.41	0.25
survey_luganda	0.98	1.00	0.98	0.99	0.98	0.97	0.99	0.26
female	0.59	0.53	0.54	0.54	0.46	0.55	0.51	0.28
mutooro	0.02	0.02	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.00	0.04	0.28
muslim	0.20	0.20	0.14	0.14	0.15	0.07	0.17	0.31
teacher	0.60	0.64	0.58	0.59	0.53	0.51	0.58	0.32
highest_grade	6.97	7.09	6.21	6.25	6.22	6.08	6.47	0.33
munyankole	0.08	0.10	0.11	0.07	0.10	0.17	0.10	0.36
write_and_read	0.83	0.87	0.76	0.82	0.80	0.78	0.85	0.38
domestic_work	0.07	0.06	0.05	0.03	0.04	0.03	0.05	0.38
age	35.16	34.61	33.91	34.79	35.16	35.44	34.14	0.40
atheist	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.41
cooperative	2.72	2.75	2.73	2.72	2.65	2.74	2.74	0.41
catholic	0.40	0.42	0.42	0.44	0.43	0.52	0.38	0.45
write_only	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.05	0.03	0.05	0.03	0.47
university	0.07	0.04	0.04	0.03	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.50
christian_only	0.18	0.13	0.16	0.13	0.12	0.11	0.16	0.50
education_work	0.04	0.03	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.52
manual_work	0.09	0.08	0.04	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.53
other_work	0.04	0.05	0.07	0.04	0.04	0.06	0.04	0.53
mufumbira_tribe	0.03	0.01	0.03	0.09	0.05	0.07	0.01	0.55
mobile_phone_use	3.41	3.33	3.19	3.34	3.29	3.42	3.46	0.58
read_only	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.61
police	0.26	0.28	0.28	0.22	0.24	0.22	0.23	0.62
fumbira_lang	0.03	0.01	0.03	0.08	0.06	0.06	0.02	0.63

runyankole_lang	0.02	0.03	0.07	0.03	0.06	0.10	0.04	0.65
not_married	0.13	0.17	0.15	0.14	0.13	0.16	0.12	0.70
religious_service	1.82	1.84	1.42	1.35	1.61	1.22	1.39	0.70
judge	0.13	0.09	0.10	0.09	0.12	0.10	0.11	0.72
munyarwanda	0.09	0.09	0.16	0.11	0.09	0.13	0.11	0.74
official	0.20	0.21	0.20	0.16	0.17	0.18	0.18	0.78
married	0.54	0.53	0.55	0.53	0.58	0.48	0.54	0.79
muganda_tribe	0.60	0.57	0.48	0.56	0.50	0.53	0.57	0.81
separated	0.13	0.14	0.13	0.13	0.12	0.17	0.13	0.84
transport_work	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.03	0.02	0.03	0.04	0.85
other_person	0.09	0.08	0.08	0.06	0.06	0.08	0.07	0.85
retail_work	0.09	0.09	0.10	0.11	0.06	0.11	0.10	0.89
living_conditions_compared	2.06	2.03	1.94	2.01	2.04	2.00	2.00	0.91
living_as_married	0.20	0.16	0.17	0.20	0.17	0.19	0.21	0.92
frequency_discussion	1.45	1.43	1.52	1.45	1.51	1.46	1.46	0.98
clergy	0.50	0.53	0.49	0.52	0.52	0.52	0.52	0.98
agriculture_work	0.60	0.60	0.62	0.64	0.66	0.61	0.62	0.99
hospitality_work	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.05	0.99
no_work	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.05	0.99

Table 8: Balance on covariates among **all respondents in the endline sample**, irrespective of gender or compliance.

	PLA	VAW	ABO	ABS	ABO_ABS	VAW_ABS	VAW_ABO	p-value
illiterate	0.11	0.09	0.24	0.16	0.22	0.21	0.09	0.09
minority_tribe	0.05	0.09	0.09	0.03	0.09	0.05	0.06	0.09
village_official	0.17	0.13	0.09	0.05	0.10	0.07	0.06	0.10
read_only	0.03	0.05	0.04	0.00	0.04	0.01	0.02	0.10
female	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.12
atheist	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.13
highest_grade	6.83	6.57	5.73	5.66	5.02	5.90	6.18	0.15
radius	369.80	425.20	433.11	521.88	503.68	387.36	415.49	0.19
write_and_read	0.84	0.83	0.68	0.78	0.73	0.75	0.84	0.23
munyankole	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.07	0.10	0.18	0.09	0.24
write_only	0.01	0.03	0.04	0.06	0.01	0.02	0.05	0.25
munyoro	0.11	0.06	0.07	0.08	0.03	0.02	0.07	0.26
age	36.46	35.71	34.61	35.95	36.26	35.61	34.56	0.34
mobile_phone_use	3.25	3.17	2.85	3.06	3.02	3.24	3.27	0.35
muslim	0.18	0.18	0.13	0.16	0.11	0.08	0.15	0.35
mufumbira_tribe	0.04	0.01	0.02	0.09	0.06	0.06	0.01	0.36
household_head	0.23	0.32	0.26	0.28	0.26	0.33	0.21	0.37
english_christian	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.05	0.02	0.06	0.37
holy_spirit	0.14	0.10	0.14	0.19	0.16	0.19	0.11	0.37
education_work	0.04	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.40
mutooro	0.03	0.02	0.05	0.04	0.04	0.01	0.06	0.41
domestic_work	0.10	0.12	0.09	0.05	0.10	0.06	0.09	0.43
university	0.06	0.02	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.04	0.01	0.44
luganda_lang	0.91	0.94	0.82	0.84	0.79	0.83	0.92	0.48
retail_work	0.09	0.13	0.09	0.13	0.06	0.16	0.12	0.50
minority_lang	0.03	0.02	0.08	0.04	0.07	0.02	0.01	0.52
manual_work	0.08	0.04	0.03	0.05	0.04	0.07	0.05	0.52
religious_service	1.43	1.28	1.30	1.31	1.40	1.33	1.12	0.52
survey_luganda	0.97	1.00	0.97	0.99	0.96	0.97	0.99	0.53
mukiga	0.05	0.02	0.03	0.01	0.07	0.03	0.01	0.54
married	0.52	0.47	0.52	0.51	0.52	0.41	0.52	0.55
not_married	0.10	0.13	0.09	0.11	0.08	0.11	0.06	0.55
fumbira_lang	0.04	0.02	0.03	0.10	0.07	0.06	0.03	0.58
official	0.15	0.17	0.15	0.10	0.17	0.17	0.15	0.62
other_work	0.03	0.04	0.05	0.04	0.01	0.03	0.02	0.66
doctor	0.34	0.35	0.34	0.34	0.28	0.35	0.43	0.66
separated	0.19	0.23	0.22	0.21	0.21	0.28	0.18	0.69
catholic	0.41	0.43	0.43	0.44	0.40	0.52	0.40	0.71
day	1.34	1.28	1.34	1.37	1.26	1.36	1.38	0.76
principal	0.29	0.28	0.20	0.22	0.24	0.22	0.27	0.76
runyankole_lang	0.02	0.02	0.07	0.02	0.07	0.09	0.04	0.78
teacher	0.60	0.60	0.55	0.61	0.50	0.52	0.55	0.79
judge	0.13	0.08	0.11	0.08	0.12	0.11	0.12	0.82
other_person	0.13	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.07	0.12	0.11	0.84
christian_only	0.22	0.20	0.22	0.17	0.19	0.16	0.23	0.86
living_as_married	0.19	0.16	0.17	0.18	0.18	0.20	0.23	0.90
muganda_tribe	0.54	0.58	0.51	0.56	0.49	0.51	0.56	0.92
cooperative	2.70	2.70	2.72	2.68	2.62	2.69	2.70	0.92
agriculture_work	0.59	0.57	0.61	0.63	0.66	0.57	0.63	0.94
frequency_discussion	1.34	1.24	1.32	1.30	1.35	1.22	1.31	0.94
hospitality_work	0.06	0.07	0.09	0.09	0.10	0.09	0.08	0.95
no_work	0.06	0.07	0.09	0.09	0.10	0.09	0.08	0.95
munyarwanda	0.09	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.14	0.13	0.97
police	0.26	0.24	0.25	0.22	0.21	0.23	0.25	0.98
clergy	0.50	0.54	0.49	0.53	0.54	0.52	0.54	0.98
living_conditions_compared	2.09	2.09	2.06	2.05	2.13	2.07	2.10	1.00
transport_work	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00

Table 9: Balance on covariates among **all women in the endline sample**, irrespective of compliance.



	PLA	VAW	ABO	ABS	ABO_ABS	VAW_ABS	VAW_ABO	p-value
minority_tribe	0.05	0.15	0.08	0.04	0.13	0.03	0.03	0.00
english_christian	0.03	0.07	0.06	0.08	0.08	0.06	0.17	0.01
minority_lang	0.03	0.04	0.09	0.02	0.05	0.03	0.00	0.05
doctor	0.37	0.32	0.36	0.31	0.34	0.25	0.43	0.05
atheist	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.08
age	29.95	29.49	28.92	30.03	31.28	31.82	29.95	0.09
principal	0.36	0.23	0.21	0.22	0.21	0.21	0.23	0.09
radius	379.82	457.81	471.23	554.79	512.57	381.56	439.31	0.09
munyarwanda	0.07	0.09	0.19	0.11	0.08	0.15	0.10	0.16
catholic	0.46	0.43	0.47	0.49	0.44	0.58	0.39	0.16
university	0.06	0.05	0.03	0.04	0.07	0.01	0.02	0.17
police	0.31	0.32	0.36	0.24	0.28	0.23	0.21	0.17
luganda_lang	0.91	0.93	0.85	0.86	0.86	0.82	0.96	0.20
munyankole	0.09	0.10	0.12	0.06	0.08	0.19	0.11	0.22
munyoro	0.07	0.05	0.09	0.07	0.02	0.02	0.08	0.24
cooperative	2.77	2.83	2.75	2.79	2.68	2.82	2.80	0.25
teacher	0.63	0.65	0.57	0.62	0.54	0.50	0.62	0.27
highest_grade	7.15	7.59	6.45	7.00	7.07	6.16	6.94	0.28
write_only	0.05	0.02	0.06	0.04	0.02	0.05	0.02	0.28
education_work	0.05	0.05	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.29
domestic_work	0.05	0.03	0.05	0.01	0.04	0.02	0.04	0.32
mobile_phone_use	3.55	3.27	3.26	3.53	3.45	3.46	3.59	0.33
runyankole_lang	0.03	0.02	0.05	0.02	0.04	0.12	0.03	0.34
holy_spirit	0.08	0.06	0.11	0.13	0.13	0.10	0.08	0.36
other_person	0.04	0.08	0.08	0.03	0.05	0.08	0.08	0.36
survey_luganda	0.99	0.99	0.99	0.99	0.99	0.97	1.00	0.38
mukiga	0.04	0.03	0.02	0.05	0.09	0.03	0.03	0.40
manual_work	0.09	0.11	0.04	0.10	0.09	0.09	0.11	0.40
write_and_read	0.80	0.88	0.79	0.88	0.84	0.80	0.88	0.45
mutooro	0.01	0.03	0.03	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.03	0.45
separated	0.08	0.09	0.04	0.05	0.08	0.10	0.09	0.50
village_official	0.12	0.09	0.07	0.05	0.11	0.08	0.11	0.50
not_married	0.18	0.23	0.22	0.17	0.16	0.25	0.20	0.54
illiterate	0.11	0.08	0.12	0.07	0.13	0.14	0.08	0.54
muganda_tribe	0.64	0.53	0.46	0.55	0.54	0.53	0.61	0.54
day	1.24	1.26	1.20	1.30	1.30	1.36	1.22	0.55
hospitality_work	0.04	0.06	0.03	0.03	0.06	0.04	0.06	0.56
no_work	0.04	0.06	0.03	0.03	0.06	0.04	0.06	0.56
other_work	0.04	0.07	0.07	0.04	0.05	0.08	0.07	0.56
religious_service	2.25	2.30	1.23	1.05	1.77	1.22	1.22	0.56
female	0.31	0.30	0.29	0.27	0.30	0.38	0.30	0.57
official	0.26	0.26	0.24	0.24	0.17	0.18	0.20	0.57
transport_work	0.07	0.05	0.07	0.06	0.04	0.05	0.08	0.58
married	0.48	0.50	0.54	0.53	0.57	0.44	0.50	0.59
muslim	0.23	0.19	0.14	0.16	0.16	0.07	0.17	0.65
mufumbira_tribe	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.11	0.04	0.04	0.01	0.68
christian_only	0.02	0.02	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.01	0.68
living_conditions_compared	1.94	1.84	1.78	1.89	1.95	1.84	1.88	0.70
fumbira_lang	0.04	0.01	0.01	0.10	0.05	0.03	0.01	0.71
judge	0.12	0.09	0.08	0.10	0.13	0.09	0.09	0.75
living_as_married	0.26	0.19	0.20	0.25	0.19	0.21	0.21	0.76
agriculture_work	0.57	0.55	0.60	0.65	0.62	0.62	0.53	0.77
household_head	0.65	0.68	0.67	0.66	0.72	0.67	0.70	0.81
clergy	0.57	0.53	0.47	0.49	0.52	0.53	0.49	0.81
read_only	0.04	0.02	0.03	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.83
frequency_discussion	1.61	1.48	1.65	1.49	1.60	1.63	1.55	0.91
retail_work	0.09	0.06	0.11	0.09	0.08	0.08	0.10	0.96

Table 10: Balance on covariates among **all compliers in the endline sample**, irrespective of gender or presence in midline sample.

	PLA	VAW	ABO	ABS	ABO_ABS	VAW_ABS	VAW_ABO	p-value
other_work	0.00	0.09	0.00	0.07	0.00	0.03	0.02	0.03
mobile_phone_use	3.26	2.78	2.38	3.20	3.02	3.25	3.41	0.04
english_christian	0.05	0.07	0.11	0.07	0.08	0.04	0.20	0.04
married	0.49	0.38	0.58	0.62	0.48	0.36	0.52	0.05
munyoro	0.10	0.04	0.11	0.07	0.00	0.01	0.04	0.05
catholic	0.56	0.47	0.56	0.49	0.39	0.63	0.46	0.05
household_head	0.13	0.29	0.13	0.11	0.23	0.31	0.20	0.08
radius	374.36	480.00	475.56	575.56	501.64	382.67	456.52	0.09
illiterate	0.13	0.09	0.22	0.04	0.18	0.19	0.07	0.10
religious_service	1.18	1.07	1.24	1.00	1.49	1.28	0.98	0.10
village_official	0.21	0.20	0.09	0.09	0.11	0.09	0.04	0.11
christian_only	0.05	0.11	0.00	0.09	0.05	0.08	0.00	0.11
age	31.23	29.42	27.20	30.62	31.90	32.13	30.33	0.13
munyankole	0.08	0.11	0.13	0.04	0.07	0.24	0.11	0.13
domestic_work	0.15	0.09	0.18	0.07	0.13	0.05	0.17	0.14
holy_spirit	0.05	0.07	0.09	0.07	0.21	0.09	0.11	0.14
write_and_read	0.82	0.84	0.64	0.89	0.77	0.77	0.87	0.18
minority_tribe	0.05	0.07	0.11	0.02	0.11	0.03	0.04	0.21
separated	0.13	0.20	0.07	0.07	0.21	0.21	0.13	0.22
highest_grade	6.82	6.93	5.00	6.56	5.80	5.52	6.30	0.23
other_person	0.08	0.13	0.18	0.11	0.03	0.19	0.17	0.27
read_only	0.03	0.02	0.04	0.00	0.05	0.00	0.00	0.28
doctor	0.41	0.33	0.36	0.33	0.36	0.25	0.50	0.28
principal	0.33	0.27	0.13	0.27	0.26	0.27	0.17	0.28

luganda_lang	0.92	0.93	0.87	0.80	0.82	0.80	0.96	0.29
minority_lang	0.00	0.04	0.07	0.04	0.08	0.01	0.00	0.29
clergy	0.64	0.47	0.40	0.53	0.56	0.53	0.50	0.30
frequency_discussion	1.62	1.22	1.44	1.20	1.46	1.37	1.33	0.39
education_work	0.08	0.02	0.00	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.40
runyankole_lang	0.03	0.02	0.07	0.00	0.05	0.13	0.04	0.43
teacher	0.67	0.56	0.42	0.71	0.52	0.52	0.54	0.43
mutooro	0.03	0.04	0.02	0.00	0.03	0.01	0.09	0.46
fumbira_lang	0.05	0.00	0.00	0.16	0.05	0.05	0.00	0.49
official	0.15	0.22	0.13	0.18	0.16	0.08	0.13	0.54
university	0.03	0.02	0.00	0.04	0.05	0.01	0.00	0.58
mukiga	0.00	0.04	0.02	0.04	0.08	0.01	0.02	0.59
write_only	0.03	0.04	0.09	0.07	0.00	0.04	0.07	0.61
mufumbira_tribe	0.08	0.00	0.02	0.16	0.05	0.07	0.00	0.62
living_conditions_compared	1.97	1.87	1.82	2.09	2.05	1.92	1.98	0.73
judge	0.05	0.09	0.07	0.04	0.13	0.08	0.11	0.73
police	0.38	0.33	0.33	0.20	0.33	0.31	0.28	0.75
not_married	0.10	0.16	0.13	0.07	0.08	0.19	0.13	0.76
muganda_tribe	0.62	0.53	0.42	0.53	0.52	0.47	0.59	0.77
hospitality_work	0.05	0.13	0.07	0.09	0.10	0.07	0.11	0.79
no_work	0.05	0.13	0.07	0.09	0.10	0.07	0.11	0.79
survey_luganda	0.97	1.00	0.98	0.96	0.98	0.97	1.00	0.85
cooperative	2.79	2.73	2.78	2.80	2.70	2.76	2.80	0.85
munyarwanda	0.05	0.16	0.16	0.13	0.13	0.16	0.11	0.86
agriculture_work	0.56	0.49	0.60	0.64	0.61	0.61	0.50	0.90
female	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.91
day	1.41	1.44	1.38	1.38	1.31	1.33	1.50	0.92
living_as_married	0.28	0.27	0.22	0.24	0.23	0.24	0.22	0.93
retail_work	0.10	0.09	0.07	0.07	0.08	0.12	0.13	0.93
muslim	0.18	0.13	0.16	0.20	0.11	0.09	0.13	0.93
manual_work	0.05	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.05	0.08	0.04	0.94
transport_work	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
atheist	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

Table 11: Balance on covariates among all women compliers in the endline sample.

	PLA	VAW	ABO	ABS	ABO_ABS	VAW_ABS	VAW_ABO	p-value
married	0.46	0.36	0.57	0.62	0.51	0.34	0.51	0.03
catholic	0.51	0.49	0.55	0.49	0.38	0.66	0.44	0.03
radius	354.29	479.49	483.33	594.87	509.09	385.29	451.16	0.03
english_christian	0.06	0.08	0.12	0.08	0.09	0.04	0.21	0.04
munyoro	0.11	0.05	0.12	0.05	0.00	0.01	0.05	0.05
mobile_phone_use	3.26	2.77	2.45	3.21	3.07	3.19	3.44	0.05
illiterate	0.14	0.10	0.24	0.03	0.20	0.21	0.05	0.06
age	30.63	27.38	27.74	30.05	31.07	32.25	29.72	0.07
other_work	0.00	0.08	0.00	0.05	0.00	0.03	0.02	0.07
holy_spirit	0.06	0.08	0.10	0.08	0.24	0.10	0.09	0.12
religious_service	1.23	1.10	1.29	1.00	1.55	1.32	0.98	0.14
luganda_lang	0.91	0.97	0.88	0.79	0.80	0.82	0.95	0.15
write_and_read	0.80	0.82	0.64	0.90	0.76	0.76	0.88	0.16
minority_lang	0.00	0.03	0.07	0.05	0.09	0.00	0.00	0.16
minority_tribe	0.03	0.08	0.12	0.03	0.13	0.03	0.02	0.17
domestic_work	0.14	0.10	0.17	0.05	0.13	0.04	0.14	0.18
household_head	0.11	0.26	0.14	0.10	0.22	0.29	0.21	0.19
village_official	0.20	0.15	0.10	0.08	0.11	0.09	0.05	0.25
highest_grade	6.89	6.85	4.93	6.31	5.91	5.50	6.28	0.25
other_person	0.06	0.15	0.19	0.10	0.04	0.18	0.19	0.25
christian_only	0.06	0.08	0.00	0.03	0.02	0.03	0.00	0.26
clergy	0.66	0.49	0.40	0.51	0.56	0.54	0.49	0.28
munyankole	0.09	0.10	0.12	0.05	0.07	0.22	0.09	0.32
frequency_discussion	1.66	1.21	1.50	1.21	1.45	1.43	1.35	0.34
runyankole_lang	0.03	0.00	0.05	0.00	0.05	0.12	0.05	0.35
principal	0.34	0.26	0.14	0.28	0.24	0.26	0.19	0.38
judge	0.06	0.05	0.07	0.03	0.15	0.09	0.09	0.42
education_work	0.09	0.03	0.00	0.03	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.43
read_only	0.03	0.03	0.05	0.00	0.04	0.00	0.00	0.46
mutooro	0.03	0.05	0.02	0.00	0.02	0.01	0.09	0.48
fumbira_lang	0.06	0.00	0.00	0.15	0.05	0.06	0.00	0.49
separated	0.14	0.18	0.07	0.08	0.18	0.21	0.14	0.52
doctor	0.37	0.31	0.36	0.33	0.35	0.24	0.47	0.52
official	0.14	0.23	0.14	0.15	0.16	0.09	0.14	0.58
teacher	0.66	0.54	0.45	0.72	0.51	0.51	0.56	0.61
mufumbira_tribe	0.09	0.00	0.02	0.15	0.05	0.07	0.00	0.62
mukiga	0.00	0.05	0.02	0.05	0.09	0.01	0.02	0.63
not_married	0.11	0.15	0.14	0.05	0.09	0.19	0.14	0.65
agriculture_work	0.54	0.44	0.62	0.69	0.58	0.62	0.51	0.67
write_only	0.03	0.05	0.07	0.08	0.00	0.03	0.07	0.68
hospitality_work	0.06	0.15	0.07	0.08	0.11	0.06	0.12	0.71
no_work	0.06	0.15	0.07	0.08	0.11	0.06	0.12	0.71
university	0.03	0.03	0.00	0.03	0.05	0.01	0.00	0.72
living_conditions_compared	1.97	1.79	1.81	2.05	2.07	1.88	1.95	0.73
munyarwanda	0.03	0.15	0.17	0.15	0.13	0.16	0.12	0.74
police	0.37	0.33	0.36	0.21	0.31	0.26	0.23	0.74
muganda_tribe	0.63	0.51	0.40	0.51	0.51	0.47	0.60	0.75
muslim	0.20	0.10	0.14	0.23	0.13	0.09	0.14	0.75
female	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.84
living_as_married	0.29	0.31	0.21	0.26	0.22	0.26	0.21	0.84
survey_luganda	0.97	1.00	0.98	0.95	0.98	0.97	1.00	0.84
manual_work	0.06	0.05	0.02	0.05	0.05	0.07	0.05	0.87

retail_work	0.11	0.10	0.07	0.05	0.09	0.13	0.14	0.89
cooperative	2.80	2.74	2.76	2.77	2.71	2.74	2.81	0.91
day	1.40	1.36	1.38	1.36	1.40	1.32	1.49	0.95
transport_work	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	
atheist	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	

Table 12: Balance on covariates among women panel compliers in the endline sample.

	PLA	VAW	ABO	ABS	ABO_ABS	VAW_ABS	VAW_ABO	p-value
minority_tribe	0.06	0.18	0.06	0.05	0.12	0.03	0.05	0.00
domestic_work	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.03
minority_lang	0.04	0.04	0.09	0.01	0.04	0.04	0.00	0.07
principal	0.37	0.23	0.23	0.19	0.20	0.17	0.25	0.07
day	1.17	1.20	1.13	1.26	1.24	1.37	1.10	0.10
atheist	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.10
cooperative	2.77	2.87	2.75	2.79	2.68	2.88	2.80	0.11
english_christian	0.01	0.07	0.04	0.08	0.07	0.07	0.15	0.12
munyarwanda	0.09	0.05	0.19	0.09	0.06	0.13	0.08	0.16
radius	395.06	450.55	471.30	540.54	511.03	378.26	435.85	0.18
education_work	0.04	0.07	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.19
mutooro	0.00	0.02	0.03	0.01	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.22
write_only	0.06	0.01	0.06	0.04	0.04	0.06	0.00	0.23
retail_work	0.07	0.04	0.12	0.12	0.08	0.04	0.08	0.28
teacher	0.63	0.70	0.61	0.59	0.54	0.50	0.64	0.28
university	0.07	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.07	0.01	0.03	0.29
age	29.42	31.00	29.94	30.57	31.82	32.06	30.44	0.30
holy_spirit	0.09	0.05	0.12	0.14	0.08	0.11	0.08	0.34
mukiga	0.06	0.02	0.02	0.05	0.10	0.04	0.04	0.38
doctor	0.36	0.34	0.35	0.30	0.32	0.26	0.42	0.38
luganda_lang	0.91	0.91	0.84	0.89	0.87	0.81	0.95	0.39
other_work	0.05	0.07	0.10	0.04	0.07	0.11	0.08	0.43
household_head	0.88	0.87	0.89	0.87	0.93	0.90	0.92	0.44
police	0.27	0.31	0.35	0.24	0.27	0.23	0.21	0.44
official	0.32	0.26	0.28	0.27	0.17	0.23	0.23	0.46
muslim	0.23	0.23	0.14	0.13	0.19	0.07	0.19	0.48
manual_work	0.11	0.13	0.05	0.11	0.10	0.10	0.13	0.51
religious_service	2.67	2.78	1.19	1.06	1.88	1.14	1.31	0.51
survey_luganda	1.00	0.99	0.99	1.00	0.99	0.97	1.00	0.51
living_as_married	0.25	0.13	0.19	0.25	0.17	0.17	0.21	0.52
highest_grade	7.27	7.89	6.96	7.23	7.47	6.47	7.06	0.52
judge	0.15	0.12	0.07	0.13	0.14	0.10	0.08	0.52
village_official	0.09	0.07	0.06	0.06	0.12	0.08	0.13	0.55
transport_work	0.10	0.07	0.09	0.08	0.05	0.08	0.11	0.59
runyankole_lang	0.02	0.03	0.05	0.03	0.04	0.12	0.04	0.61
catholic	0.43	0.41	0.44	0.50	0.46	0.52	0.38	0.61
munyoro	0.05	0.05	0.07	0.07	0.04	0.03	0.09	0.66
christian_only	0.01	0.00	0.06	0.04	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.69
mufumbira_tribe	0.00	0.02	0.03	0.09	0.05	0.03	0.01	0.70
other_person	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.00	0.05	0.03	0.04	0.71
munyankole	0.09	0.10	0.11	0.06	0.10	0.17	0.13	0.76
muganda_tribe	0.65	0.55	0.49	0.58	0.52	0.57	0.59	0.79
frequency_discussion	1.60	1.62	1.76	1.60	1.67	1.76	1.65	0.80
not_married	0.21	0.25	0.24	0.21	0.19	0.27	0.23	0.82
separated	0.05	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.03	0.07	0.85
write_and_read	0.80	0.90	0.85	0.86	0.86	0.83	0.88	0.85
agriculture_work	0.58	0.60	0.59	0.63	0.65	0.63	0.56	0.86
read_only	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.03	0.87
married	0.49	0.57	0.54	0.50	0.60	0.52	0.50	0.88
fumbira_lang	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.07	0.05	0.03	0.01	0.88
hospitality_work	0.04	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.89
no_work	0.04	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.89
mobile_phone_use	3.69	3.49	3.56	3.67	3.54	3.64	3.63	0.91
living_conditions_compared	1.94	1.87	1.78	1.86	1.91	1.83	1.87	0.95
clergy	0.53	0.56	0.50	0.50	0.49	0.52	0.49	0.96
illiterate	0.10	0.07	0.07	0.08	0.10	0.10	0.09	1.00
female	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	

Table 13: Balance on covariates among all men compliers in the endline sample.

	PLA	VAW	ABO	ABS	ABO_ABS	VAW_ABS	VAW_ABO	p-value
minority_tribe	0.06	0.18	0.06	0.05	0.12	0.04	0.04	0.00
domestic_work	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.04
day	1.16	1.21	1.12	1.28	1.25	1.39	1.11	0.07
minority_lang	0.04	0.04	0.10	0.01	0.03	0.05	0.00	0.07
atheist	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.10
principal	0.37	0.22	0.23	0.20	0.20	0.18	0.25	0.11
english_christian	0.01	0.07	0.04	0.08	0.07	0.07	0.16	0.12
cooperative	2.76	2.87	2.74	2.79	2.67	2.87	2.79	0.12
write_only	0.06	0.01	0.06	0.03	0.03	0.06	0.00	0.14
munyarwanda	0.09	0.06	0.20	0.09	0.06	0.14	0.09	0.15
radius	391.14	448.31	466.35	540.19	514.06	379.28	434.31	0.17
mutooro	0.00	0.02	0.03	0.01	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.21
education_work	0.04	0.07	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.21
doctor	0.37	0.33	0.37	0.30	0.34	0.25	0.42	0.28
university	0.08	0.06	0.05	0.05	0.07	0.01	0.03	0.29

teacher	0.62	0.70	0.62	0.58	0.55	0.49	0.65	0.30
retail_work	0.08	0.04	0.12	0.10	0.08	0.05	0.08	0.33
police	0.28	0.31	0.36	0.25	0.27	0.22	0.20	0.34
luganda_lang	0.91	0.91	0.84	0.89	0.88	0.81	0.96	0.35
christian_only	0.00	0.00	0.06	0.02	0.02	0.04	0.01	0.36
village_official	0.09	0.07	0.06	0.05	0.12	0.08	0.14	0.38
holy_spirit	0.09	0.06	0.12	0.15	0.09	0.10	0.08	0.39
muslim	0.24	0.22	0.13	0.13	0.18	0.06	0.19	0.43
age	29.65	30.42	29.40	30.03	31.38	31.55	30.05	0.47
other_work	0.05	0.07	0.10	0.04	0.07	0.12	0.09	0.47
household_head	0.89	0.87	0.88	0.87	0.93	0.90	0.91	0.49
manual_work	0.10	0.13	0.05	0.11	0.11	0.10	0.14	0.49
survey_luganda	1.00	0.99	0.99	1.00	0.99	0.97	1.00	0.49
mukiga	0.06	0.02	0.02	0.05	0.09	0.05	0.04	0.51
religious_service	2.71	2.82	1.21	1.07	1.87	1.15	1.32	0.53
living_as_married	0.25	0.13	0.19	0.25	0.17	0.18	0.21	0.56
catholic	0.43	0.40	0.43	0.50	0.47	0.53	0.37	0.56
highest_grade	7.27	7.91	7.06	7.25	7.57	6.56	7.23	0.57
runyankole_lang	0.03	0.03	0.05	0.03	0.04	0.13	0.03	0.57
munyoro	0.05	0.06	0.08	0.07	0.03	0.03	0.10	0.58
other_person	0.03	0.04	0.04	0.00	0.05	0.02	0.04	0.58
judge	0.15	0.10	0.08	0.12	0.12	0.09	0.09	0.61
mufumbira_tribe	0.00	0.02	0.02	0.09	0.04	0.03	0.01	0.63
transport_work	0.10	0.07	0.10	0.08	0.05	0.08	0.12	0.63
official	0.32	0.27	0.28	0.27	0.18	0.23	0.23	0.63
not_married	0.20	0.26	0.25	0.21	0.19	0.28	0.23	0.71
munyankole	0.09	0.10	0.12	0.07	0.09	0.17	0.12	0.74
write_and_read	0.80	0.90	0.86	0.87	0.87	0.82	0.88	0.76
muganda_tribe	0.65	0.54	0.48	0.57	0.55	0.56	0.61	0.77
separated	0.05	0.04	0.03	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.07	0.80
frequency_discussion	1.59	1.61	1.71	1.59	1.66	1.76	1.64	0.80
agriculture_work	0.58	0.60	0.59	0.64	0.63	0.62	0.54	0.83
read_only	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.03	0.86
fumbira_lang	0.03	0.01	0.02	0.07	0.05	0.02	0.01	0.87
married	0.49	0.56	0.53	0.50	0.60	0.50	0.50	0.88
hospitality_work	0.04	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.89
no_work	0.04	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.89
mobile_phone_use	3.68	3.48	3.59	3.65	3.61	3.63	3.66	0.94
living_conditions_compared	1.92	1.85	1.77	1.83	1.90	1.81	1.85	0.96
clergy	0.53	0.55	0.50	0.48	0.51	0.52	0.49	0.97
illiterate	0.10	0.07	0.07	0.08	0.09	0.10	0.09	0.99
female	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	

Table 14: Balance on covariates among men panel compliers in the endline sample.

## B Robustness Checks

In this section of the appendix we illustrate that our main results (those presented in Tables 1, 2, 3, and 4 of the paper) are robust to alternative estimation strategies.

- Subsection B.1 reports results of the pre-registered procedure for testing for cross-over effects between the VAW-related outcomes and non-VAW related treatment messages (absenteeism and abortion stigma). It illustrates that results are robust to an estimation strategy in which we allow for the presence of crossover effects.
- Subsection B.2 addresses robustness of our main results to the imbalance in the treatment induced by our crossover design. The substantive interpretation and statistical significance of our main results do not change when using an alternative estimator that does not assume absence of crossover effects.
- Subsection B.3 illustrates that our main results are robust to strategies in which we: do not impute values that are missing at the item-level instead of using multiple imputation via chained equations (MICE); include on the righthandside of the regression equation covariates selected through the pre-registered lasso procedure; and include all compliers in the midline and endline, rather than restricting attention to those compliers in both datasets (panel compliers).
- Subsection B.4 shows that our main results are robust to the pre-registered procedure for dealing with attrition using extreme value bounding.

### B.1 Crossover Effects

When designing the study, we expected each of the three messages to affect only views and perceived norms in that issue domain. In other words, we expect messages about violence against women to affect views and perceived norms regarding violence against women but not regarding abortion or absenteeism. Thus, our core model is one in which views or norms regarding a given topic are represented as a function of village-level exposure to messages on that topic and that topic only.

We use the term “crossover effects” to refer to the effects that videos on one substantive topic may have on outcomes associated with another substantive topic. For example, if the VAW videos

were to affect attitudes about abortion, that would constitute a crossover effect.

The existence of crossover effects is not entirely implausible, because all our treatments convey the message that one should take action of some sort. We thus test for the existence of crossover and interaction effects, where interaction effects refer to the effects of particular combinations of video messages. If crossover and interaction effects exist, we expect them to be positive. We also expect them to be strongest for the abortion and VAW treatments given that both are related to views on gender roles.

For each outcome we analyze, we conduct a two-step diagnosis for crossover effects.

1. The first step is only run if the outcome is abortion- or VAW-related; as specified above, these are two outcomes where we do see a positive interaction as plausible. We take the observed difference in  $F$ -statistics between the main model that only has the relevant treatment indicator and covariates on the right-hand side, and an augmented model that contains the other treatment indicator (VAW if the outcome is abortion-related, and vice versa) and its interaction with the main treatment indicator. We obtain a  $p$ -value for the difference in  $F$ -statistics.
2. In the second step, which we carry out for all models, we will run the ‘saturated crossover’ model, which contains all treatment indicators and their pairwise interactions. We follow a similar  $F$ -test procedure using randomization inference as described in step 1, and obtain a  $p$ -value for the observed difference in  $F$ -statistics.

As stated in our pre-analysis plan, if the  $p$ -value obtained in step 2 is less than .05, we report the fully saturated model from step 2. If the  $p$ -value obtained from step 2 is greater than .05 but that from step 1 is less than .05, we report the IPV-Abortion interaction model from step 1. If neither  $p$ -value is less than .05, we report the main specification with only the relevant treatment indicator and covariates on the right-hand side.

Table 15 reports the results for the first step under “abortion interaction  $p$ -value,” and those for the second step under “fully saturated  $p$ -value.”

Outcome	Wave	Subset	Abortion interaction $p$ -value	Fully saturated $p$ -value
Number of Incidents	endline	all women	0.282	0.330
Any Incidents	endline	all women	0.469	0.797
Reporting Index	endline	complier men	0.120	0.048
Involve Parents	endline	complier men	0.549	0.550
Involve Counselor	endline	complier men	0.441	0.538
Involve Village Leader	endline	complier men	0.347	0.076
Report to Police	endline	complier men	0.111	0.278
Reporting Index	endline	complier women	0.030	0.158
Involve Parents	endline	complier women	0.012	0.079
Involve Counselor	endline	complier women	0.019	0.137
Involve Village Leader	endline	complier women	0.538	0.571
Report to Police	endline	complier women	0.974	0.916
Reporting Index	midline	complier men	0.686	0.150
Involve Parents	midline	complier men	0.708	0.333
Involve Counselor	midline	complier men	0.464	0.618
Involve Village Leader	midline	complier men	0.492	0.614
Report to Police	midline	complier men	0.960	0.265
Reporting Index	midline	complier women	0.554	0.220
Involve Parents	midline	complier women	0.357	0.208
Involve Counselor	midline	complier women	0.391	0.544
Involve Village Leader	midline	complier women	0.490	0.730
Report to Police	midline	complier women	0.259	0.068
Personal Retribution	endline	complier men	0.530	0.048
Personal Retribution	endline	complier women	0.809	0.284
Social Repercussions	endline	complier men	0.517	0.343
Social Repercussions	endline	complier women	0.886	0.844
Community Would Intervene	midline	men compliers	0.118	0.133
Community Would Intervene	endline	men compliers	0.181	0.106
Community Would Intervene	midline	women compliers	0.346	0.604
Community Would Intervene	endline	women compliers	0.852	0.991

Table 15:  $F$ -tests for the presence of crossover effects.

We see some sporadic indications of crossovers on the intervene index among men and women in the midline and endline. In line with our pre-analysis plan, we report results from the models used in steps 1 and 2 as a function of the  $p$ -values in Table 15. The substantive interpretation and statistical significance of the results remains unchanged.

	Reporting Index		Involve Parents	Involve Counselor	Personal Retribution
	Endline		Endline	Endline	Endline
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Anti-VAW Media	0.214*** (0.048)	0.057* (0.034)	0.311*** (0.062)	0.328*** (0.076)	-0.122 (0.094)
Anti-Abortion Stigma Media	0.099** (0.045)	-0.023 (0.029)	0.167** (0.074)	0.156** (0.085)	-0.173 (0.089)
Anti-Absenteeism Media					-0.210 (0.077)
VAW x Abortion	-0.173 (0.070)	-0.051 (0.048)	-0.338 (0.105)	-0.317 (0.112)	0.154 (0.122)
VAW x Absenteeism					0.109 (0.110)
Abortion x Absenteeism					0.219** (0.109)
RI $p$ -values	0	0.058	0	0	0.927
Sample	Women	Men	Women	Women	Men
Block FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Observations	321	720	321	321	720
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.092	0.023	0.030	0.062	0.012

\* $p < 0.1$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.01$

Table 16: Unrestricted models from pre-registered crossover analysis procedure (Compliers).

See Tables 1 and 3 for more details on the main specifications. All analyses use individual respondents as the unit of observation. All  $p$ -values are calculated using randomization inference. Significance stars are based on a two-sided test for the effect of the main treatment (*Anti-VAW Media*). See section E.2 of the appendix for details on model specifications and section D of the appendix for details on question wording.



## B.2 Agnostic Estimation

Because our experiment does not feature an arm in which viewers were exposed to all three messages (VAW, absenteeism, and abortion stigma), the comparison of the VAW-treated subjects with the VAW-untreated subjects is slightly imbalanced. The VAW-untreated group is more likely to have been exposed to either absenteeism or abortion stigma treatments. In order to see how this imbalance arises, note that we have seven experimental conditions: placebo, VAW, absenteeism, abortion, VAW+absenteeism, VAW+abortion, and absenteeism+abortion. The VAW treatment group comprises VAW, VAW+absenteeism, and VAW+abortion, whereas the control group comprises the remaining four groups. The average marginal effect of the VAW message could be identified by comparing VAW to placebo, by comparing VAW+absenteeism to absenteeism, or by comparing VAW+abortion to abortion. Because we do not have an VAW+absenteeism+abortion group, we do not have a treated counterpart to the absenteeism+abortion control group.

An alternative estimator to the one used in this paper simply excludes the absenteeism+abortion group and includes a fixed effect for the VAW+absenteeism and absenteeism groups (to control for the effects of the absenteeism treatment) and a fixed effect for the VAW+abortion and abortion groups (to control for the effects of the abortion treatment). As can be seen in tables 17 and 18, we find that this estimator of the VAW treatment effect produces very similar point estimates but larger standard errors due to the diminished number of subjects.

A slightly less agnostic approach would be to include the absenteeism+abortion group in the analysis along with the aforementioned fixed effects; this approach in effect introduces the assumption that the fixed effects are additive. Again, this modeling approach produces similar results. The model we use throughout this paper is a special case of this specification, imposing the constraint that these fixed effects are zero.

	Any Incidents		Reporting Index		Social Repercussions
	Endline	Endline	Midline	Endline	Endline
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Anti-VAW Media	-0.048*	-0.066**	0.094***	0.125***	-0.143**
	(0.024)	(0.028)	(0.032)	(0.039)	(0.052)
Abortion	0.039	0.055	-0.074	0.003	-0.053
	(0.027)	(0.034)	(0.043)	(0.048)	(0.074)
Absenteeism	0.019	0.026	-0.072	0.017	-0.034
	(0.030)	(0.034)	(0.044)	(0.051)	(0.087)
Control Mean	0.18	0.2	0.34	0.41	0.61
RI $p$ -values VAW	0.073	0.024	0.008	0.004	0.023
RI $p$ -values Abortion	0.228	0.125	0.947	0.473	0.276
RI $p$ -values Absenteeism	0.556	0.46	0.937	0.383	0.341
Hypothesis	Two	Two	Upr	Upr	Lwr
Analysis Level	Indiv.	Clus.	Indiv.	Indiv.	Indiv.
Block FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	900	94	266	266	266
Adjusted $R^2$	0.012	0.045	0.067	0.074	0.004

\* $p < 0.1$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.01$

Table 17: Effects among women using an estimator that is unbiased in the presence of cross-over effects.

All analyses exclude respondents from clusters assigned to the absenteeism+abortion treatment condition. *Absenteeism* is a fixed effect for the VAW+absenteeism and absenteeism groups and *Abortion* is a fixed effect for the VAW+abortion and abortion groups. The row ‘Hypothesis’ indicates the direction of the hypothesis test for both the effect of ‘Anti-VAW media’ and the two fixed effects. The RI  $p$ -values are included in the rows below. These are calculated by re-randomizing based on all clusters and subsequently excluding observations from clusters assigned to the absenteeism+abortion treatment condition from the analysis. Estimates in column 1 and 2 are based on responses from all women in the endline survey (not only compliers). Estimates in columns 3,4 and 5 are based on responses from women compliers. The analyses in column 1 and 3 to 5 use individual respondents as the unit of observation. The analysis in column 2 is conducted at the village level, after collapsing individual responses to the cluster-level using cluster-level means. See section E.2 of the appendix for details on model specifications and section D of the appendix for details on question wording.

	Reporting Index		Social Repercussions
	Midline	Endline	Endline
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Anti-VAW Media	0.037* (0.021)	0.054** (0.025)	-0.037 (0.036)
Abortion	-0.036 (0.028)	-0.092 (0.029)	-0.074* (0.041)
Absenteeism	0.005 (0.028)	-0.040 (0.031)	-0.120** (0.047)
Control Mean	0.39	0.43	0.47
RI <i>p</i> -values VAW	0.073	0.029	0.185
RI <i>p</i> -values Abortion	0.883	0.997	0.071
RI <i>p</i> -values Absenteeism	0.425	0.867	0.01
Hypothesis	Upr	Upr	Lwr
Analysis Level	Indiv.	Indiv.	Indiv.
Block FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	592	592	592
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.009	0.047	0.010

\**p*<0.1; \*\**p*<0.05; \*\*\**p*<0.01

Table 18: Effects among men using an estimator that is unbiased in the presence of cross-over effects.

All analyses exclude respondents from clusters assigned to the absenteeism+abortion treatment condition. *Absenteeism* is a fixed effect for the VAW+absenteeism and absenteeism groups and *Abortion* is a fixed effect for the VAW+abortion and abortion groups. The row ‘Hypothesis’ indicates the direction of the hypothesis test for both the effect of ‘Anti-VAW media’ and the two fixed effects. The RI *p*-values are included in the rows below. These are calculated by re-randomizing based on all clusters and subsequently excluding observations from clusters assigned to the absenteeism+abortion treatment condition from the analysis. All estimates are based on responses from men compliers and all analyses use individual respondents as the unit of observation. See section E.2 of the appendix for details on model specifications and section D of the appendix for details on question wording.

### B.3 Robustness of Main Results to Alternative Estimation Strategies

Main results presented in Tables 1, 2, 3, and 4 of the paper are estimated using multiple imputation via chained equations (MICE) and do not condition on covariates beyond resample fixed effects and average audience size. In the following tables we show that our results are robust to alternative strategies that do not use imputations or condition on covariates selected using the pre-registered lasso strategy. In addition, Tables 1, 2 and 3 focus on panel compliers for the sake of comparability. We show here that our results are robust to considering effects among all compliers in the midline

(endline), irrespective of their presence in the endline (midline). The tables can be summarized as follows:

- Table 19 employs alternative statistical models to estimate the main results reported in Table 4 in the main paper. The substantive interpretation of the results remains unchanged, but the exercise illustrates that the more parametric modelling strategies increase the precision of estimates.
- Table 20 shows that the statistical significance and substantive interpretation of the main effects of the treatment on violence remain largely unchanged by adopting either a strategy in which no imputation is used or lasso-selected covariates are included in the righthandside of the regression equation. The effects of the treatment on violence frequency among all women fall short of statistical significance when incorporating the lasso-selected covariates, possibly due to the increased complexity of the model being fit.
- Table 21 shows that the statistical significance and substantive interpretation of the main effects of the treatment on attitudes towards reporting among women compliers remain largely unchanged by the use of alternative analysis strategies.
- Table 22 shows that the statistical significance and substantive interpretation of the main effects of the treatment on attitudes towards reporting among men compliers remain largely unchanged by the use of alternative analysis strategies. The effect on reporting to the village leader fall short of statistical significance when using covariates in the endline, and that on reporting to the village counselor falls short of significance in the endline when using all compliers instead of those only included in the panel.
- Table 23 shows that the statistical significance and substantive interpretation of the main effects of the treatment on perceptions of the costs associated with reporting remain largely unchanged by the use of alternative analysis strategies. The effect on the view the community would intervene falls short of significance in both the midline and endline for men when using covariates, while the use of such covariates makes the same effect significant for women in the endline.

	Number of Incidents			Violence Frequency		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Anti-VAW Media	-0.334 (0.192)	-0.572* (0.361)	-0.213** (0.097)	-0.457*** (0.172)	-0.093* (0.051)	-0.291** (0.127)
Control Mean	0.57	0.94	0.19	0.32	0.42	0.76
RI <i>p</i> -values: IPV	0.111	0.077	0.04	0.006	0.099	0.024
Hypothesis	Two	Two	Two	Two	Two	Two
Sample	All W	W compl.	All W	W compl.	All W	W compl.
Analysis Level	Indiv.	Indiv.	Indiv.	Indiv.	Indiv.	Indiv.
Block FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Estimator	Poisson	Poisson	Probit	Probit	OLS	OLS
Observations	1,036	356	1,036	356	1,036	356
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>					0.020	0.034
Log Likelihood	-1,260.649	-500.547	-441.518	-185.916		
Akaike Inf. Crit.	2,559.299	1,039.094	921.036	409.833		

\**p*<0.1; \*\**p*<0.05; \*\*\**p*<0.01

Table 19: The effect of anti-VAW mass media on incidents of violence against women over the preceding six-month period (endline).

All outcomes were measured during the endline survey. Analyses labelled “All W” are conducted among all women in the endline, regardless of compliance status, those labelled “W compl.” are conducted among women compliers only. Analyses in columns labelled “Indiv.” use individual respondents as the unit of observation, those labelled “Clus.” are conducted at the village level, after collapsing individual responses to the cluster-level using cluster-level means. Columns 1 and 2 report results from a poisson model, 3 and 4 report results from a probit model, and 5 and 6 report results from an ordinary least squares regression.

Outcome	Original sample	Alternative specification	Alt. Est.	Orig. Est.
Number of Incidents (EL)	All women	No imputations	-0.15 (p = 0.143)	-0.15 (p = 0.138)
Number of Incidents (EL)	All women	Lasso covariates	-0.14 (p = 0.173)	-0.15 (p = 0.138)
Number of Incidents (EL)	Women compliers (all)	No imputations	-0.35 (p = 0.134)	-0.34 (p = 0.132)
Number of Incidents (EL)	Women compliers (all)	Lasso covariates	-0.28 (p = 0.195)	-0.34 (p = 0.132)
Any Incidents (EL)	All women	No imputations	-0.05 (p = 0.043)	-0.05 (p = 0.044)
Any Incidents (EL)	All women	Lasso covariates	-0.05 (p = 0.044)	-0.05 (p = 0.044)
Any Incidents (EL)	Women compliers (all)	No imputations	-0.13 (p = 0.008)	-0.13 (p = 0.007)
Any Incidents (EL)	Women compliers (all)	Lasso covariates	-0.13 (p = 0.007)	-0.13 (p = 0.007)
Violence Frequency (EL)	All women	No imputations	-0.30 (p = 0.090)	-0.31 (p = 0.092)
Violence Frequency (EL)	All women	Lasso covariates	-0.30 (p = 0.109)	-0.31 (p = 0.092)
Violence Frequency (EL)	Women compliers (all)	No imputations	-0.68 (p = 0.016)	-0.67 (p = 0.015)
Violence Frequency (EL)	Women compliers (all)	Lasso covariates	-0.63 (p = 0.023)	-0.67 (p = 0.015)

Table 20: Robustness of main results reported in Table 4 to alternative estimation strategies.

*Outcome* indicates the outcome and whether it was measured in the endline (EL) or midline (ML). *Original sample* indicates the participants among whom the results in the original table were estimated: All women indicates that the sample included all of the women in the sample, irrespective of compliance status; women compliers (all) indicates that the sample includes all of the compliers surveyed in the sample, and not only those who were present in both the midline and endline samples (panel compliers). *Alternative specification* indicates the alternative approach used.

Outcome	Original sample	Alternative specification	Alt. Est.	Orig. Est.
Parents (ML)	Women compliers (panel only)	No imputations	0.09 (p = 0.065)	0.09 (p = 0.062)
Parents (EL)	Women compliers (panel only)	No imputations	0.14 (p = 0.009)	0.14 (p = 0.009)
Parents (ML)	Women compliers (panel only)	Lasso covariates	0.09 (p = 0.062)	0.09 (p = 0.062)
Parents (EL)	Women compliers (panel only)	Lasso covariates	0.14 (p = 0.009)	0.14 (p = 0.009)
Parents (ML)	Women compliers (panel only)	Women compliers (all)	0.10 (p = 0.044)	0.09 (p = 0.062)
Parents (EL)	Women compliers (panel only)	Women compliers (all)	0.13 (p = 0.011)	0.14 (p = 0.009)
Counselor (ML)	Women compliers (panel only)	No imputations	0.08 (p = 0.100)	0.08 (p = 0.100)
Counselor (EL)	Women compliers (panel only)	No imputations	0.17 (p = 0.006)	0.17 (p = 0.006)
Counselor (ML)	Women compliers (panel only)	Lasso covariates	0.06 (p = 0.139)	0.08 (p = 0.100)
Counselor (EL)	Women compliers (panel only)	Lasso covariates	0.16 (p = 0.010)	0.17 (p = 0.006)
Counselor (ML)	Women compliers (panel only)	Women compliers (all)	0.07 (p = 0.086)	0.08 (p = 0.100)
Counselor (EL)	Women compliers (panel only)	Women compliers (all)	0.13 (p = 0.025)	0.17 (p = 0.006)
Village Leader (ML)	Women compliers (panel only)	No imputations	0.06 (p = 0.152)	0.06 (p = 0.152)
Village Leader (EL)	Women compliers (panel only)	No imputations	0.06 (p = 0.168)	0.06 (p = 0.171)
Village Leader (ML)	Women compliers (panel only)	Lasso covariates	0.05 (p = 0.169)	0.06 (p = 0.152)
Village Leader (EL)	Women compliers (panel only)	Lasso covariates	0.04 (p = 0.245)	0.06 (p = 0.171)
Village Leader (ML)	Women compliers (panel only)	Women compliers (all)	0.10 (p = 0.031)	0.06 (p = 0.152)
Village Leader (EL)	Women compliers (panel only)	Women compliers (all)	0.04 (p = 0.231)	0.06 (p = 0.171)
Police (ML)	Women compliers (panel only)	No imputations	0.11 (p = 0.012)	0.11 (p = 0.012)
Police (EL)	Women compliers (panel only)	No imputations	0.13 (p = 0.013)	0.13 (p = 0.012)
Police (ML)	Women compliers (panel only)	Lasso covariates	0.11 (p = 0.012)	0.11 (p = 0.012)
Police (EL)	Women compliers (panel only)	Lasso covariates	0.13 (p = 0.012)	0.13 (p = 0.012)
Police (ML)	Women compliers (panel only)	Women compliers (all)	0.14 (p = 0.001)	0.11 (p = 0.012)
Police (EL)	Women compliers (panel only)	Women compliers (all)	0.09 (p = 0.039)	0.13 (p = 0.012)

Table 21: Robustness of main results reported in Table 1 to alternative estimation strategies. *Outcome* indicates the outcome and whether it was measured in the endline (EL) or midline (ML). *Original sample* indicates the participants among whom the results in the original table were estimated: women compliers (panel only) indicates that the sample includes only women compliers surveyed in both midline and endline samples. *Alternative specification* indicates the alternative approach used.

Outcome	Original sample	Alternative specification	Alt. Est.	Orig. Est.
Parents (ML)	Men compliers (panel only)	No imputations	0.08 (p = 0.030)	0.07 (p = 0.048)
Parents (EL)	Men compliers (panel only)	No imputations	0.04 (p = 0.178)	0.04 (p = 0.187)
Parents (ML)	Men compliers (panel only)	Lasso covariates	0.08 (p = 0.036)	0.07 (p = 0.048)
Parents (EL)	Men compliers (panel only)	Lasso covariates	0.04 (p = 0.176)	0.04 (p = 0.187)
Parents (ML)	Men compliers (panel only)	Men compliers (all)	0.07 (p = 0.048)	0.07 (p = 0.048)
Parents (EL)	Men compliers (panel only)	Men compliers (all)	0.03 (p = 0.207)	0.04 (p = 0.187)
Counselor (ML)	Men compliers (panel only)	No imputations	0.04 (p = 0.185)	0.04 (p = 0.185)
Counselor (EL)	Men compliers (panel only)	No imputations	0.05 (p = 0.079)	0.05 (p = 0.079)
Counselor (ML)	Men compliers (panel only)	Lasso covariates	0.04 (p = 0.185)	0.04 (p = 0.185)
Counselor (EL)	Men compliers (panel only)	Lasso covariates	0.06 (p = 0.077)	0.05 (p = 0.079)
Counselor (ML)	Men compliers (panel only)	Men compliers (all)	0.04 (p = 0.155)	0.04 (p = 0.185)
Counselor (EL)	Men compliers (panel only)	Men compliers (all)	0.04 (p = 0.138)	0.05 (p = 0.079)
Village Leader (ML)	Men compliers (panel only)	No imputations	0.02 (p = 0.277)	0.02 (p = 0.290)
Village Leader (EL)	Men compliers (panel only)	No imputations	0.06 (p = 0.042)	0.06 (p = 0.046)
Village Leader (ML)	Men compliers (panel only)	Lasso covariates	0.02 (p = 0.322)	0.02 (p = 0.290)
Village Leader (EL)	Men compliers (panel only)	Lasso covariates	0.04 (p = 0.116)	0.06 (p = 0.046)
Village Leader (ML)	Men compliers (panel only)	Men compliers (all)	0.04 (p = 0.173)	0.02 (p = 0.290)
Village Leader (EL)	Men compliers (panel only)	Men compliers (all)	0.07 (p = 0.029)	0.06 (p = 0.046)
Police (ML)	Men compliers (panel only)	No imputations	-0.05 (p = 0.947)	-0.05 (p = 0.956)
Police (EL)	Men compliers (panel only)	No imputations	0.02 (p = 0.329)	0.02 (p = 0.335)
Police (ML)	Men compliers (panel only)	Lasso covariates	-0.05 (p = 0.943)	-0.05 (p = 0.956)
Police (EL)	Men compliers (panel only)	Lasso covariates	0.03 (p = 0.175)	0.02 (p = 0.335)
Police (ML)	Men compliers (panel only)	Men compliers (all)	-0.05 (p = 0.958)	-0.05 (p = 0.956)
Police (EL)	Men compliers (panel only)	Men compliers (all)	0.02 (p = 0.323)	0.02 (p = 0.335)

Table 22: Robustness of main results reported in Table 2 to alternative estimation strategies. *Outcome* indicates the outcome and whether it was measured in the endline (EL) or midline (ML). *Original sample* indicates the participants among whom the results in the original table were estimated: men compliers (panel only) indicates that the sample includes only men compliers surveyed in both midline and endline samples. *Alternative specification* indicates the alternative approach used.



Outcome	Original sample	Alternative specification	Alt. Est.	Orig. Est.
Community Would Intervene (ML)	Men compliers (panel only)	No imputations	0.05 (p = 0.053)	0.05 (p = 0.058)
Community Would Intervene (EL)	Men compliers (panel only)	No imputations	0.04 (p = 0.090)	0.04 (p = 0.090)
Community Would Intervene (ML)	Men compliers (panel only)	Lasso covariates	0.04 (p = 0.116)	0.05 (p = 0.058)
Community Would Intervene (EL)	Men compliers (panel only)	Lasso covariates	0.04 (p = 0.119)	0.04 (p = 0.090)
Community Would Intervene (ML)	Men compliers (panel only)	Men compliers (all)	0.04 (p = 0.089)	0.05 (p = 0.058)
Community Would Intervene (EL)	Men compliers (panel only)	Men compliers (all)	0.05 (p = 0.071)	0.04 (p = 0.090)
Community Would Intervene (ML)	Women compliers (panel only)	No imputations	0.08 (p = 0.099)	0.08 (p = 0.099)
Community Would Intervene (EL)	Women compliers (panel only)	No imputations	0.07 (p = 0.101)	0.07 (p = 0.101)
Community Would Intervene (ML)	Women compliers (panel only)	Lasso covariates	0.08 (p = 0.094)	0.08 (p = 0.099)
Community Would Intervene (EL)	Women compliers (panel only)	Lasso covariates	0.09 (p = 0.040)	0.07 (p = 0.101)
Community Would Intervene (ML)	Women compliers (panel only)	Women compliers (all)	0.10 (p = 0.040)	0.08 (p = 0.099)
Community Would Intervene (EL)	Women compliers (panel only)	Women compliers (all)	0.05 (p = 0.190)	0.07 (p = 0.101)
Personal Retribution (EL)	Men compliers (panel only)	No imputations	-0.02 (p = 0.335)	-0.02 (p = 0.353)
Personal Retribution (EL)	Men compliers (panel only)	Lasso covariates	-0.02 (p = 0.353)	-0.02 (p = 0.353)
Personal Retribution (EL)	Men compliers (panel only)	Men compliers (all)	-0.02 (p = 0.343)	-0.02 (p = 0.353)
Personal Retribution (EL)	Women compliers (panel only)	No imputations	-0.03 (p = 0.313)	-0.03 (p = 0.321)
Personal Retribution (EL)	Women compliers (panel only)	Lasso covariates	-0.02 (p = 0.357)	-0.03 (p = 0.321)
Personal Retribution (EL)	Women compliers (panel only)	Women compliers (all)	0.01 (p = 0.559)	-0.03 (p = 0.321)
Social Repercussions (EL)	Men compliers (panel only)	No imputations	-0.03 (p = 0.197)	-0.03 (p = 0.197)
Social Repercussions (EL)	Men compliers (panel only)	Lasso covariates	-0.03 (p = 0.226)	-0.03 (p = 0.197)
Social Repercussions (EL)	Men compliers (panel only)	Men compliers (all)	-0.03 (p = 0.226)	-0.03 (p = 0.197)
Social Repercussions (EL)	Women compliers (panel only)	No imputations	-0.11 (p = 0.039)	-0.11 (p = 0.039)
Social Repercussions (EL)	Women compliers (panel only)	Lasso covariates	-0.12 (p = 0.027)	-0.11 (p = 0.039)
Social Repercussions (EL)	Women compliers (panel only)	Women compliers (all)	-0.12 (p = 0.027)	-0.11 (p = 0.039)

Table 23: Robustness of main results reported in Table 3 to alternative estimation strategies.

*Outcome* indicates the outcome and whether it was measured in the endline (EL) or midline (ML). *Original sample* indicates the participants among whom the results in the original table were estimated: women / men compliers (panel only) indicates that the sample includes only women / men compliers surveyed in both midline and endline samples. Alternative specification indicates the alternative approach used.

## B.4 Extreme Value Bounds

As mentioned in section C.2, we were unable to conduct our midline and endline household surveys in two out of the 112 villages in our sample. As we explain in section C.2, our failure to conduct the surveys seemed to be unrelated to the treatment status of these villages. We therefore simply exclude these villages from our analyses in the main part of the paper. In this section, we report extreme value bounds for our main estimates as a robustness check.




Figure 1: Distribution of the number of men and women compliers across villages.

To obtain bounds of complier average causal effects, we first predict the number of women and men compliers in the attrited villages. In line with our pre-analysis plan, we rely on a negative binomial model with the following predictors to model the number of women and men compliers per village in our midline sample: average attendance of women and, respectively, men during our screenings, the length of the radius from which respondents were sampled, block fixed effects as well as latitude and longitude of the village (video hall). We obtain the predicted number of men and women compliers for the two attrited villages in the midline. Subsequently, we multiply this number by the average of the cluster-level response rates for men and women compliers in the endline (.89 and .91 respectively). This procedure predicts 5 men and 2 women compliers for one and 7 men and 2 women compliers for the other attrited village.<sup>2</sup> See Figure 1 on how this compares to the distribution of compliance across villages.

Tables 24 and 25 report estimates among women and men compliers, respectively. Both of the attrited villages have received the VAW treatment. Upper bounds are thus obtained by imputing the

<sup>2</sup>When using all compliers and overall attendance, the models predict a total number of 7 and 9 compliers, respectively. For men compliers, the negative binomial model does not converge, but a poisson model gives the same prediction. When directly predicting the number of compliers in the endline, we obtain almost the same results (1 predicted complier more in one case and 1 complier less in another).

highest (lowest) possible values of the outcome for the compliers in the attrited clusters for positive (negative) effects. Conversely, lower bounds are obtained by imputing the lowest (highest) possible value of the outcome variable for the compliers in the attrited clusters for positive (negative) effects. All estimates are based on our usual specification that controls for block fixed effects, average attendance and an indicator for whether the respondent has been sampled during the re-sampling round. The latter has been set to zero for the hypothetical respondents in the attrited clusters.

Overall, our results are remarkably robust to the extreme value bounds approach. The estimates in table 24 suggest that the lower bound of the effect of our media intervention on the proportion of households that experienced any violence in the six months preceding our survey is a reduction of ten percentage points among compliers. In other words, our evidence suggests that our media intervention caused a substantial reduction in violence experienced by women compliers even if we presume that all complier households that would have been sampled in the attrited clusters had experienced violence in the six months preceding our household survey. Similarly, even according to the lower bounds in table 24, our media intervention substantially increased the willingness to intervene in hypothetical cases of VAW among women compliers and reduced the perception among women compliers that they would be scolded for gossiping were they to report a husband for beating his wife. The corresponding effects among men compliers were not as strong to begin with, but the lower bounds still point in the expected directions.

Finally, we further assess the robustness of our findings on violence reduction by estimating extreme value bounds for effects on the cluster level. The analyses in table 26 use the village as the unit of analyses after collapsing individual-level responses using cluster-level means. Upper and lower bounds are obtained by imputing the empirically observed minimum and maximum on the cluster-level for the attrited clusters. These analyses include all endline respondents, not only compliers.

	Any Incidents (EL)	Reporting Index (ML)	Reporting Index (EL)	Social Repercussions (EL)
Observed effect	-0.131	0.085	0.126	-0.114
RI p-value observed	0.012	0.007	0.002	0.039
Upper Bound	-0.138	0.101	0.140	-0.127
RI p-value upper bound	0.006	0.002	0.001	0.025
Lower Bound	-0.104	0.066	0.106	-0.093
RI p-value lower bound	0.059	0.035	0.007	0.080

Table 24: Extreme value bounds for estimates among women compliers.

All analyses use individual respondents as the unit of observation. See tables 4, 1 and 3 in the main text for the same estimates. Bounds are obtained by imputing the lowest (0) and highest (1) possible values of all outcome variables for the predicted number of women compliers in the two attrited villages. The resample indicator is set to 0 for all respondents in the attrited villages. See section E.2 of the appendix for details on model specifications and section D for question wording.

	Reporting Index (ML)	Reporting Index (EL)	Social Repercussions (EL)
Observed effect	0.020	0.043	-0.034
RI p-value observed	0.204	0.056	0.197
Upper Bound	0.043	0.066	-0.050
RI p-value upper bound	0.061	0.017	0.103
Lower Bound	0.005	0.027	-0.012
RI p-value lower bound	0.443	0.166	0.385

Table 25: Extreme value bounds for estimates among men compliers.

All analyses use individual respondents as the unit of observation. See tables 2 and 3 in the main text for the same estimates. Bounds are obtained by imputing the lowest (0) and highest (1) possible values of all outcome variables for the predicted number of men compliers in the two attrited villages. The resample indicator is set to 0 for all respondents in the attrited villages. See section E.2 of the appendix for details on model specifications and section D for question wording.

	Any Incidents	Number Of Incidents	Violence Frequency
Observed effect	-0.071	-0.185	-0.132
RI p-value observed	0.009	0.096	0.034
Upper Bound	-0.079	-0.211	-0.151
RI p-value upper bound	0.004	0.055	0.015
Lower Bound	-0.054	-0.084	-0.096
RI p-value lower bound	0.061	0.508	0.129
Maximum	0.600	3.000	1.300
Minimum	0.000	0.000	0.000

Table 26: Extreme value bounds for estimates among all women endline respondents collapsed to the village level.

All outcomes were measured during the endline survey. The analyses are based on responses from all women in the endline survey (not only compliers). Analyses are conducted at the village level, after collapsing individual responses to the cluster-level using cluster-level means. See table 4 in the main text for the same estimates. Bounds are obtained by imputing the lowest (see row *Minimum*) and highest (see row *Maximum*) value observed for a given outcome after taking cluster-level means for the two attrited clusters. See section E.2 of the appendix for details on model specifications and section D of the appendix for details on question wording.

## C Sampling Strategy

This section presents our sampling strategy.

- Subsection C.1 describes the method via which we selected villages into the study population.
- Subsection C.2 describes how, conditional on having selected villages, we selected households and individuals within households for inclusion in our study. It explains response rates, attrition and our approach to follow-up sampling.

### C.1 Sampling Strategy for Clusters

To select the 112 villages included in our study, we first conducted a census of villages with video halls in the districts of Mubende, Mityana, Masaka and Lwengo, which led to the identification of 342 video halls in approximately 300 candidate villages. As illustrated in Figure 2, we identified and excluded potentially problematic sites according to a number of pragmatic criteria,<sup>3</sup> narrowing down the selection to 247 candidate villages.




Figure 2: Method for Sampling Clusters from Mubende, Mityana, Masaka and Lwengo.

<sup>3</sup>We excluded video halls that operated seasonally, could not be rented on weekends, for which the GPS coordinates were missing, that only screened football matches instead of movies, and where enumerators indicated it may be difficult to successfully screen movies.

We then used a random walk algorithm to choose a set of 125 villages from the 247 candidate villages such that each village is at least 4.5 kilometers from its closest neighbor. We imposed this distance constraint in order to address concerns about spillovers. Due to various practical concerns (see Figure 2), we replaced 19 villages in the initially selected set by hand-selecting other clusters sufficiently distant from the remaining set. Among the eligible set of 125 villages, we then chose the 112 villages with the largest distance to the nearest unit. The respondents in the clusters selected in this manner comprise our sample.

## **C.2 Sampling Strategy for Individuals**

Within the villages in our study, we conducted household surveys among adults and teenagers as well as surveys with members of Village Health Teams (VHTs). In this project, we draw on surveys conducted among adult household members and VHTs.

Household respondents were sampled from a circular area around the video hall that was used to screen the treatment messages. During the first survey wave (midline survey), enumerators received a map for each village that depicted a circle around this video hall with a radius of between 200 and 800 meters. The radius was chosen based on the population density of the given village as judged from satellite images. Enumerators worked with village leaders (LC1 chairpersons) or other knowledgeable members of the community to produce a list of all households that reside within the circle indicated on the map. For the midline survey, 50 households were randomly selected from this list. Twenty-five of those were randomly chosen as households within which a woman would be interviewed by a female interviewer; in the remaining households men were interviewed by male enumerators.

Upon meeting each household, enumerators listed all adult household members (aged 18-50) of the relevant gender and randomly selected one of them as the adult respondent. If no adult respondent of the relevant gender resided in the selected household, another household was randomly chosen from the list of households within the circle around the video hall. If a respondent could not be found during the first visit of the enumerators, two additional visits were conducted before the respondent was coded as a non-response. To ensure our sampling and surveying methods were appropriate to the local context and respectful of subjects' rights, we pre-tested the survey and the questionnaire in non-experimental villages. Interviewers were extensively trained and supervised

to make sure that respondents were interviewed alone and out of earshot of others and that their responses were kept confidential.

As will be explained in more detail below, villages have been grouped into blocks of seven units. During the midline survey, there was a slight change in the sampling strategy for adults after the survey had been completed in all villages belonging to the first block. Specifically, we narrowed the age range of adult respondents from 18-65 to 18-50 and increased the number of respondents per village from 40 to 50. The first change was made to oversample compliers and the second was due to additional capacities in our survey team that we had not anticipated. Since the same sampling strategy was used among villages within the same block, there is no correlation between the sampling strategy and treatment assignment within block.<sup>4</sup>

In total, we planned to conduct 5530 interviews with adult respondents (40 respondents in the first 7 and 50 respondents in the other 105 villages) during the midline survey. We successfully conducted 5344 of these in 110 of our 112 villages. Unfortunately, we were not able to conduct any household surveys in two villages due to resistance from the local communities. We believe that our inability to work in these locations was unrelated to the treatment status of the village. The two locations are in an area known for suspicion towards outside groups. In both locations villagers were suspicious of the research team and in particular their motives for collecting head of household names (a component of the sampling procedure). There were fears related to land evictions and kidnapping. We deemed it unsafe to continue data collection in those areas. There was no indication from discussions with the residents of these villages that these difficulties were related to the specific treatment messages that were screened.

Preliminary analyses that we conducted after having completed the midline survey in the remaining 110 villages showed that some cluster-level samples had very few responses from adult respondents who had attended at least one film. Consequently, we undertook a second round of sampling in these 110 villages to target such compliers, aiming to survey 15 additional adult respondents in 14 clusters. To select the 14 clusters, we identified the two clusters in each of the 7 treatment conditions with the fewest compliers.<sup>5</sup> We conducted this sampling by continuing the

---

<sup>4</sup>Note also that we will not be re-weighting the villages to account for the fact that some have more expected compliers than others due to sampling, since our estimand is the ATE among the compliers that we find. Effects on the rate of VAW incidents will be estimated both on the individual and the cluster level. This is in accordance with an addendum to our Pre-Analysis plan.

<sup>5</sup>In one such case, the two clusters with the second lowest number of compliers had the same number of compliers.



same random sequence of households generated in the first round of sampling, so that the sampled units are the same units that would have been sampled had we continued the main midline data collection. In order to over-sample compliers, the sampling strategy within households was altered to target respondents between 18 - 35, aiming for a target of 2/3 men. This change in plan was reflected in an addendum to the pre-analysis plan submitted prior to revealing the second round of data collection. Figure 3 contains information about our midline sample. Our response rate among household respondents in the midline survey (main data collection and re-sampling combined) is 96.4%.

For the endline survey, we returned to the same villages and re-interviewed the compliers that had been sampled during the midline survey. We managed to re-interview 1,041 of the 1,156 compliers that were interviewed during the midline survey, giving a follow-up rate of 90%. In addition to re-interviewing compliers, we also conducted surveys with a new sample of 915 adult household respondents during the endline survey. 684 of those were parents of teenagers whom we interviewed as part of a second teenager survey. Additionally, we interviewed 231 additional respondents as part of our efforts to gather data on more women compliers. These additional respondents were sampled by, again, continuing the same random sequence of households generated in the first round of sampling in the midline.

Finally, we also conducted interviews with members of VHTs in the 112 villages in our sample during both the midline and endline. Members of VHTs are local volunteers whose task it is to provide advice on medical questions to the residents of the village. Each volunteer is responsible for a set of households that he or she is supposed to visit regularly. VHTs do receive compensation and do not typically provide medication. During the midline, we managed to interview at least one VHT member in each of the villages in our sample. In total, we conducted 320 midline interviews with VHT members, an average of around 3 per village. As part of the endline survey, we interviewed 338 members of VHTs in 111 clusters. The VHT members interviewed during the endline are not necessarily the same as those interviewed during the midline, since we are focus on current members in each of the survey waves.

---

We randomly selected one among the two.




Figure 3: Sample from Individual Surveys

VHT refers to the Village Health Team. Clusters refer to villages.

## D Codebooks

This section provides information about the question wording and coding of outcome measures broken down by tables and figures in the main paper and the appendix.

The responses “Don’t know” and “Refuse to answer” have been coded as missing for all outcomes.

### D.1 Results in Paper

#### Figure 5

##### *VAW Not Acceptable*

This outcome is an index created using the four items listed below. All respondents were asked the first item (disobey) but only one of the other three items. VAW Not Acceptable is created by averaging the two questions that a respondent was asked.

- In your opinion, does a man have a good reason to hit his wife if she disobeys him? If yes: Should she be slapped or should more force be used than that? If no: What if she persists in disobeying the husband? Does he then have good reason to hit her?
  - 0 = More force than that
  - $\frac{1}{3}$  = Slapped
  - $\frac{2}{3}$  = Yes
  - 1 = No
- In your opinion, does a man have a good reason to hit his wife if she spends a lot of time chatting with friends in the market?
  - 0 = Yes
  - 1 = No
- In your opinion, does a man have a good reason to hit his wife if she does not complete her household work to his satisfaction?
  - 0 = Yes
  - 1 = No
- In your opinion, does a man have a good reason to hit his wife if he is under immense financial pressure and becomes angry when she asks for money to buy food for the family?
  - 0 = Yes
  - 1 = No

##### *Women Suffer Greatly*

- Imagine that you are walking back from the garden one day, and through the bushes you see someone from your community beating his wife, who is silently crying and cowering in the corner of their home. Some people say that women like her suffer greatly when they are hit by their husbands. Other people say that women like her tend to exaggerate their suffering. Which statement comes closest to your view?

- 0 = Women like her tend to exaggerate their suffering
- 1 = Women like her suffer greatly when they are hit by their husbands

*Violence Spirals Out of Control*

- Think of a man who has never beaten his wife before but beats her for a first time. Some people think he will probably not necessarily do so again. Others think that now that he has started beating her, he will continue to beat her, and soon her life will be in danger. Which view do you most agree with?
  - 0 = He will probably not do so again
  - 1 = Now that he has started beating her, he will continue to beat her, and soon her life will be in danger

*Support Gender Equality (ML)*

This outcome is an index created of four items based on the following question stem:

- Do you agree or disagree with the following statements? There is no right or wrong answer. We are simply interested in your views on this issue.

The four items are:

- It is much better if the man is the achiever outside the home and the woman takes care of the home and family.
  - 0 = Agree
  - 1 = Disagree
- A woman should not have to kneel when she greets a man.
  - 0 = Disagree
  - 1 = Agree
- If a woman earns more money than her husband, it's almost certain to cause problems.
  - 0 = Agree
  - 1 = Disagree
- In general, women make better village leaders than men do.
  - 0 = Disagree
  - 1 = Agree

*Support Gender Equality (EL)*

This outcome is an index created of four items based on the following question stem:

- Do you agree or disagree with the following statements? There is no right or wrong answer. We are simply interested in your views on this issue.

The four items are:

- It is more important that a boy goes to school than a girl.
  - 0 = Agree
  - 1 = Disagree
- Women should be able to marry whomever they want, regardless of their parents views.
  - 0 = Disagree
  - 1 = Agree
- The father not the mother is the one who should have the final say in the household.
  - 0 = Agree
  - 1 = Disagree
- Nowadays men should participate in child rearing and household chores rather than leaving it all to the women.
  - 0 = Disagree
  - 1 = Agree

**Tables 1 and 2**

All outcomes in these tables are based on the following question stem:

- Suppose you visit your cousin and she tells you that her husband beat her severely and asks you for help. Suppose there are only two actions that you can take. Please tell us which one you would prefer to take.

Each respondent was asked to make four decisions, each of which involved a choice between two options. In each pair of options, one option involved reporting to a village-level actor, while the other option implied inaction. Different respondents were randomly assigned to be faced with different pairs of options. The randomization was restricted in the following ways: Each pair contained an ‘active’ and an ‘inactive’ option. Respondents were never asked twice about the same action and the order of the ‘active’ options remained constant.

*Involve Parents (Columns 1-2)*

- Suppose there are only two actions that you can take. Please tell us which one you would prefer to take.
  - 1 = I would talk to her parents and ask them to come by to help the couple find a peaceful solution
  - 0 = One of the following:
    - \* I would calm her down and tell her that the situation is bound to get better
    - \* I would express my sympathy for her but would tell her that every couple has to work it out for themselves
    - \* I would advise her to try harder to please her husband and things will likely improve
    - \* I would tell her that beating is often a sign of love and that she should try to work it out with her husband

*Involve Counselor (Columns 3-4)*

- Suppose there are only two actions that you can take. Please tell us which one you would prefer to take.
  - 1 = I would notify the Nabakyala and ask her to mediate the dispute (If respondent is Nabakyala: I would try to mediate the dispute in my role as Nabakyaala)
  - 0 = One of the following:
    - \* I would calm her down and tell her that the situation is bound to get better
    - \* I would express my sympathy for her but would tell her that every couple has to work it out for themselves
    - \* I would advise her to try harder to please her husband and things will likely improve
    - \* I would tell her that beating is often a sign of love and that she should try to work it out with her husband

*Involve Village Leader (Columns 5-6)*

- Suppose there are only two actions that you can take. Please tell us which one you would prefer to take.
  - 1 = I would get the LC1 chairperson involved (If respondent is an LC1 chairperson: I would get involved to mediate the dispute in my role as the LC1 chairperson)
  - 0 = One of the following:
    - \* I would calm her down and tell her that the situation is bound to get better
    - \* I would express my sympathy for her but would tell her that every couple has to work it out for themselves
    - \* I would advise her to try harder to please her husband and things will likely improve
    - \* I would tell her that beating is often a sign of love and that she should try to work it out with her husband

*Report to Police (Columns 7-8)*

- Suppose there are only two actions that you can take. Please tell us which one you would prefer to take.
  - 1 = I would accompany her to the police to report the incident
  - 0 = One of the following:
    - \* I would calm her down and tell her that the situation is bound to get better
    - \* I would express my sympathy for her but would tell her that every couple has to work it out for themselves
    - \* I would advise her to try harder to please her husband and things will likely improve
    - \* I would tell her that beating is often a sign of love and that she should try to work it out with her husband

*Reporting Index (Columns 9-10)*

- The index is created by summing the variables Involve Parents, Involve Counselor, Involve Village Leader and Report Police and then dividing by 4

### Table 3

#### *Social Repercussions (Columns 1-2)*

- If you noticed your neighbor was beating his wife, and told other people about it, how would most of the people in your village react?
  - 0 = They would say that I did the right thing
  - 1 = They would scold me for gossiping and starting rumors

#### *Personal Retribution (Columns 3-4)*

- If you were to report such an incident to the a local leader (such as the LC1 or Nabakyala), do you think the family or friends of the husband would try to take revenge against you?
  - 0 = No
  - 1 = Yes

#### *Community Would Intervene (Columns 5-8)*

- If people in your community were to find out that a man was beating his wife or girlfriend, how would most of them react?
  - 0 = They would mind their own business and let the couple work it out on their own
  - 1 = They would either intervene themselves or get local leaders or the family to intervene

### Table 4

#### *Number of Incidents (Columns 1-3)*

- Take a moment to think back over life in your household since last Christmas. During that time, can you remember any incidents in which a woman in your household, including yourself, was a victim of violence? If Yes: How many specific incidents since last Christmas can you remember when a woman in your household, including yourself, was a victim of intra-household violence?
  - Integer

#### *Any Incidents (Columns 4-6)*

- Recoding of Number of Incidents.
  - 1 = Number of Incidents > 0
  - 0 = Number of Incidents = 0

#### *Violence Frequency (Columns 7-8)*

- In many of the villages we have visited, men sometimes beat women. Thinking again of the time that has passed since last Christmas, would you say that this has happened more than about once a week to a woman in your household, including yourself? If yes: Did it happen just about once a week, or almost every day? If no: Did it happen about once a month, less than once a month, or almost never?

- 0 = Almost never
- 1 = Less than once a month
- 2 = About once a month
- 3 = Just about once a week
- 4 = Almost every day

## D.2 Results in Appendix

### Table 15

See the description of Tables 4 to 3 above.

### Table 16

#### *Reporting Index (Column 1)*

- The index is created by summing the variables Involve Parents, Involve Counselor, Involve Village Leader and Report Police and then dividing by 4.
- See description of outcomes in Tables 1 and 2 above for description of individual items.

#### *Involve Parents (Column 2)*

See description of outcomes in Tables 1 and 2 above for more detail.

- Suppose you visit your cousin and she tells you that her husband beat her severely and asks you for help. Suppose there are only two actions that you can take. Please tell us which one you would prefer to take.
  - 1 = I would talk to her parents and ask them to come by to help the couple find a peaceful solution
  - 0 = One of the following:
    - \* I would calm her down and tell her that the situation is bound to get better
    - \* I would express my sympathy for her but would tell her that every couple has to work it out for themselves
    - \* I would advise her to try harder to please her husband and things will likely improve
    - \* I would tell her that beating is often a sign of love and that she should try to work it out with her husband

#### *Involve Counselor (Column 3)*

See description of outcomes in Tables 1 and 2 above for more detail.

- Suppose you visit your cousin and she tells you that her husband beat her severely and asks you for help. Suppose there are only two actions that you can take. Please tell us which one you would prefer to take.
  - 1 = I would notify the Nabakyala and ask her to mediate the dispute (If respondent is Nabakyala: I would try to mediate the dispute in my role as Nabakyaala)
  - 0 = One of the following:
    - \* I would calm her down and tell her that the situation is bound to get better



- \* I would express my sympathy for her but would tell her that every couple has to work it out for themselves
- \* I would advise her to try harder to please her husband and things will likely improve
- \* I would tell her that beating is often a sign of love and that she should try to work it out with her husband

*Personal Retribution (Column 4)*

- If you were to report such an incident to the a local leader (such as the LC1 or Nabakyala), do you think the family or friends of the husband would try to take revenge against you?
  - 0 = No
  - 1 = Yes

**Tables 17 and 18**

*Any Incidents (Columns 1-2 in Table 17)*

- Recoding of Number of Incidents (see description of Table 4 above)
  - 1 = Number of Incidents > 0
  - 0 = Number of Incidents = 0

*Reporting Index (Columns 3-4 in Table 17 and Columns 1-2 in Table 18)*

- The index is created by summing the variables Involve Parents, Involve Counselor, Involve Village Leader and Report Police and then dividing by 4.
- See description of outcomes in Tables 1 and 2 above for description of individual items.

*Social Repercussions (Column 5 in Table 17 and Column 3 in Table 18)*

- If you noticed your neighbor was beating his wife, and told other people about it, how would most of the people in your village react?
  - 0 = They would say that I did the right thing
  - 1 = They would scold me for gossiping and starting rumors

**Table 19**

See description of Table 4 above.

**Tables 20 to 23**

See description of Tables 4 to 3 above.

**Tables 24 and 25**

See description of Tables 17 and 18 above.

**Table 26**

See description of Table 4 above.

**Table 28**

See text above Table 28.

## Tables 29 and 30

See description of Figure 5 above.

### Table 31

*Number of Incidents (Comm.) (Columns 1-2)*

Midline:

- As far as you know, roughly how many times has someone been badly hurt or beaten in your community since last Christmas? Just give your best guess. Of those incidents, how many of them involved a woman being beaten?

– Integer

Endline:

- As far as you know, roughly how many times has someone been badly hurt or beaten in your community since last September? Just give your best guess. Of those incidents, how many of them involved a woman being beaten?

– Integer

*Any Incidents (Comm.) (Columns 3-4)*

- Same question as Number of Incidents (Comm.)

– 1 = Number of Incidents (Comm.) > 0

– 0 = Number of Incidents (Comm.) = 0

*Viol. Freq. (Comm.) (Columns 5-6)*

- In many of the villages we have visited, husbands sometimes beat their wives. Thinking back over the past two months, would you say that this happened more than about once a week in your community? If yes: Did it happen just about once a week, or almost every day? If no: Did it happen about once a month, less than once a month, or almost never?

– 0 Almost never

– 1 Less than once a month

– 2 About once a month

– 3 Just about once a week

– 4 Almost every day

*Number of Incidents (VHT) (Columns 7-8)*

Midline:

- Since September, how many people have come to you with the following concerns? Violence against a woman in the family

– Integer

Endline:

- Since December 2016, how many people have come to you with the following concerns? Violence against a woman in the family

– Integer

### Table 32

*N EL W*

Same variable as Number of Incidents in Table 4.

- Take a moment to think back over life in your household since last Christmas. During that time, can you remember any incidents in which a woman in your household, including yourself, was a victim of violence? If Yes: How many specific incidents since last Christmas can you remember when a woman in your household, including yourself, was a victim of intra-household violence?

– Integer

*Frq ML and Frq EL*

Same variable as Viol. Freq. (Comm.) in Table 31.

- In many of the villages we have visited, husbands sometimes beat their wives. Thinking back over the past two months, would you say that this happened more than about once a week in your community? If yes: Did it happen just about once a week, or almost every day? If no: Did it happen about once a month, less than once a month, or almost never?

– 0 Almost never

– 1 Less than once a month

– 2 About once a month

– 3 Just about once a week

– 4 Almost every day

*Cnt ML and Cnt EL*

Same variable as Number of Incidents (Comm.) in Table 31.

Midline:

- As far as you know, roughly how many times has someone been badly hurt or beaten in your community since last Christmas? Just give your best guess. Of those incidents, how many of them involved a woman being beaten?

– Integer

Endline:

- As far as you know, roughly how many times has someone been badly hurt or beaten in your community since last September? Just give your best guess. Of those incidents, how many of them involved a woman being beaten?

– Integer

*Cnt VHT*

Same as variable as Number of Incidents (VHT) in Table 31.

Midline:

- Since September, how many people have come to you with the following concerns? Violence against a woman in the family

- Integer

Endline:

- Since December 2016, how many people have come to you with the following concerns?  
Violence against a woman in the family

- Integer

## Tables 34 and 35

### *Any Incidents*

- Recoding of Number of Incidents (see description of Table 4).
  - 1 = Number of Incidents > 0
  - 0 = Number of Incidents = 0

## Table 36

### *VAW Not Acceptable*

This outcome is an Index which created of the four items listed below. All respondents were asked the first item (disobey) but only one of the other three items. VAW Not Acceptable is created by averaging the two questions that a respondent was asked.

- In your opinion, does a man have a good reason to hit his wife if she disobeys him? If yes: Should she be slapped or should more force be used than that? If no: What if she persists in disobeying the husband? Does he then have good reason to hit her?
  - 0 = More force than that
  - $\frac{1}{3}$  = Slapped
  - $\frac{2}{3}$  = Yes
  - 1 = No
- In your opinion, does a man have a good reason to hit his wife if she spends a lot of time chatting with friends in the market?
  - 0 = Yes
  - 1 = No
- In your opinion, does a man have a good reason to hit his wife if she does not complete her household work to his satisfaction?
  - 0 = Yes
  - 1 = No
- In your opinion, does a man have a good reason to hit his wife if he is under immense financial pressure and becomes angry when she asks for money to buy food for the family?
  - 0 = Yes
  - 1 = No

*Reporting Index*

- The index is created by summing the variables Parents, Counselor, LC1 Chairperson and Police and then dividing by 4.
- See description of outcomes in Tables 1 and 2 above for description of individual items.

*Any Incidents*

- Recoding of Number of Incidents (see description of Table 4).
  - 1 = Number of Incidents  $> 0$
  - 0 = Number of Incidents = 0

## **E Supplementary Information**

This section of the appendix provides non-statistical information not included in the main text of the article.

- Subsection E.1 addresses the ethical considerations involved in the intervention and data collection strategies.
- Subsection E.2 explains the model specifications used in the main analyses, the meaning of the rows at the bottom of the tables, and how summary statistics are calculated.
- Subsection E.3 explains the narrative of the three anti-VAW videos employed in the campaign.
- Subsection E.4 provides a collection of anti-VAW mass media campaigns from around the world.

### **E.1 Ethical Considerations**

Given the sensitivity of the topic of violence against women, we took a number of steps to ensure that both our intervention and our data collection strategies were protective of participants' rights and wellbeing.

Focusing firstly on the intervention, one potential concern centers on the risk of retraumatization. Our treatment videos directly depict violence, in the form of slapping, and might thereby trigger recollections of violence among those who view them. Several facts mitigate this concern, however.

First, we vetted our messages extensively in order to reduce retraumatization risks. We conducted three days of focus groups on the videos among different age and gender groups with roughly 60 people in two rural Ugandan villages not included in the study. These focus groups provided feedback that we used to make the videos more believable and relatable, but also provided an opportunity to ascertain whether any of the messaging would be traumatic or culturally inappropriate. We did not see any evidence that the messaging was troubling to viewers. In one-on-one presentations of the films, respondents who did reveal that they had experienced such violence themselves praised the content of the film and expressed the wish that their husband or partner could also see it.

Moreover, the commonness with which gruesome violence is depicted in Ugandan media bolstered our belief that the violence depicted in our videos would not be out of the ordinary. Depictions of very severe violence and its consequences are common in mainstream fictional and news television programming in Uganda. In this sense, the violence depicted in the short vignettes is likely in keeping with audiences' expectations about the sorts of violent depictions they might see when consuming mainstream entertainment. We shared scripts and early cuts with prominent Ugandan NGOs specialized in the prevention of intimate partner violence. Their reviews and commentary helped ensure continuity with other interventions aimed at preventing VAW in Uganda.

Despite these efforts, we cannot entirely remove the risk that viewers were traumatized by the violent depictions in the videos. This is true for many if not all media campaigns to counter violence against women. In section E.4 of the appendix we provide a review of anti-VAW media campaigns from around the world. Many of these depict violence very graphically, without recourse to trigger warnings. A claim often made in defense of such messaging strategies is that the potentially life-saving benefits of preventing violence against women outweigh the risks of traumatization.

In addition to retraumatization risks from the intervention itself, we were also mindful of the risks that measurement of IPV-related outcomes can pose to subjects (Ellsberg et al., 2001). Of particular concern is the risk of retaliation by a partner who feels compromised by the answers the respondent provides. We took a number of steps to minimize such risks.

First and foremost, before asking respondents about violence in their household we remind them that they are under no obligation to answer if they do not feel comfortable doing so. Enumerators are trained to interview women out of earshot of their partners, in a private room in their own homes. To maximize the possibility that men remained unaware of the questions we were asking women, we did not ask men about incidents of violence in their own homes, and only interviewed one person per household.

Moreover, our questions pose little risk to individuals because they do not focus on any particular person. The violence question is worded as follows: "Take a moment to think back over life in your household since last Christmas. During that time, can you remember any incidents in which a woman in your household, including yourself, was a victim of violence?" Thus, a respondent can answer it without necessarily indicating who was the victim. We ask no questions about perpetrators. A respondent is thus able to answer the questions without inculcating their partners

or directly revealing their own victimization experiences.

Finally, prior to any research activities the protocol for our intervention and for our data collection strategy underwent extensive ethical review by the Columbia University IRB, the Mildmay Uganda Research Ethics Committee (MUREC), and the Uganda National Council for Science and Technology (UNCST).

## **E.2 Explanatory Note on Main Tables**

Unless otherwise indicated, analyses use individual respondents from our household surveys as the unit of observation. Some analyses are conducted at the village level, after collapsing individual responses to the cluster level using cluster-level means. Where applicable, this is indicated in the row labeled “Analysis Level” in the respective tables. Information about the sample on which analyses are conducted is included in the table caption and in the row “Sample”. “All W” stands for “All Women” and “W. compl.” stands for “Women compliers”.  $HH$  stands for all respondents from the household survey,  $HH(M)$  stands for men respondents from the household survey and  $VHT$  stands for our surveys with members of Village Health Teams.

For all individual-level analyses, standard errors are clustered at the level of the village. As specified in our pre-analysis plan, all analyses condition on the average audience size over the six screenings and all analyses run on the individual level condition on an indicator for whether the respondent was included in follow-up sampling. Specifications with “Block FE” include an indicator variable for the cluster’s block. No other covariates are included unless this is indicated in the table. Specifications with “Covariates” also include a set of covariates which are taken from the endline and selected through a lasso regression procedure as explained in our pre-analysis plan.

All  $p$ -values are calculated using the pre-registered randomization test in which the treatment is permuted 3,000 times to simulate effects under the sharp null hypothesis of no effects for all units. The row labeled “Hypothesis” in each table indicates the direction of the hypothesis test (two-tailed, lower, upper) for each column. As pre-registered, outcome values that are missing at the respondent-level are imputed using the pre-registered multiple imputation through chained equations (MICE) approach, conditioning only on outcomes from the same family. We show in section B.3 above that the results are robust to using a listwise deletion approach to missingness (no imputation).



### **E.3 Narrative for Anti-VAW Videos**

The plot structure involves two parallel stories of violence against women. Whereas one ends tragically, in the other, community intervention prevents the continuation of violence. The first vignette revolves around Miriam, a middle-aged woman whom we see returning home from choir practice. As she begins to prepare dinner for her family, the focus shifts to her husband Richard, standing in line at the local mill. Having deposited his sack of maize at the mill, Richard overhears two other villagers discussing his inadequacy for a position on the local savings cooperative Richard had been seeking. Visibly upset, Richard returns home and orders his wife to make him tea. Quick thereafter, he demands a bath. Sensing her husband's tension, Miriam hurries to obey his commands. Yet, given the unavailability of a second kettle, she is forced to choose between preparing the tea and the bath and prioritizes the latter. Richard ignores her attempted explanation, becoming more and more upset until he begins to beat her. We see a neighbor emerge from her house, alerted by Miriam's cries. She sighs at Richard's actions, making clear this is not the first time that the neighbor has overheard Richard beating his wife. She pauses as if weighing what to do but ultimately takes no action. It is implied that the neighbor could have intervened at this point, even in the absence of a cry for help by the victim.



Figure 4: Excerpts from the Anti-VAW media campaign.

From top: a neighbor overhears the horrific screams of a woman experiencing a violent attack by her husband nextdoor but fails to report it to those who could intervene; after an initial violent incident in which Richard beats his wife, he eventually becomes so violent that one day she is hospitalized; the family of the woman who experienced violence intervenes in a couple's affairs, and report the issue further to the woman's counselor (*Nabakyala*).

The second vignette is set in a hospital room. Miriam lies in bed breathing through an oxygen mask, surrounded by her family. The narrator explains that Richard's beating is responsible for Miriam's condition. We hear Richard's thoughts as he regrets his lack of self-restraint, and those of Miriam's parents, who wish that they had intervened when Miriam reached out. The video also depicts the emotional pain of Miriam's daughter who has witnessed Richard's attack. The vignette ends with Miriam's parents mourning her death.

At the beginning of the third vignette, we watch Miriam's funeral while the narrator recalls what happened. The story then shifts to a neighboring village where we encounter another family with a similar problem. Again, we are introduced to a wife who is beaten by her husband when he is frustrated for reasons beyond her control and in spite of her efforts to please him. This time, however, the wife receives help from her parents to whom she reaches out.<sup>6</sup>

Her parents arrive in the family's home, and we see the father talking to his son-in-law, giving him advice on how to find peaceful solutions when conflict arises. The mother consoles her daughter, reminding her violence against women is unacceptable. The family consults the women representative of the village, who steps in and monitors the situation. The video closes with the situation improving.

At the end of each video, the narrator reaffirms the need for community members to take action when encountering violence against women.

---

<sup>6</sup>In principle, this may be construed as putting the onus on victims to solve their own problems, rather than portraying the society or the state as responsible for adopting a proactive stance against VAW. However, it is worth emphasizing that this narrative choice does not reflect a normative statement about victims' responsibilities, but a positive description on the part of the Ugandan scriptwriter to accurately reflect the difficulties such situations pose. In many cases, only the victim may know about a violent incident, and so it may indeed be necessary for victims to speak out.

## E.4 Anti-VAW Media Campaigns Around the World

Campaign	Country	Implementer	URL
Alokam	Arab States	UN Women Regional Office for Arab States	<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o2Wt0CmpgyQ">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o2Wt0CmpgyQ</a>
Strong Hands Stop VAWG	Thailand	Bangkok Mass Transit Authority	<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6YyvNQiaqd0">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6YyvNQiaqd0</a>
How to Be More Than a Bystander	Canada	Ending Violence Association	<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AlcRzaaZaqw">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AlcRzaaZaqw</a>
Isn't It Time Someone Called CUT!	UK	Women's Aid	<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j4RjsqPYaS0">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j4RjsqPYaS0</a>
Rape - It's Your Fault	India	All India Bakchod	<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8hC0Ng_ajpY">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8hC0Ng_ajpY</a>
Le film choc	France	Fédération Nationale Solidarité Femmes	<a href="https://vimeo.com/17086120">https://vimeo.com/17086120</a>
Monsters in the Closet	USA	National violence against women Hotline	<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LbRba9XHKKw">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LbRba9XHKKw</a>
Stairs	Germany	Bundesverband Frauenberatungsstellen und Frauennotrufe	<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l7HqwAleUQg">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l7HqwAleUQg</a>
Ring the Bell - Bell Bajao	India	Breakthrough, Ministry of Women and Child Development, UNIFEM, UN Trust Fund	<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9t3BPv8tBP4">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9t3BPv8tBP4</a>
The Johannesburg Drums Experiment	South Africa	People Opposing Women Abuse	<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BW30WslahMc">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BW30WslahMc</a>
Who Are You?	New Zealand	Who Are You Campaign	<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iUj2OHLAG3w">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iUj2OHLAG3w</a>
Who Will You Help?	Canada	Ontario Government	<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=opPb2E3bkoo">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=opPb2E3bkoo</a>
It Rarely Stops	USA	National violence against women Hotline	<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WL3rfk2iFww">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WL3rfk2iFww</a>
Do You See Her?	UK	Women's Aid	<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sk0YJsDXx24">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sk0YJsDXx24</a>
Ring the Bell	China	UN Women	<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=abkj99Zx8Kg">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=abkj99Zx8Kg</a>
Violencia de Género	Mexico	Tecate Beer	<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f9E5h_i_KYA">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f9E5h_i_KYA</a>
violence against women Awareness, Prevention and Support	USA	Mexican Consulate	<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u8kzV9abPbw">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u8kzV9abPbw</a>
No More	USA	NFL	<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rTJT3fVv1vU">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rTJT3fVv1vU</a>
Marie et Fred	Belgium	Wallonia-Brussels Federation	<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aj27cA6irvU">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aj27cA6irvU</a>

Table 27: Examples of anti-VAW media campaigns from around the world.

Trigger warning: Videos contain depictions of graphic violence.

All videos accessed the 28th of November 2017.

## F Supplementary Analyses

This section of the appendix reports extra analyses that support arguments made in the paper.

- Subsection F.1 provides evidence from a survey experiment that priming respondents to think that they are not the only ones who have observed a hypothetical incident of VAW increases

their willingness to report the hypothetical incident to local authorities. This evidence is referenced in section 2 of the main text.

- Subsection F.2 provides the full tables underlying the coefficient plot (Figure 5) in the paper. As in the plot, none of the analyses exhibit statistically significant effects.
- Subsection F.3 reports the effect of the treatment on peoples' perception of the prevalence of violence in their communities. While we see very little evidence of an effect, this subsection also shows that the correlation between the rate of violence provided in firsthand victimization accounts and respondents' perceptions of prevalence is low, suggesting people are not well-informed about the true rate of violence in their communities (in line with the idea that violent offenders are able to render their crimes difficult to detect).
- Subsection F.4 presents our method for extrapolating estimates of the total number of households in which the campaign is estimated to have prevented violence from occurring over the six-month period preceding our endline survey. We estimate that a total of 302 households did not experience any violence as a result of the campaign, which is equivalent to six households in each of the 48 villages where we screened the anti-VAW videos.
- Subsection F.5 shows how the effect of the campaign on violence against women varies by whether the respondent had been interviewed before or for the first time when interviewed in the endline, and by socio-economic status. Both interactions are insignificant and are signed in a direction that lends no support to the notion that the reduction in violence is a measurement artefact due to priming or fear of anticipated sanctions against a partner, respectively. Note we estimate heterogeneity by socio-economic status among panel compliers because we do not have the necessary covariates to compute this index for the compliers who were in our endline but not our midline survey, as these covariates were typically merged in from the midline responses.
- Subsection F.6 illustrates that correlations among the main outcomes are very low. In a world where respondents reported a reduction in violence because they were aiming to please researchers, we should expect these correlations to be high. Thus, the subsection presents additional evidence against the effect being a measurement artefact.

## F.1 Other Witnesses Increase Willingness to Report

One reason that witnesses do not speak out about VAW seems to be the expectation that reports of VAW will be doubted and that those who come forward will face social sanctions for gossiping. If so, we may expect bystanders to be more willing to report if other community members also know that violence took place and are able to confirm the bystander’s report. Knowing that others also know about the incident may reduce a bystander’s concern about not being believed.

To test this prediction, we included the following survey experiment in our endline survey. Respondents were presented with a hypothetical scenario in which, while walking home, they observe a neighbor beating his wife. At random, respondents were asked one of the following two questions:

- (Others Observe = 0): Suppose **you know that you are the only one who has observed the incident**, would you report it to a local leader (such as the village leader or women’s counselor)?
- (Others Observe = 1): Suppose **you see a group of people from your community standing nearby, discussing the incident**, would you report it to a local leader (such as the village leader or women’s counselor)?

	Would Report IPV Incident		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Others Observe	0.041** (0.023)	0.043** (0.023)	0.061** (0.033)
Anti-VAW Media		0.040* (0.019)	0.061** (0.031)
Others Observe x Anti-VAW Media			-0.042 (0.044)
Control Mean	0.81	0.79	0.79
Block FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,041	1,041	1,041
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.0005	0.003	0.003

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table 28: The effect of bystander presence on willingness to report hypothetical incident of VAW among compliers (endline).

Table 28 reports the results of this survey experiment and how it interacts with our media campaign. Columns 1-3 illustrate that, in line with our expectation, the presence of other community members in a hypothetical incident of VAW increases the proclivity to report the incident to village level authorities by about 4 percentage points ( $p < .05$ ). Consistent with tables 1 and 2, the anti-VAW campaign has about the same magnitude of effect on the proclivity to report.<sup>7</sup> It is important to note that the coefficient on the interaction between the presence of other community members and the anti-VAW media, while not very precisely estimated, is negative. In other words, the presence of others in a hypothetical incident of VAW appears to matter for the willingness to report the incident among respondents in the control group, but not necessarily for those in the treatment group. This evidence supports the notion that our treatment weakened anti-disclosure norms and lessened the risk to those who come forward.<sup>8</sup>

## F.2 Tables for Coefficient Plot (Figure 5)

	VAW Not Acceptable		Women Suffer Greatly	Violence Spirals Out of Control	Support Gender Equality	
	Midline	Endline	Endline	Endline	Midline	Endline
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Anti-VAW Media	-0.010 (0.018)	0.001 (0.015)	0.012 (0.030)	0.015 (0.026)	0.008 (0.017)	-0.013 (0.019)
Control Mean	0.82	0.86	0.71	0.19	0.24	0.67
RI $p$ -values	0.693	0.493	0.354	0.318	0.333	0.731
Hypothesis	Upr	Upr	Lwr	Upr	Upr	Upr
Block FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	720	720	720	720	720	720
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	-0.003	0.001	-0.002	0.003	0.007	-0.006

\* $p < 0.1$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.01$

Table 29: Table of results for first panel of Figure 5 (Men Compliers).

<sup>7</sup>While the marginal effect of the treatment on this measure of reporting proclivity is similar to effects on the reporting outcomes reported on tables 1 and 2, it should be noted that the baselines are quite different. The additive index indicates respondents give pro-reporting responses in about 40% of questions in the control, whereas the free-riding vignette exhibits baseline pro-reporting responses at rate of over 80%. The latter asked respondents whether they would report a hypothetical case of violence against women to a local leader (yes or no), rather than offering a potentially more attractive alternative answer as in the paired vignettes that form the additive reporting index.

<sup>8</sup>While in line with our theory, these findings run counter to the literature on the “bystander effect” in social psychology, which finds that the presence of others decreases the proclivity of bystanders to intervene in an emergency due to free-riding (Fischer et al., 2011).

	VAW Not Acceptable		Women Suffer Greatly	Violence Spirals Out of Control	Support Gender Equality	
	Midline	Endline	Endline	Endline	Midline	Endline
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Anti-VAW Media	0.007 (0.026)	0.033 (0.029)	0.027 (0.038)	0.062 (0.054)	-0.018 (0.026)	-0.014 (0.026)
Control Mean	0.75	0.75	0.85	0.26	0.4	0.65
RI <i>p</i> -values	0.428	0.188	0.269	0.125	0.726	0.692
Hypothesis	Upr	Upr	Lwr	Upr	Upr	Upr
Block FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	321	321	321	321	321	321
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	-0.008	-0.011	0.037	-0.023	-0.014	0.006

\**p*<0.1; \*\**p*<0.05; \*\*\**p*<0.01

Table 30: Table of results for second panel of Figure 5 (Women Compliers).

### F.3 Effects on Community-Level Measures of Violence

In this section we report the effects of the anti-VAW campaign among other measures to that reported in the main results table 4.

Table 31 reports the effects of the anti-VAW campaign on community-level perceptions of the prevalence of VAW. Columns 1-2 record the number of times that respondents believe women in their community were beaten over the preceding three and six months, respectively.<sup>9</sup> Columns 3-4 report results on a binary transformation of the variables in columns 1-2, where 1 indicates any number greater than 0, 0 otherwise. Columns 5-6 record whether respondents believe women in their community are beaten: almost every day (coded 4), around once a week (coded 3), about once a month (coded 2), less than once a month (coded 1), or almost never (coded 0). The final two columns record the number of times village health team (VHT) members report that individuals came to them about episodes of violence against a woman in the family over the preceding three and six months, respectively. There is no statistically significant effect on any outcome, among any of the subsets (see caption for explanation of subsetting).

<sup>9</sup>In the midline survey, respondents were asked about the number of times a women had been beaten “since September.” In the endline survey, respondents were asked about the number times a women had been beaten “since Christmas.”



	Number of Incidents (Comm.)		Any Incidents (Comm.)		Viol. Freq. (Comm.)		Number of Incidents (VHT)	
	Midline	Endline	Midline	Endline	Midline	Endline	Midline	Endline
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Anti-VAW Media	-0.056 (0.076)	-0.036 (0.120)	0.010 (0.023)	-0.005 (0.028)	0.043 (0.057)	-0.057 (0.117)	-0.088 (0.544)	0.921 (2.237)
Control Mean	0.66	1.02	0.31	0.45	1.37	1.57	3.09	9.79
RI <i>p</i> -values	0.475	0.759	0.655	0.859	0.449	0.63	0.869	0.69
Hypothesis	Two	Two	Two	Two	Two	Two	Two	Two
Sample	HH	HH	HH	HH	HH	HH (M)	VHT	VHT
Block FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	110	110	110	110	110	110	112	111
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	-0.085	0.006	-0.089	0.128	0.097	-0.034	0.055	-0.026

\**p*<0.1; \*\**p*<0.05; \*\*\**p*<0.01

Table 31: The effect of anti-VAW mass media on perceptions of the prevalence of violence against women.

Analyses in columns 1 to 5 are run on reports from all household respondents (not only compliers). Estimates in columns 6 are based on all male household respondents. Estimates in columns 7 and 8 are based on reports by members of Village Health Teams. All analyses are conducted at the village level, after collapsing individual responses to the cluster level using cluster-level means. See section E.2 of the appendix for details on model specifications and section D of the appendix for details on question wording.

While the results presented in Table 31 would appear to undercut the main results presented in Table 4 of section 5, we believe that the community-level measures simply do not present a reliable measure of the true underlying rate of violence, due in part to the private nature of VAW. Table 32 illustrates the unreliability of these measures, indicating the low correlation between reports at the village-level. While correlations are reasonably high among the same groups (men, women, VHTs) at different times or across different questions, correlations among these groups are typically very low, rarely exceeding .2. Thus, we are more inclined to believe results on individuals' self-reported victimization than on community-wide estimates, which appear to exhibit a high degree of measurement error.

	N EL W	Frq EL W	Frq EL M	Cnt EL M	Frq ML M	Frq ML W	Cnt ML M	Cnt ML W	Cnt ML VHT	Cnt EL VHT
N EL W	1.00	0.17	0.23	0.13	0.18	0.16	0.07	0.14	-0.03	-0.01
Frq EL W	0.17	1.00	0.17	0.08	0.05	0.16	0.05	0.10	0.00	-0.15
Frq EL M	0.23	0.17	1.00	0.46	0.45	0.06	0.28	0.07	-0.04	0.19
Cnt EL M	0.13	0.08	0.46	1.00	0.42	0.25	0.40	0.13	-0.09	0.26
Frq ML M	0.18	0.05	0.45	0.42	1.00	0.25	0.47	0.19	0.04	0.13
Frq ML W	0.16	0.16	0.06	0.25	0.25	1.00	0.28	0.41	0.04	0.14
Cnt ML M	0.07	0.05	0.28	0.40	0.47	0.28	1.00	0.10	0.08	0.06
Cnt ML W	0.14	0.10	0.07	0.13	0.19	0.41	0.10	1.00	-0.05	0.09
Cnt ML VHT	-0.03	0.00	-0.04	-0.09	0.04	0.04	0.08	-0.05	1.00	0.21
Cnt EL VHT	-0.01	-0.15	0.19	0.26	0.13	0.14	0.06	0.09	0.21	1.00

Table 32: Correlation between perceptions of the prevalence of violence against women, across genders, survey rounds and samples.

All correlations are across clusters, calculated by first collapsing to the cluster level by taking the mean. ‘N EL W’ is the number of times that women in the endline recall a woman in their household, including themselves, having been beaten over the preceding 6 months; ‘Frq EL W’ and ‘Frq EL M’ are the perceived frequency with which women and men respondents in the endline believe women in their community are beaten, respectively, with ‘Frq ML W’ and ‘Frq ML M’ measuring the same outcomes at midline; ‘Cnt EL M’, ‘Cnt ML M’ and ‘Cnt ML W’ measure the number of times men in the endline, men in the midline, and women in the midline can recall a woman in their community having been beaten over the preceding 3, respectively 6, months; ‘Cnt ML VHT’ and ‘Cnt EL VHT’ measure responses to the same question given by members of the village health team.

#### F.4 Extrapolation of Main Results on Violence

In order to estimate the number of households within which the anti-VAW messaging prevented violence from occurring, we take the following steps:

1. **Estimate the proportion of complier households in treated clusters** by taking the average number of respondents who report having seen at least one film when asked during the midline survey in clusters that had anti-VAW messaging in them.
2. **Estimate the number of complier and non-complier households in the sample frame of treated clusters** by summing the product of, on the one hand, the number of households listed in each cluster where anti-VAW messaging took place, and, on the other, the corresponding proportion of compliers and non-compliers as calculated in 1.
3. **Estimate the effect of the treatment on the probability of VAW in the household over the past six months** among both complier and non-complier women in the endline, by subsetting to the respective groups.
4. **Estimate the number of households that did not experience violence** among complier and non-complier households by multiplying the corresponding quantities calculated in 2 and 3. The total number of households in which violence was prevented is estimated by summing these two numbers.

Using these methods we estimate that VAW was prevented in a total of 302 households. Our VAW treatment was implemented in 48 villages: expressed in per-village terms, we thus estimate we prevented VAW in 6 households per village in which our campaign took place.

We characterize statistical uncertainty around this estimate through bootstrapping. While the number of households in the sample frame is a known quantity, the proportion of complier households (estimated in step 1) and the effect of the treatment among complier and non-complier subgroups (step 3) are both subject to uncertainty generated by the sampling procedure. We conduct the following steps 3,000 times:

1. **Bootstrap the midline data** by resampling respondents within their clusters with replacement.
2. Repeat steps 1-2 as above.
3. **Bootstrap the endline data** by resampling respondents within their clusters with replacement.
4. Repeat steps 3-4 as above, and store results.

This procedure gives a bootstrap distribution for three statistics of interest: the number of complier households that did not experience VAW over the preceding six months due to the treatment,

the number of non-complier households that did not experience VAW over the preceding six months due to the treatment, and the total number of households within which VAW was prevented over the six months preceding the endline. Table 33 presents the 95% confidence intervals generated by taking the 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles from the bootstrap distributions of the statistics.

	Compliers	Non-Compliers	Weighted Combination
2.5%	-268	-339	-534
97.5%	-64	102	-52

Table 33: Percentiles from distribution of bootstrapped extrapolations of treatment effect on household violence probability among treated villages.

## F.5 Heterogeneity of Main Effect on Violence

	Any Incidents
Anti-VAW Media	-0.129** (0.052)
Socioeconomic Status	-0.029 (0.030)
Socioeconomic Status x Anti-VAW Media	-0.015 (0.058)
Control Mean	0.31
RI <i>p</i> -values VAW	0.015
RI <i>p</i> -values Interaction	0.796
Hypothesis	Two
Sample	Compliers
Block FE	Yes
Observations	321
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.018

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table 34: Heterogeneous effects of anti-VAW mass media on incidents of violence against women (endline).

The outcome is measured during the endline survey. The analysis is based on responses from women compliers in the endline survey and uses individual respondents as the unit of observation. See section E.2 of the appendix for details on model specifications and section D of the appendix for details on question wording. *Socioeconomic Status* is a latent measure of a respondent's socioeconomic status which summarizes the following five covariates and has been obtained through factor analysis: *Illiterate* is an indicator for whether the respondent says that she cannot read or write (endline). *Living Conditions* reflects the enumerator's assessment (endline) of how the respondent's living conditions compare to those of others in the village (0 = Much Worse, 1 = Worse, 2 = Same, 3 = better, 4 = much better). *Highest Grade* measures the highest education level attained by the respondent (endline) ranging from 0 (No education) to 16 (university). *N children HH* measures the number of children living in the household (midline). *Asset Index* is an additive index of five items that ask whether the respondent's household owns a TV, a radio, a chair, a sofa or a motorcycle and an indicator for whether the walls of the respondent's house are made of a material other than mud (midline). The index ranges from 0 to 1.

	Any Incidents
Anti-VAW Media	-0.152 (0.137)
Interviewed in Midline	-0.043 (0.107)
Anti-VAW Media x Interviewed Midline	0.022 (0.140)
Control Mean	0.32
RI $p$ -values	0.294
Hypothesis	two
Block FE	Yes
Observations	356
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.027

\* $p < 0.1$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.01$

Table 35: Heterogeneity of main violence finding by whether respondent was interviewed in midline. Results estimated among all compliers in endline.

## F.6 Correlations Among Key Outcomes

	VAW Not Acceptable	Reporting Index	Any Incidents
VAW Not Acceptable	1.00	0.06	-0.05
Reporting Index	0.06	1.00	0.03
Any Incidents	-0.05	0.03	1.00

Table 36: Correlations among women between attitudes toward the moral status of VAW, attitudes toward reporting of VAW, and number of reported VAW incidents in the household.  $N = 1,036$ .

## References

- Ellsberg, Mary, Lori Heise, Rodolfo Pena, Sonia Agurto, and Anna Winkvist. 2001. "Researching domestic violence against women: methodological and ethical considerations." *Studies in Family Planning* 32 (1): 1–16.
- Fischer, Peter, Joachim I. Krueger, Tobias Greitemeyer et al. 2011. "The bystander-effect: A meta-analytic review on bystander intervention in dangerous and non-dangerous emergencies." *Psychological Bulletin* 137 (4): 517.